Personal security manager for ubiquitous patient monitoring

• US 9,094,383 B2
• Filed: 06/10/2009
• Issued: 07/28/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 06/18/2008
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (Koninklijke Philips N.V.)
• Original Assignee: Koninklijke Philips N.V.
• Inventors: Garcia Morchon, Oscar, Baldus, Heribert, Huebner, Axel Guenther
• Primary Examiner(s): Kyle, Tamara T
• Application Number:
  US12/995,677
• Publication Number:
  US 20110145894A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,239 Days
• Field of Search: 726/4, 726/5, 726/6, 726/7, 726/26, 726/27
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/0022 Monitoring a patient using a global network, e.g. telephone networks, internet
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/0024 for multiple sensor units attached to the patient, e.g. using a body or personal area network
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6245 Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
• CPC Class Codes: G16H 10/60 for patient-specific data, e.g. for electronic patient records
• CPC Class Codes: G16H 40/40 for the management of medical equipment or devices, e.g. scheduling maintenance or upgrades
• CPC Class Codes: G16H 40/63 for local operation
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/88 Medical equipments
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/125 involving control of end-device applications over a network
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3273 for mutual authentication network architectures or network communication protocols for achieving mutual authentication in a packet data network H04L63/0869
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0433 Key management protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/08 Access security
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/12 Detection or prevention of fraud
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/122 Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices

Abstract

The present invention relates to a system and corresponding method for a secure end-to-end patient healthcare system which includes wireless medical sensors adapted to be attached to a patient'"'"'s body and in communication with each other forming a body sensor network within a wireless medical sensor network including one or more body sensor networks; λ-secure keying means incorporated into each wireless medical sensor for enabling secure communications between the wireless medical sensors, and a personal security manager within the body sensor network and in communication with the wireless medical sensors within the body sensor network, the personal security manager providing secure communications with backend services and providing security relationships within the body sensor network by means of the λ-secure keying means, wherein the λ-secure keying means are such that a coalition of no more than λ compromised wireless medical sensors conceals a pairwise key between any two non-compromised wireless medical sensors and provides protection against node compromise until λ+1 wireless medical sensors have been compromised.

Claims

1. A secure end-to-end patient healthcare system comprising:

at least two wireless medical sensors adapted to be attached to a patient'"'"'s body and in communication with each other forming a body sensor network within a wireless medical sensor network including one or more body sensor networks, the at least two wireless medical sensors including a first and a second wireless medical sensor;

a memory configured to store λ

-secure key material, the memory incorporated into each of said wireless medical sensors for enabling secure communications between said wireless medical sensors;

a personal security manager within the body sensor network and in communication with said one or more wireless medical sensors within said body sensor network, said personal security manager providing secure communications with backend services and providing security relationships within said body sensor network by use of said λ

-secure key material, wherein said λ

-secure key material ensures that a coalition of less than λ

compromised wireless medical sensors cannot calculate a pairwise key between any two non-compromised wireless medical sensors and the λ

-secure key material provides protection against wireless medical sensor compromise until λ

+1 wireless medical sensors have been compromised, the λ

-secure key material being generated by evaluating a bivariate polynomial of degree λ

; and

a healthcare card plugged into the personal security manager, wherein the healthcare card includes identification information and security information for secure communication with the backend healthcare services, wherein the personal security manager includes a certificate issued by a local trust center, and wherein the system is adapted to execute a security protocol for auditing and/or access control and/or privacy protection, and/or mutual authentication of the personal security manager with the healthcare card

wherein the first wireless medical sensor generates a pairwise key based on the λ

-secure key material , encrypts a message using the pairwise key, and sends the encrypted message to the second wireless medical sensor which decrypts the message using the pairwise key.

2. A secure end-to-end patient healthcare system, comprising:

a plurality of wireless medical sensors, including a first wireless medical sensor, adapted to be attached to a patient'"'"'s body and in communication with each other forming a body sensor network within a wireless medical sensor network including one or more body sensor networks, wherein information from the body sensor network is linked to the patient'"'"'s identity;

a memory incorporated into each of the wireless medical sensors to store λ

-secure key material which enables secure communications among said wireless medical sensors, said λ

-secure key material being such that a coalition of less than λ

compromised wireless medical sensors cannot calculate a pairwise key between any two non-compromised wireless medical sensors, enabling the λ

-secure key material to provide protection against wireless medical system compromise until λ

