Method for forming a trust relationship, and embedded UICC therefor

• US 9,426,654 B2
• Filed: 10/30/2012
• Issued: 08/23/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 11/04/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.
• Original Assignee: KT Corporation
• Inventors: LEE, Jin Hyoung
• Primary Examiner(s): Elhag, Magdi
• Application Number:
  US14/356,037
• Publication Number:
  US 20140287725A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,393 Days
• Field of Search: 455410-411, 455/412.1, 455/558, 455/556.1, 455/556.2
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/35 Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method for forming a trust relationship among an MNO, an SM, and an eUICC in a communication system in which the SM is defined as an entity for managing the eUICC, as well as to an embedded UICC therefor.

Claims

1. A method for forming a trust relationship between an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) and a Subscription Manager-Secure Routing (SM-SR) connected to the eUICC via a network, the method comprising:

a verification information generating step of generating, by the eUICC, a first verification information based on a first trust information that is transferred or shared;

a verification information exchanging step of transmitting, by the eUICC, the first verification information to the SM-SR as information to be used by the SM-SR to authenticate the eUICC based on the first trust information, and receiving a second verification information from the SM-SR, the second verification information being generated by the SM-SR based on a second trust information that is transferred or shared;

and a verification information verifying step of authenticating, by the eUICC, the SM-SR by verifying the second verification information received from the SM-SR based on the second trust information.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the verification information generating step comprises one of:

generating, by the eUICC, as the first verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the first trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, or

generating, by the eUICC, as the first verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the verification information exchanging step comprises:

the eUICC transmitting, to the SM-SR, the random value or the identity information which can be made public together with the first trust information, and receiving, from the SM-SR, another random value or other identity information which can be made public together with the second verification information generated by the SM-SR.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the first trust information and the second trust information are certificates, and

wherein the verification information exchanging step comprises additionally transmitting, by the eUICC, the first trust information to the SM-SR, and additionally receiving the second trust information of the SM-SR from the SM-SR.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein the verification information verifying step comprises one of:

when the first trust information and the second trust information are symmetric keys, authenticating, by the eUICC, the SM-SR by verifying the second verification information transferred from the SM-SR by comparing a result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public transferred from the SM-SR with the second verification information transferred from the SM-SR;

or

when the first trust information and second trust information are certificates, authenticating, by the eUICC, the SM-SR by verifying the second verification information transferred from the SM-SR by comparing a result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received second verification information by using the certificate which is the second trust information.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

when the first trust information and the second trust information are certificates, performing, after the verification information exchanging step, a trust information verifying step of verifying, by the eUICC, validity and reliability of the second trust information of the SM-SR by requesting an authentication organization which issued the second trust information to perform a verification process.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the first trust information comprises a first certificate corresponding to the eUICC, the second trust information comprises a second certificate corresponding to the SM-SR, and the first and second certificates are generated by a hardware security module (HSM).

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the first verification information comprises information configured to certify the eUICC as a trusted entity and the second verification information comprises information configured to certify the SM-SR as a trusted entity.

9. An embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) configured to form a trust relationship with a Subscription Manager-Secure Routing (SM-SR), the eUICC being connected to the SM-SR via a network, the eUICC comprising:

a verification information generator configured to generate a first verification information based on a first trust information that is transferred or shared;

a verification information exchanger configured to transmit the first verification information to the SM-SR as information to be used by the SM-SR to authenticate the eUICC based on the first trust information, and to receive a second verification information from the SM-SR, the second verification information being generated by the SM-SR based on a second trust information that is transferred or shared; and

a verification information verifier configured to authenticate the SM-SR by verifying the second verification information received from the SM-SR based on the second trust information.

10. The eUICC of claim 9, wherein the verification information generator is configured to generate, as the first verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, or generate, as the first verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key.

11. The eUICC of claim 10,

wherein when the first trust information and second trust information are symmetric keys, the verification information verifier authenticates the SM-SR by verifying the second verification information transferred from the SM-SR by comparing a result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public transferred from the SM-SR with the second verification information transferred from the SM-SR;

and

wherein when the first trust information and second trust information are certificates, the verification information verifier is configured to authenticate the SM-SR by verifying the second verification information transferred from the SM-SR by comparing a result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received second verification information by using the certificate which is the second trust information.

12. The eUICC of claim 9, wherein the first trust information and second trust information are certificates, and the method further comprises a trust information verifier configured to verify validity and reliability of the second trust information of the SM-SR by requesting an authentication organization which issued the second trust information to perform a verification process.

13. A method for forming a trust relationship between entities connected to each other in a communication system, the method comprising:

generating, by a first entity among the entities, first verification information based on a first trust information of the first entity, the first trust information being transferred or shared, and generating, by a second entity among the entities, a second verification information based on a second trust information of the second entity, the second trust information being transferred or shared;

exchanging, by each of the first and second entities, the generated first and second verification information by transmitting the generated first and second verification information respectively to the other of the first and second entities; and

authenticating, by the first entity, the second entity by verifying the second verification information transferred from the second entity based on the second trust information and authenticating, by the second entity, the first entity by verifying the first verification information transferred from the first entity based on the first trust information so as to form the trust relationship between the first and second plurality of entities.

