Invariant biohash security system and method

• US 9,374,370 B1
• Filed: 11/05/2015
• Issued: 06/21/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 01/23/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Island Intellectual Property LLC (Double Rock Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Island Intellectual Property LLC (Double Rock Corporation)
• Inventors: Bent, Bruce R. II, Buarque de Macedo, Charles R.
• Primary Examiner(s): Hoffman, Brandon
• Application Number:
  US14/933,580
• Time in Patent Office: 229 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0482 Interaction with lists of selectable items, e.g. menus
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/04842 Selection of displayed objects or displayed text elements G06F3/0482 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/10 specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/108 Remote banking, e.g. home banking
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3827 Use of message hashing
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3829 involving key management
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40145 Biometric identity checks
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 2220/00 Business processing using cryptography postage metering system using cryptography G06Q2250/05
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/02 Banking, e.g. interest calculation or account maintenance credit or loans G06Q40/03
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/083 using passwords cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0861 using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using biological data H04L9/3231
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0866 involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/068 : using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 : using certificates or pre-shared keys

Abstract

Systems, methods, and program products for providing secure authentication for electronic messages are disclosed. A method may comprise generating an asymmetric private key based at least in part upon an invariant biometric feature vector derived from an input biometric reading. The private key may be further based at least in part upon a user password. The resulting private key may not be stored but rather may be generated when required to authenticate an electronic message, at which time it may be used to provide a digital signature for the electronic message. The private key may be deleted after use. The private key may be regenerated by inputting both a new instance of the biometric reading as well as a new instance of the password.

Claims

1. A method for generating a secure biometric-based cryptographic key without storing biometric information in order to authenticate data in a deposit sweep transfer system comprising:

(a) receiving, via a first graphical user interface on a mobile device, a user password;

(b) capturing, using a biometric reader embedded in the mobile device, into a secure enclave processor core, a first digital biometric image of a biometric reading of a user, wherein the secure enclave processor core is only accessible to input passwords, digital biometric image data, and electronic messages targeted for encryption, and to receive from the secure enclave processor core encrypted electronic messages and public keys configured to verify the authenticity of encrypted electronic messages;

(c) converting, by the secure enclave processor core, the first digital biometric image into an invariant biometric feature vector using an integrated wavelet and Fourier-Mellin transformation process comprising the following steps within the secure enclave processor core;

(1) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, a wavelet transformation to the first digital biometric image to generate a second digital biometric image;

(2) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, a fast Fourier transform to the second digital biometric image, to generate a third digital biometric image;

(3) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, a log-polar transformation to the third digital biometric image to generate a fourth digital biometric image;

(4) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, a high pass filter to the fourth digital biometric image to generate a fifth digital biometric image;

(5) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, a fast Fourier transform to the fifth digital biometric image to generate a first set of feature data;

(6) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, row concatenation to the first set of feature data to generate the invariant biometric feature vector;

(d) converting, by the secure enclave processor core, the invariant feature vector using the user password into a 128-bit invariant code comprising the following steps within the secure enclave processor core;

(1) generating, by the secure enclave processor core, using the user password a threshold intensity value;

(2) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, the threshold intensity value to the invariant feature vector to generate the 128-bit invariant code;

(e) generating, by the secure enclave processor core, an invariant asymmetric private key using the 128-bit invariant code and the user password;

(f) applying, by the secure enclave processor core, the invariant asymmetric private key to an electronic message comprising a message payload associated with a deposit sweep transaction to generate a digitally signed electronic message to be securely transmitted to a second device associated with the deposit sweep transaction;

(g) securely transmitting, from the mobile device to the second device, the digitally signed electronic message causing the deposit sweep transaction to be initiated upon successful verification of the digital signature using a corresponding public key previously provided to the second device, wherein the corresponding public key corresponds to the invariant asymmetric private key; and

(h) permanently deleting, from the secure enclave processor core, the user password, the first digital biometric image, the second digital biometric image, the third digital biometric image, the fourth digital biometric image, the fifth digital biometric image, the first set of feature data, the invariant biometric feature vector, the invariant asymmetric private key, and the 128-bit invariant code.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the user password is an alphanumeric password that is encoded to convert it to a numeric sequence.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the user password is a personal identification number.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the user password is received via an input device comprising any of a keyboard, keypad, pointer device, or touch screen.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the biometric reader is a fingerprint scanner.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the fingerprint scanner is a capacitive fingerprint scanner.

7. The method of claim 1, further comprising, prior to converting the first digital biometric image into an invariant biometric feature vector:

(i) converting, by the secure enclave processor core, the first digital biometric image into a sixth digital biometric image by applying a distortion to the first digital biometric image, the distortion based at least in part upon the user password and the sixth digital biometric image to be converted into an invariant biometric feature vector in place of the first digital biometric image.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein applying the distortion to the first digital biometric image comprises selecting from a predefined set of distortion algorithms based at least in part upon a numeric value derived from the user password.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein applying the distortion to the first digital biometric image comprises selecting a pixel location associated with a center of distortion based at least in part upon a numeric value derived from the user password.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein generating a threshold intensity value using the user password comprises:

(a) obtaining, by the secure enclave processor core, a numeric value from the user password; and

(b) normalizing, by the secure enclave processor core, the numeric value within a predefined intensity range of possible intensity values by scaling the numeric value based at least in part upon a relation between a range of possible numeric values and the predefined intensity range.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein applying the threshold intensity value to the invariant feature vector to generate the 128-bit invariant code comprises:

(i) generating, using the threshold intensity value, a sequence of real numbers comprising a set of pseudo-random vectors;

(ii) applying a Gram-Schmidt ortho-normalization to the set of pseudo-random vectors to transform them into an orthonormal set of vectors;

(iii) computing an inner product between the invariant biometric feature vector and the orthonormal set of vectors;

(iv) assigning a value of zero to each inner product value less than the threshold intensity value and assigning a value of one to each inner product value greater than the threshold intensity value;

(v) mapping each value to a bit location based at least in part upon the location within the biometric feature vector; and

(vi) aggregating the values in their respective locations to produce a bit string.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein applying the threshold intensity value to the invariant feature vector to generate the 128-bit invariant code further comprises, prior to computing the inner product, normalizing the invariant biometric feature vector between the values negative one and positive one.

13. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of applying, by the secure enclave processor core, the invariant asymmetric private key to an electronic message comprises:

(a) receiving, at the secure enclave processor core from a normal processor core, the electronic message;

(b) evaluating, by the secure enclave processor core, the electronic message to verify the message data format;

(c) generating, by the secure enclave processor core, a message digest by computing a hash of the message payload; and

(d) encrypting, by the secure enclave processor core, the message digest using the private key.