Keyed PV signatures
First Claim
Patent Images
1. A computer-implemented method of enabling a second correspondent device to prove to a third party the authenticity of a signed message received from a first correspondent device, the method comprising:
- (a) obtaining the signed message at the second correspondent device comprising a confidential component;
(b) operating upon at least a portion of the signed message at the second correspondent device comprising the confidential component to generate a first value;
(c) generating a second value at the second correspondent device using the first value, a public value of the first correspondent device, and a private value of the second correspondent device;
(d) sending the second value by the second correspondent device to the third party, the third party coupled to the second correspondent device; and
(e) proving knowledge to the third party by the second correspondent of the private value of the second correspondent device by sending the second value for subsequent verification by the third party, the third party being configured to retrieve a decryption key from the second value to decrypt a portion of the signed message and accepting said portion as valid if decryption is successful.
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Abstract
A system and method enabling a recipient correspondent of a keyed PV signature to convert it to a signature with properties similar to a traditional signature (i.e., where the message is public and may be verified by anyone), removing the keyed aspect of the signature. The recipient correspondent may transfer the converted signature to a third party and provide the third party with a proof of knowledge such that the third party may be convinced that the originator of the signature signed the message.
35 Citations
19 Claims
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1. A computer-implemented method of enabling a second correspondent device to prove to a third party the authenticity of a signed message received from a first correspondent device, the method comprising:
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(a) obtaining the signed message at the second correspondent device comprising a confidential component; (b) operating upon at least a portion of the signed message at the second correspondent device comprising the confidential component to generate a first value; (c) generating a second value at the second correspondent device using the first value, a public value of the first correspondent device, and a private value of the second correspondent device; (d) sending the second value by the second correspondent device to the third party, the third party coupled to the second correspondent device; and (e) proving knowledge to the third party by the second correspondent of the private value of the second correspondent device by sending the second value for subsequent verification by the third party, the third party being configured to retrieve a decryption key from the second value to decrypt a portion of the signed message and accepting said portion as valid if decryption is successful. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
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10. A device for proving to a third party the authenticity of a signed message received from a first correspondent, the device being associated with a second correspondent, the device comprising a processor configured for:
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(a) obtaining the signed message at the device comprising a confidential component; (b) operating upon at least a portion of the signed message comprising the confidential component to generate a first value; (c) generating a second value using the first value, a public value of the first correspondent device, and a private value of the second correspondent device; (d) sending the second value to the third party, the third party coupled to the second correspondent; and (e) proving knowledge by the second correspondent to the third party of the private value of the second correspondent device by sending the second value for subsequent verification by the third party, the third party being configured to retrieve a decryption key from the second value to decrypt a portion of the signed message and accepting said portion as valid if decryption is successful. - View Dependent Claims (11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)
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19. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium comprising computer executable instructions for enabling a second correspondent device to prove to a third party the authenticity of a signed message received from a first correspondent device said computer executable instructions comprising instructions for:
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obtaining the signed message at the second correspondent device comprising a confidential component; operating upon at least a portion of the signed message at the second correspondent device comprising the confidential component to generate a first value; generating a second value at the second correspondent device using the first value, a public value of the first correspondent device, and a private value of the second correspondent device; sending the second value by the second correspondent device to the third party, the third party coupled to the second correspondent device; and proving knowledge to the third party by the second correspondent of the private value of the second correspondent device by sending the second value for subsequent verification by the third party, the third party being configured to retrieve a decryption key from the second value to decrypt a portion of the signed message and accepting said portion as valid if decryption is successful.
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Specification