14. A method for forming a trust relationship, the method comprising:

a step of forming a trust relationship between an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) and a first Subscription Manager-Secure Routing (SM-SR) connected to the eUICC via a network, wherein the SM SR generates a first verification information based on a first trust information that is transferred or shared and the first SM-SR generates second verification information based on a second trust information that is transferred or shared, the eUICC transmits the generated first verification information to the first SM-SR, the first SM-SR transmits the generated second verification information to the eUICC, and the eUICC authenticates the first SM-SR by verifying the second verification information received from the first SM-SR based on the second trust information, and the first SM-SR authenticates the eUICC by verifying the first verification information received from the eUICC based on the first trust information;

a step of forming a trust relationship between the first SM-SR and a second SM-SR connected to the first SM-SR via the network, wherein the first SM-SR generates a third verification information based on a third trust information that is transferred or shared, the second SM-SR generates a fourth verification information based on a fourth trust information that is transferred or shared, the first SM-SR transmits the generated third verification information to the second SM-SR, the second SM-SR transmits the generated fourth verification information to the first SM-SR, and the first SM-SR authenticates the second SM-SR by verifying the fourth verification information received from the second SM-SR based on the fourth trust information; and

a step of forming a trust relationship between the second SM-SR and a Subscription Manager-Data Preparation (SM-DP) connected to the second SM-SR via the network, wherein the second SM-SR generates a fifth verification information based on a fifth trust information that is transferred or shared, the SM-DP generates a sixth verification information based on a sixth trust information that is transferred or shared, the second SM-SR transmits the generated fifth verification information to the SM-DP, the SM-DP transmits the generated sixth verification information to the second SM-SR, the second SM-SR authenticates the SM-DP by verifying the sixth verification information received from the SM-DP based on the sixth trust information, and the SM-DP authenticates the second SM-SR by verifying the fifth verification information received from the second SM-SR based on the fifth trust information.

15. The method of claim 14, further comprising:

a step of forming a trust relationship between the eUICC and a device in which the eUICC is embedded, wherein the eUICC authenticates the device in which the eUICC is embedded based on trust information of the device in which the eUICC is embedded, and the device in which the eUICC is embedded authenticates the eUICC based on trust information of the eUICC;

a step of forming a trust relationship between a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and the first SM-SR, wherein the MNO authenticates the first SM-SR unidirectionally based on the third trust information of the SM-SR; and

a step of forming a trust relationship between the MNO and the SM-DP, wherein the MNO authenticates the SM-DP based on the sixth trust information of the SM-DP.

16. The method of claim 14, wherein

the step of forming the trust relationship between the eUICC and the first SM-SR comprises one of:

the eUICC generating, as the first verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the first trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, and the SM-SR generating, as the second verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the second trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public;

or

the eUICC generating, as the first verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key of the eUICC and the SM-SR generating, as the second verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value of identity information which can be made public by using a private key of the SM-SR;

the step of forming a trust relationship between the first SM-SR and the second SM-SR comprises one of;

the first SM-SR generating, as the third verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the third trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, and the second SM-SR generating, as the fourth verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the fourth trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, or

the first SM-SR generating, as the third verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key of the first SM-SR, and the second SM-SR generating, as the fourth verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key of the second SM-SR; and

the step of forming a trust relationship between the second SM-SR and the SM-DP comprises one of;

the second SM-SR generating, as the fifth verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the fifth trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, and the SM-DP generating, as the sixth verification information, a result value of a hash function computation whose inputs are the sixth trust information, and a random value or identity information which can be made public, or

the second SM-SR generating, as the fifth verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key of the second SM-SR and the SM-DP generating, as the sixth verification information, a result value of an electronic signature computation performed on a generated random value or identity information which can be made public by using a private key of the SM-DP.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein

the step of forming a trust relationship between the eUICC and the SM-SR comprises one of:

the eUICC authenticating the first SM-SR by verifying the second verification information transferred from the first SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public transferred from the first SM-SR with the second verification information transferred from the first SM-SR, and the first SM-SR authenticating the eUICC by verifying the first verification information transferred from the eUICC by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value of the identity information which can be made public transferred from the eUICC with the first verification information transferred from the eUICC;

or

the eUICC authenticating the first SM-SR by verifying the second verification information transferred from the first SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received second verification information by using a certificate and the first SM-SR authenticating the eUICC by verifying the first verification information transferred from the eUICC by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received first information by using a certificate;

the step of forming a trust relationship between the first SM-SR and the second SM-SR comprises one of;

the first SM-SR authenticating the second SM-SR by verifying the fourth verification information transferred from the second SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public transferred from the second SM-SR with the fourth verification information transferred from the second SM-SR, and the second SM-SR authenticating the first SM-SR by verifying the third verification information transferred from the first SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public transferred from the first SM-SR with the third verification information transferred from the first SM-SR, or

the first SM-SR authenticating the second SM-SR by verifying the fourth verification information transferred from the second SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received fourth verification information by using the certificate and the second SM-SR authenticating the first SM-SR by verifying the third verification information transferred from the first SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value of the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received third verification information by using the certificate; and

the step of forming a trust relationship between the second SM-SR and the SM-DP comprises one of;

the second SM-SR authenticating the SM-DP by verifying the sixth verification information transferred from the SM-DP by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public transferred from the SM-DP with the sixth verification information transferred from the SM-DP, and the SM-DP authenticating the second SM-SR by verifying the fifth verification information transferred from the second SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value of the identity information which can be made public transferred from the second SM-SR;

or

the second SM-SR authenticating the SM-DP by verifying the sixth verification information transferred from the SM-DP by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received sixth verification information by using the certificate and the SM-DP authenticating the second SM-SR by verifying the fifth verification information transferred from the second SM-SR by comparing the result value of the hash function computation on the random value or the identity information which can be made public with a result value obtained by decrypting the received fifth verification information by using the certificate.