Cryptographic authentication techniques for mobile devices

• US 9,185,111 B2
• Filed: 07/30/2013
• Issued: 11/10/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 06/23/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Pomian & Corella LLC
• Original Assignee: Pomian & Corella LLC
• Inventors: Corella, Francisco, Lewison, Karen Pomian
• Primary Examiner(s): Okeke, Izunna
• Application Number:
  US13/954,973
• Publication Number:
  US 20140032906A1
• Time in Patent Office: 833 Days
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/082 applying multi-factor authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0876 based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3213 using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures

Abstract

A method of authenticating a computing device to a back-end subsystem. In one embodiment a prover black-box in the computing device regenerates a credential containing a key pair from a PIN and a protocredential, and authenticates cryptographically to a verifier black-box in the back-end subsystem; then the verifier black-box sends an authentication token to the prover black-box as verifiable confirmation of the cryptographic authentication, the prover black-box sends the authentication token to an application front-end in the computing device, the application front-end sends the authentication token to an application back-end in the back-end subsystem, and the application back-end verifies the authentication token.

Claims

1. A multifactor authentication method performed at a computing device, comprising:

at registration time, obtaining a passcode from a user;

at registration time, generating a protocredential comprising one or more parameters combinable with the passcode to generate a credential;

at registration time, storing the protocredential in the computing device;

at registration time, generating the credential, the credential comprising a key pair, the key pair comprising a private key and a public key;

at registration time, using the credential to register the device and subsequently discarding the credential;

at authentication time, obtaining again the passcode from the user;

at authentication time, regenerating the credential from the protocredential stored in the computing device and the passcode obtained from the user, using a credential regeneration process having at least 1% probability of producing well-formed output and at most 0.1% probability of producing correct output from the protocredential and a random guess of the passcode, the random guess having a uniform probability distribution over the range of allowable passcodes; and

at authentication time, proving possession of the credential to a verifier by sending the public key and a proof of knowledge of the private key to the verifier over a secure connection after the verifier has authenticated to the computing device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the key pair pertains to a digital signature public key cryptosystem and the proof of knowledge comprises a signature computed with the private key.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the signature is computed on a challenge that comprises a nonce.

4. A multifactor authentication method performed at a computing device, comprising:

at registration time, generating a protocredential comprising one or more parameters combinable with one or more secrets not stored in the computing device to generate a credential;

at registration time, storing the credential in the computing device;

at registration time, generating the credential, the credential comprising a key pair, the key pair comprising a private key and public key;

at registration time, using the credential to register the device and subsequently discarding the credential;

at authentication time, obtaining from a user one or more secrets not stored in the computing device;

at authentication time, regenerating the credential from the protocredential stored in the computing device and the one or more secrets not stored in the device obtained from the user, by a credential regeneration process that does not include decryption steps other than steps that decrypt zero or more encrypted bare parameters; and

at authentication time, proving knowledge of the private key to a verifier by sending the public key and a proof of knowledge of the private key to the verifier over a secure connection after the verifier has authenticated to the computing device.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the one or more secrets obtained from the user at authentication time comprise a passcode.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein the credential regeneration process makes use of a biometric key, the biometric key being computed from a biometric sample that is one of the one or more secrets obtained from the user at authentication time and auxiliary data that is part of the protocredential.

7. The method of claim 4, wherein the protocredential comprises an encrypted bare parameter of the credential, and the credential regeneration process includes a step of decrypting the encrypted bare parameter.

8. A system comprising:

a back-end subsystem; and

a computing device programmed to register with the back-end subsystem and subsequently authenticate to the back-end subsystem, the computing device comprising an application front-end and a prover black-box,

wherein

at registration time, the computing device generates a protocredential comprising one or more parameters combinable with one or more secrets not stored in the computing device to generate a credential;

at registration time, the computing device stores the protocredential;

at registration time, the computing device generates the credential;

at registration time, the computing device uses the credential to register with the back-end subsystem and subsequently discards the credential;

at authentication time, the computing device obtains from a user one or more secrets not stored in the computing device;

at authentication time, the prover black-box regenerates the credential from the protocredential stored in the computing device and the one or more secrets not stored in the device obtained from the user, using a credential regeneration process having at least 1% probability of producing well-formed output and at most 0.1% probability of producing correct output from guesses of the one or more secrets not stored in the computing device;

at authentication time, the prover black-box authenticates cryptographically to the back-end subsystem by proving possession of the credential;

at authentication time, the prover black-box receives an authentication token from the back-end subsystem as verifiable confirmation of the cryptographic authentication;

at authentication time, the prover black-box sends the authentication token to the application front-end; and

at authentication time, the application front-end sends the authentication token to the back-end subsystem.

9. The system of claim 8, wherein the one or more secrets obtained from the user at authentication time comprise a passcode.

10. The system of claim 8, wherein the credential comprises a private key that is part of a key pair pertaining to a public key cryptosystem, and proving possession of the credential includes proving knowledge of the private key.

11. The system of claim 8, wherein the public key cryptosystem is a digital signature cryptosystem and proving knowledge of the private key includes using the private key to sign a challenge.

12. The system of claim 8, wherein the credential regeneration process does not include decryption steps other than steps that decrypt zero or more encrypted bare parameters.

13. The system of claim 8, wherein the protocredential comprises an encrypted bare parameter of the credential, and the credential regeneration process includes a step of decrypting the encrypted bare parameter.

14. The system of claim 8, wherein the credential regeneration process makes use of a biometric key, the biometric key being computed from a biometric sample that is one of the one or more secrets obtained from the user at authentication time and auxiliary data that is part of the protocredential.

15. The system of claim 8, wherein the back-end subsystem keeps a count of consecutive authentication failures and sets a limit on the count.

16. The system of claim 8, wherein the authentication token uniquely identifies an object stored in the back-end subsystem that contains authentication data.

17. The system of claim 8, wherein the authentication token comprises digitally signed authentication data.

18. The system of claim 8, wherein the application front-end sends the authentication token to the back-end subsystem repeatedly as a login session identifier.

19. A computing device programmed to register with a back-end and subsequently authenticate to the back-end, the computing device comprising a prover black-box and an application front-end, the prover black-box being programmed to perform steps of:

at registration time, generating a protocredential comprising one or more parameters combinable with one or more secrets not stored in the computing device to generate a credential;

at registration time, storing the protocredential in the computing device;

at registration time, generating the credential;

at registration time, discarding the credential after the device has registered with the back-end;

at authentication time, regenerating the credential from the protocredential stored in the device and one or more secrets not stored in the computing device that have been obtained from a user, using a credential regeneration process having at least 1% probability of producing well-formed output and at most 0.1% probability of producing correct output from guesses of the one or more secrets not stored in the computing device;

at authentication time, authenticating cryptographically to the back-end by proving possession of the credential;

at authentication time, receiving an authentication token from the back-end;

at authentication time, sending the authentication token to the application front-end, the authentication token being submissible to the back-end by the application front-end as verifiable confirmation of the cryptographic authentication.