Preventing data extraction by side-channel attack

• US 9,135,453 B2
• Filed: 08/27/2012
• Issued: 09/15/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 09/06/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Cisco Technology, Inc. (Cisco Systems, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Cisco Technology, Inc. (Cisco Systems, Inc.)
• Inventors: Shen-Orr, Chaim, Shlomovich, Yonatan, Elbaum, Reuven, Shkedy, Zvi, Amarilio, Lior, Shapiro, Yigal, Bear, Uri
• Primary Examiner(s): Song, Hosuk
• Application Number:
  US14/131,396
• Publication Number:
  US 20140143883A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,114 Days
• Field of Search: 380/46, 713/189, 713/193, 726 26- 27, 726/30, 708/250, 708/255
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/60 Protecting data
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/755 with measures against power attack
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/003 for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]

Abstract

A method for data transfer includes receiving a control signal triggering a transfer of a secret value into an element (24) of a circuit (20). In response to the control signal, a dummy value (42, 50) and the secret value are inserted in succession into the element of the circuit.

Claims

1. A method for data transfer, comprising:

receiving a control signal triggering a transfer of a secret value into an element of a circuit;

in response to the control signal, inserting a deterministic non-constant dummy value and the secret value in succession into the element of the circuit; and

asserting a data valid signal after inserting the secret value into the element, wherein the data valid signal is deasserted while the element holds the dummy value.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein inserting the dummy value and the secret value in succession comprises inserting the dummy value into the element and then overwriting the dummy value with the secret value.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein inserting the dummy value and the secret value in succession comprises inserting the secret value into the element and then overwriting the secret value with the dummy value.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the dummy value comprises a string of alternating bits.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the dummy value comprises an inverse of the secret value.

6. An electronic device, comprising:

a secret data source, configured to provide a secret value;

a dummy data generator, configured to generate deterministic, non-constant dummy values;

a circuit element, which is configured to receive data values;

a switching element, which is configured, in response to a control signal triggering a transfer of the secret value into the circuit element, to successively insert a deterministic non-constant dummy value from the dummy data generator and the secret value from the secret data source into the circuit element; and

wherein the circuit element is configured to assert a data valid signal after inserting the secret value into the element, and wherein the data valid signal is deasserted while the circuit element holds the dummy value.

7. The device according to claim 6, wherein the switching element is configured to insert the dummy value into the element and then to overwrite the dummy value with the secret value.

8. The device according to claim 6, wherein the switching element is configured to insert the secret value into the element and then to overwrite the secret value with the dummy value.

9. The device according to claim 6, wherein the dummy value comprises a string of alternating bits.

10. The device according to claim 6, wherein the dummy value comprises an inverse of the secret value.