Key derivation for a module using an embedded universal integrated circuit card

• US 9,319,223 B2
• Filed: 11/19/2013
• Issued: 04/19/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 09/10/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: John A. Nix
• Original Assignee: M2M and IoT Technologies LLC
• Inventors: Nix, John A.
• Primary Examiner(s): Cervetti, David Garcia
• Application Number:
  US14/084,141
• Publication Number:
  US 20150143125A1
• Time in Patent Office: 882 Days
• Field of Search: 713/171, 380/44
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/35 communicating wirelessly
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/445 by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2105 Dual mode as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2107 File encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2115 Third party
• CPC Class Codes: H04J 11/00 Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codesH04J13/00 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2854 Wide area networks, e.g. public data networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/72 Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/045 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0464 using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/04 specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 : involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0816 : Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 : involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 : Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 : Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 : Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 : Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 : including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 : involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3239 : involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3249 : using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/02 : Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/033 : of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 : Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 : using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/40 : Security arrangements using identity modules
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 : Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 40/005 : Routing actions in the presence of nodes in sleep or doze mode
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0216 : using a pre-established activity schedule, e.g. traffic indication frame
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0235 : where the received signal is a power saving command
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0277 : according to available power supply, e.g. switching off when a low battery condition is detected
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/27 : Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/082 : for traffic bypassing of mobility servers, e.g. location registers, home PLMNs or home agents
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 80/04 : Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/12 : WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/12 : Access point controller devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 999/99 : dummy group
• CPC Class Codes: Y02D 30/70 : in wireless communication networks

Abstract

A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a first eUICC profile and a set of cryptographic algorithms. The first eUICC profile can include an initial shared secret network key K for authentication with a wireless network. The module can receive a key K network token from, and send a key K module token to, an eUICC subscription manager (eUICC-SM). The module can use the key K network token, a derived module private key, a key derivation function, and a shared secret algorithm to derive a shared secret key that supports communication with the UICC-SM. eUICC-SM can use the received key K module token, a private key, the key derivation function, and the shared secret algorithm in order to derive the same shared secret key derived by the module. The module can subsequently receive a second eUICC profile encrypted using the derived shared secret key.

Claims

1. A method for a module using an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) to derive a first shared secret key and a second shared secret key, the method comprising the module:

storing a network public key and a module identity in the eUICC, wherein the module uses the network public key to authenticate an eUICC subscription manager;

receiving a token for a key derivation function from the authenticated eUICC subscription manager;

deriving a module private key and a module public key, wherein the module sends the derived module public key and the module identity to the eUICC subscription manager;

deriving the first shared secret key using the key derivation function and a set of cryptographic parameters, wherein the key derivation function uses as input at least (i) the derived module private key, (ii) the set of cryptographic parameters, and (iii) the received token;

deriving the second shared secret key using (i) a shared secret algorithm and (ii) the derived first shared secret key as a random number for the shared secret algorithm, wherein the shared secret algorithm uses a secure hash algorithm; and

receiving an eUICC profile, wherein the eUICC uses the derived second shared secret key to decrypt the eUICC profile.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the module derives the module private key and the module public key using a key pair generation algorithm and the received token.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the module uses the network public key to encrypt the derived module public key sent to the eUICC subscription manager.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising deriving the module private key and module public key using an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm, wherein the key derivation function comprises an elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising the eUICC subscription manager deriving the first shared secret key using the key derivation function, the set of cryptographic parameters, and the module public key.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising authenticating with a wireless network using the decrypted eUICC profile, wherein the module (i) sends a network module identity, (ii) receives a challenge (RAND), (iii) uses the RAND, a key K from the decrypted eUICC profile, and a set of cryptographic algorithms to calculate a response (RES), and (iv) sends the RES to the wireless network.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the decrypted eUICC profile includes a network module identity, a set of network parameters, and a key K, and wherein the module stores the decrypted eUICC profile in a protected memory.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising:

reading the module identity from the protected memory; and

sending the module identity to the eUICC subscription manager before receiving the token.