+1 wireless medical sensors have been compromised, said λ

-secure keys being generated by evaluating a polynomial of degree λ

;

a personal security manager within the body sensor network and in communication with the plurality of wireless medical sensors within said body sensor network, said personal security manager providing secure communications with backend services and using the λ

-secure key material to provide security relationships within said body sensor network; and

a patient healthcare card (HCC) which plugs into the personal security manager, the healthcare card including identification information and security information for secure communication with the backend healthcare services, wherein the personal security manager includes a certificate issued by a local trust center, and wherein the system is configured to execute a security protocol for auditing and/or access control and/or privacy protection, and/or mutual authentication of the personal security manager with the healthcare card wherein said patient healthcare card (HCC) and said personal security manager (PSM) form an extended personal security manager (PSMx) for connecting a number of wireless medical sensor network security domains to a pervasive healthcare system, said extended personal security manager being configured for;

storing said certificate issued by said local trust center,

storing said λ

-secure key material for establishing an end-to-end security communication issued by centralized healthcare services,

implementing said security protocol to enable mutual authentication of said extended personal security manager and said healthcare card, end-to-end security and/or auditing, and/or management of context access control and privacy policies, and

issuing λ

-secure key material to the first wireless medical sensor of the plurality of wireless medical sensors, the first wireless medical sensor encrypting sensed data with the λ

-secure key material and sending the encrypted sensed data to the personal security manager, the personal security manager decrypting the encrypted sensed data using the λ

-secure key material.

3. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 2, wherein said extended personal security manager is adapted for authenticating the personal security manager of the patient and patient'"'"'s healthcare card when the patient joins the medical sensor network.

4. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 2, wherein said personal security manager comprises a smart card reader adapted to receive said healthcare card, and wherein said healthcare card includes individual identification information and/or medical information and/or security material and/or security policies.

5. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 4, wherein said personal security manager includes a user'"'"'s name, identifier, security material, medical record or access control policies for different medical sensor networks.

6. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 4, wherein said extended personal security manager includes identification of a global user, patient area network, and individual electronic healthcare information (EHI), the electronic healthcare information (EHI) coming from said patient area network.

7. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 2, wherein security information stored on the healthcare card is provided for identifying and authenticating the user and acting as a bridge between the patient'"'"'s body sensor network and centralized or backend healthcare services.

8. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 2, wherein said extended personal security manager is a mobile phone with an additional smart card slot for the healthcare card.

9. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 2, further comprising an autonomous secure domain formed by the wireless medical sensor associated with a body sensor network, wherein said extended personal security manager is the body sensor network'"'"'s trust center and is adapted for controlling the secure association or revocation of the body sensor network'"'"'s members.

10. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 9, wherein said extended personal security manager and said wireless medical sensors are adapted for securely storing exchanged information and actions carried out in the body sensor network on the patient'"'"'s healthcare card even if connectivity to the medical sensor network trust center is lost.

11. A personal security manager for a secure end-to-end patient healthcare system, wherein the personal security manager is within a body sensor network and in communication with a plurality of wireless medical sensors within said body sensor network, said personal security manager providing secure communications with backend services and providing security relationships within said body sensor network by use of λ

-secure keys,

wherein the plurality of wireless medical sensors are adapted to be attached to a patient'"'"'s body and in communication with each other to form said body sensor network within a wireless medical sensor network including one or more body sensor networks;

a memory storing a λ

-secure key incorporated into each of said wireless medical sensors for enabling secure communications between said wireless medical sensors, the λ

-secure key comprising a λ

-secure keying material share provided by the personal security manager to the wireless medical sensors within the body sensor network, the wireless medical sensors encrypting sensed data with the λ

-secure keying material share and sending the encrypted sensed data to the personal security manager, the personal manager decrypting the encrypted sensed data, and

wherein said λ

-secure keys are such that a coalition of no more than λ

compromised wireless medical sensors cannot calculate a pairwise key between any two non-compromised wireless medical sensors and the λ

-secure keys provide protection against node compromise until λ

+1 wireless medical sensors have been compromised.

12. The secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 11, wherein the λ

-secure keys comprise λ

-secure keying material shares derived from a polynomial of at least degree λ

over a field.

13. secure end-to-end patient healthcare system of claim 12, wherein a pair of the wireless medical sensors may communicate pairwise autonomously without communication traveling through the PSM by use of the λ

-secure keys stored in the memory of each wireless medical sensor.