Method and device for protecting products against counterfeiting

• US 9,317,981 B2
• Filed: 01/22/2008
• Issued: 04/19/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 01/19/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Atmel Corporation (Microchip Technology Incorporated)
• Original Assignee: Atmel Corporation (Microchip Technology Incorporated)
• Inventors: Friedrich, Ulrich
• Primary Examiner(s): MOORTHY, ARAVIND K
• Application Number:
  US12/018,023
• Publication Number:
  US 20080196106A1
• Time in Patent Office: 3,010 Days
• Field of Search: 726/27, 726/34, 713/193, 710/36, 711/145, 711/163
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/28 the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
• CPC Class Codes: G07G 1/009 the reader being an RFID reader

Abstract

A method for protecting a product against counterfeiting is provided that has a transponder associated with the product, upon which at least one unique identifier is stored, wherein a flag in a set or cleared state is associated with the identifier, and when the flag is set, read access to the identifier by a reader is only permitted after authentication. The invention further relates to a transponder for protecting a product against counterfeiting.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

receiving a request to access a first unique identifier stored in a shadow memory area of a transponder, read access to the first identifier being based on a state of a flag and on knowledge of secret shadow memory access information, the transponder having a second unique identifier stored in a second memory area;

requiring authentication prior to permitting read access to the first identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value; and

permitting read access to the first identifier when the request includes the secret shadow memory access information.

2. The method of claim 1 further comprising preventing overwriting the state of the flag by writing the flag in a non-reprogrammable memory area.

3. The method of claim 1 further comprising analyzing a bit of the first identifier used to emulate the state of the flag.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein analyzing at least one bit of the first identifier comprises combining the bit of the at least one unique identifier with a clock signal.

5. The method of claim 1 further comprising detecting manipulation of the first identifier through a state of a check digit associated with the identifier.

6. The method of claim 1 wherein the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area is encrypted.

7. The method of claim 1 further comprising constructing a portion of the second identifier using the first identifier.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the secret shadow memory access information comprises one or more of:

a secret memory address; and

a secret access command.

9. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving a request to access the second unique identifier stored in the second memory area of the transponder, read access to the second identifier being based on the state of the flag; and

requiring authentication prior to permitting read access to the second identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value.

10. A transponder comprising:

a shadow memory area storing a first unique identifier, read access to the first identifier being based on a state of a flag and on knowledge of secret shadow memory access information;

a second memory area storing a second unique identifier; and

one or more computer-readable non-transitory storage media coupled to the memory areas that embody logic that is operable when executed to;

receive a request to access the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area;

require authentication prior to permitting read access to the first identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value; and

permit read access to the first identifier when the request includes the secret shadow memory access information.

11. The transponder of claim 10, wherein the logic is further operable to prevent overwriting of the state of the flag by writing the flag in a non-reprogrammable memory area.

12. The transponder of claim 10, wherein the logic is further operable to analyze a bit of the first identifier used to emulate the state of the flag.

13. The transponder of claim 12, wherein the logic to analyze at least one bit of the first identifier is further operable to combine the bit of the at least one unique identifier with a clock signal.

14. The transponder of claim 10, wherein the logic is further operable to detect manipulation of the first identifier-through a state of a check digit associated with the at least one unique identifier.

15. The transponder of claim 10, wherein the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area is encrypted.

16. The transponder of claim 10, wherein a portion of the second identifier is constructed using the first identifier.

17. The transponder of claim 10, wherein the secret shadow memory access information comprises one or more of:

a secret memory address; and

a secret access command.

18. The transponder of claim 10, wherein the logic is further operable to:

receive a request to access the second unique identifier stored in the second memory area of the transponder, read access to the second identifier being based on the state of the flag; and

require authentication prior to permitting read access to the second identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value.

19. One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media that embody logic that is operable when executed to:

receive a request to access a first unique identifier stored in a shadow memory area of a transponder, read access to the at least one unique identifier being based on a state of a flag and on knowledge of secret shadow memory access information, the transponder having a second unique identifier stored in a second memory area;

require authentication prior to permitting read access to the first identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value; and

permit read access to the first identifier when the request includes the secret shadow memory access information.

20. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 wherein the logic when executed is further operable to prevent overwriting the state of the flag by writing the flag in a non-reprogrammable memory area.

21. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19, wherein the logic when executed is further operable to analyze a bit of the first identifier used to emulate the state of the flag.

22. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 21, wherein analyzing at least one bit of the first identifier further comprises combining the at least one bit of the first identifier with a clock signal.

23. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19, wherein the logic when executed is further operable to detect manipulation of the first identifier through a state of a check digit associated with the first identifier.

24. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19, wherein the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area is encrypted.

25. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19, wherein a portion of the second identifier is constructed using the first identifier.

26. The one or more non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 19, wherein the secret shadow memory access information comprises one or more of:

a secret memory address; and

a secret access command.

27. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19, wherein the logic when executed is further operable to:

receive a request to access the second unique identifier stored in the second memory area of the transponder, read access to the second identifier being based on the state of the flag; and

require authentication prior to permitting read access to the second identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value.