9. A method for a module using an embedded integrated circuit card (eUICC) to support authentication, the method comprising the module:

reading a module identity from a protected memory and sending the module identity to an eUICC subscription manager;

receiving a first profile for the eUICC, wherein the first profile includes a first network module identity and a first key K;

using the eUICC, the first network module identity, and the first key K to authenticate with a first wireless network,

sending to an eUICC subscription manager an algorithm token for a shared secret algorithm after authenticating with the first key K, wherein the module uses an asymmetric ciphering algorithm to encrypt the algorithm token;

deriving a shared secret key using the algorithm token and the shared secret algorithm, wherein the shared secret algorithm includes a secure hash algorithm and a component parameter;

receiving a second profile for the eUICC, wherein the module decrypts the second profile using the derived shared secret key, wherein the decrypted second profile includes a second network module identity and a second key K; and

authenticating with a second wireless network using the second network module identity and the second key K.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising:

reading an eUICC subscription manager public key from the protected memory;

authenticating the eUICC subscription manager using the eUICC subscription manager public key; and

,

sending the module identity to the eUICC subscription manager before receiving the first profile.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the module uses an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm with the eUICC subscription manager public key, and wherein the module uses a symmetric ciphering algorithm with the shared secret key to decrypt the second encrypted profile.

12. The method of claim 9, further comprising authenticating with the second wireless network using the decrypted eUICC profile, wherein the module (i) sends the second network module identity, (ii) receives a random number (RAND), (iii) uses the RAND, the second key K, and a set of cryptographic algorithms to calculate a response (RES), and (iv) sends the RES to the second wireless network.

13. The method of claim 9, wherein the first profile includes a first set of cryptographic parameters and the second profile includes a second set of cryptographic parameters, and wherein the module uses (i) the first set of cryptographic parameters to authenticate with the first wireless network and (ii) the second set of cryptographic parameters to authenticate with the second wireless network.

14. The method of claim 9, wherein the first network module identity used with the first key K comprises a first international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), and wherein the second network module identity used with the second key K comprises a second IMSI.

15. A method for a module to send a sensor measurement, the method comprising the module:

recording in a protected memory a first module private key, a first module public key, a server public key, and a module identity;

sending (i) the module identity and (ii) a module digital signature to a server for an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) subscription manager, wherein the module uses the first module private key for the module digital signature, and wherein the module sends from an Internet Protocol address and port (IP;

port) number;

receiving a response at the IP;

port number, wherein the response includes a server digital signature and a first shared secret key, wherein the module verifies the server digital signature using the server public key, wherein the first shared secret key is decrypted with an asymmetric ciphering algorithm and the first module private key;

deriving a second shared secret key using (i) a shared secret algorithm and (ii) the received first shared secret key as a random number for the shared secret algorithm, wherein the shared secret algorithm uses a secure hash algorithm;

receiving (i) a set of cryptographic parameters, and (ii) a profile for an eUICC, wherein the profile is decrypted using the derived second shared secret key;

deriving a second module public key and a second module private key using the set of cryptographic parameters;

selecting the received profile before authenticating with a wireless network;

sending a message with the second module public key and the module identity, wherein the module authenticates using the first module private key; and

,

sending the sensor measurement in a module encrypted data, wherein the module uses the second module private key to encrypt the module encrypted data.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein the module encrypts the module encrypted data using a symmetric key and the second module private key, and further comprising one of:

(i) receiving the symmetric key, and decrypting the symmetric key using the second module private key,

(ii) sending the symmetric key, and

(iii) deriving the symmetric key from (a) a key derivation algorithm, and (b) at least, in part, the second module private key.

17. The method of claim 15, wherein the module sends the server a nonce with the module identity, and wherein the module verifies the server digital signature using the nonce.

18. The method of claim 15, the module uses at least one component parameter and the first shared secret key with the shared secret algorithm in order to derive the second shared secret key.

19. The method of claim 15, further comprising (i) receiving a response after sending the sensor measurement, wherein the response includes a security token and a module instruction for the module to derive a third private key and third public key, wherein the module sends the third module public key, and wherein the module authenticates the third module public key with the second module public key.

20. The method of claim 15, wherein the module uses a sensor in order to generate a random number, wherein a key pair generation algorithm uses the random number, and wherein the module uses the key pair generation algorithm to derive the second module private key and the second module public key.