Logical partition media access control impostor detector

• US 9,130,987 B2
• Filed: 05/08/2012
• Issued: 09/08/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 12/24/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Keohane, Susann M., McBrearty, Gerald F., Mullen, Shawn P., Murillo, Jessica C., Shieh, Johnny M.
• Primary Examiner(s): HOLDER, BRADLEY W
• Application Number:
  US13/466,678
• Publication Number:
  US 20120222113A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,218 Days
• Field of Search: 713/150, 726 22- 23, 709223-224
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 43/10 Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1475 Passive attacks, e.g. eavesdropping or listening without modification of the traffic monitored
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1483 service impersonation, e.g. phishing, pharming or web spoofing detection of rogue wireless access points H04W12/12

Abstract

Provided are techniques for to enable a virtual input/output server (VIOS) to establish cryptographically secure signals with target LPARs to detect an imposter or spoofing LPAR. The secure signal, or “heartbeat,” may be configured as an Internet Key Exchange/Internet Protocol Security (IKE/IPSec) encapsulated packet (ESP) connection or tunnel. Within the tunnel, the VIOS pings each target LPAR and, if a heartbeat is interrupted, the VIOS makes a determination as to whether the tunnel is broken, the corresponding LPAR is down or a media access control (MAC) spoofing attach is occurring. The determination is made by sending a heartbeat that is designed to fail unless the heartbeat is received by a spoofing device.

Claims

1. A computing system, comprising:

a plurality of processors, at least one of which is a hardware processor;

a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, coupled to the plurality of processors; and

logic, stored on the computer-readable storage medium and executed on the plurality of processors, for;

establishing a plurality of cryptographically secure channels, each channel between a monitoring device and a corresponding monitored device of a plurality of monitored devices, each monitored device associated with unique address of a plurality of addresses;

transmitting a first heartbeat from the monitoring device to a first monitored device of the plurality of monitored devices via a first secure channel, corresponding to the first monitored device, of the plurality of secure channels;

determining that a response to the first heartbeat has not been received; and

in response to the determining that the first heartbeat has not been received, executing a spoofing detection scheme, comprising;

transmitting a second heartbeat to the first monitored device via an address associated with a second monitored device;

receiving a response to the second heartbeat;

determining that a spoofing attack has occurred in response to receiving the response to the second heartbeat; and

in response to a determination that a response to the second heartbeat has not been received, determining that either the first channel is broken or the first monitored device is inoperative.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the monitored devices are logical partitions (LPARs) of a computing device.

3. The system of claim 1, wherein the monitoring device is a virtual input/output server (VIOS) of the computing device.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the cryptographically secure channels are based on an Internet Key Exchange/Internet Protocol Security (IKI/IPSec) encapsulated packet (ESP) protocol.

5. A computing programming product, comprising:

a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium; and

logic, stored on the computer-readable storage medium for execution on a plurality of processors, at least one of which is a hardware processor, for;

establishing a plurality of cryptographically secure channels, each channel between a monitoring device and a corresponding monitored device of a plurality of monitored devices, each monitored device associated with unique address of a plurality of addresses;

transmitting a first heartbeat from the monitoring device to a first monitored device of the plurality of monitor devices via a first secure channel, corresponding to the first monitored device, of the plurality of secure channels;

determining that a response to the first heartbeat has not been received;

in response to the determining that the first heartbeat has not been received, executing a spoofing detection scheme, comprising;

transmitting a second heartbeat to the first monitored device via the corresponding unique address associated with a second monitored device;

receiving a response to the second heartbeat; and

determining that a spoofing attack has occurred in response to receiving the response to the second heartbeat; and

in response to a determination that a response to the second heartbeat has not been received, determining that either the first channel is broken or the first monitored device is inoperative.

6. The computing programming product of claim 5, wherein the monitored devices are logical partitions (LPARs) of a computing device.

7. The computing programming product of claim 5, wherein the monitoring device is a virtual input/output server (VIOS) of the computing device.

8. The computing programming product of claim 5, wherein the cryptographically secure channels are based on an Internet Key Exchange/Internet Protocol Security (IKE/IPSec) encapsulated packet (ESP) protocol.

9. A method, comprising:

establishing, by a plurality of processors, at least one of which is a hardware processor, a plurality of cryptographically secure channels, each channel between a monitoring device and a corresponding monitored device of a plurality of monitored devices, each monitored device associated with unique address of a plurality of addresses;

transmitting a first heartbeat from the monitoring device to a first monitored device of the plurality of monitored devices via a first secure channel, corresponding to the first monitored device, of the plurality of secure channels;

determining that a response to the first heartbeat has not been received;

in response to the determining that the first heartbeat has not been received, executing a spoofing detection scheme, comprising;

transmitting a second heartbeat to the first monitored device via an address associated with a second monitored device;

receiving a response to the second heartbeat; and

determining that a spoofing attack has occurred in response to receiving the response to the second heartbeat; and

in response to a determination that a response to the second heartbeat has not been received, determining that either the first channel is broken or the first monitored device is inoperative.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the monitored devices are logical partitions (LPARs) of a computing device.

11. The method of claim 9, wherein the monitoring device is a virtual input/output server (VIOS) of the computing device.

12. The method of claim 9, wherein the cryptographically secure channels are based on an Internet Key Exchange/Internet Protocol Security (IKE/IPSec) encapsulated packet (ESP) protocol.

13. A method, comprising:

establishing, by a plurality of processors, at least one of which is a hardware processor, a plurality of cryptographically secure channels, each channel between a monitoring device and a corresponding monitored device of a plurality of monitored devices, each monitored device associated with unique address of a plurality of addresses, wherein the cryptographically secure channels are based on an Internet Key Exchange/Internet Protocol Security (IKE/IPSec) encapsulated packet (ESP) protocol;

transmitting a first heartbeat from the monitoring device to a first monitored device of the plurality of monitored devices via a first secure channel, corresponding to the first monitored device, of the plurality of secure channels;

determining that a response to the first heartbeat has not been received;

in response to the determining that the first heartbeat has not been received, executing a spoofing detection scheme, comprising;

transmitting a second heartbeat to the first monitored device via an address associated with a second monitored device;

receiving a response to the second heartbeat;

determining that a spoofing attack has occurred in response to receiving the response to the second heartbeat; and

in response to a determination that a response to the second heartbeat has not been received, determining that either the first channel is broken or the first monitored device is inoperative.