Tamper-protected hardware and method for using same
First Claim
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1. A tamper-protected semiconductor module comprising:
- a hardware module comprising one or more emitters for emitting a predetermined excitation that can be measured as a physical measurand, and one or more sensors for sensing the (back-) scatter of the excitation in form of the physical measurand in a contactless and/or contact-based manner, andsaid cocoon housing the hardware module, the cocoon being adapted to influence the (back-) scatter of the predetermined excitation to be sensed by the sensors, wherein said (back-) scatter is generated inside a cocoon of the tamper-protected semiconductor module;
wherein said one or more sensors measure values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation providing measured values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation;
wherein the tamper-protected semiconductor module is adapted to generate a digital measured fingerprint of the tamper-protected semiconductor module from the measured values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation, and is further adapted to detect an attempt to tamper the tamper-protected semiconductor module by detecting a mismatch of the digital measured fingerprint and a fingerprint of the un-tampered tamper-protected semiconductor module.
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Abstract
One of the various aspects of the invention is related to suggesting various techniques for improving the tamper-resistibility of hardware. The tamper-resistant hardware may be advantageously used in a transaction system that provides the off-line transaction protocol. Amongst these techniques for improving the tamper-resistibility are trusted bootstrapping by means of secure software entity modules, a new use of hardware providing a Physical Unclonable Function, and the use of a configuration fingerprint of a FPGA used within the tamper-resistant hardware.
63 Citations
17 Claims
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1. A tamper-protected semiconductor module comprising:
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a hardware module comprising one or more emitters for emitting a predetermined excitation that can be measured as a physical measurand, and one or more sensors for sensing the (back-) scatter of the excitation in form of the physical measurand in a contactless and/or contact-based manner, and said cocoon housing the hardware module, the cocoon being adapted to influence the (back-) scatter of the predetermined excitation to be sensed by the sensors, wherein said (back-) scatter is generated inside a cocoon of the tamper-protected semiconductor module; wherein said one or more sensors measure values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation providing measured values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation; wherein the tamper-protected semiconductor module is adapted to generate a digital measured fingerprint of the tamper-protected semiconductor module from the measured values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation, and is further adapted to detect an attempt to tamper the tamper-protected semiconductor module by detecting a mismatch of the digital measured fingerprint and a fingerprint of the un-tampered tamper-protected semiconductor module. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)
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15. A tamper-protected semiconductor module comprising:
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a hardware module comprising one or more emitters for emitting a predetermined excitation that can be measured as a physical measurand, and one or more sensors for sensing the (back-) scatter of the excitation in form of the physical measurand in a contactless and/or contact-based manner, and a cocoon housing the hardware module, the cocoon being adapted to influence the (back-) scatter of the predetermined excitation to be sensed by the sensors, wherein said (back-) scatter is generated inside a cocoon of the tamper-protected semiconductor module; wherein said one or more sensors measure values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation providing measured values of the (back-) scatter of the excitation; wherein the tamper-protected semiconductor module is adapted to generate a digital measured fingerprint of the tamper-protected semiconductor module from the measured values of (back-) scatter of the excitation, and wherein the tamper-protected semiconductor module further comprises a processor unit adapted to receive Helper-Data from a storage, and to generate a secret based on the digital measured fingerprint and the Helper-Data, wherein in case the digital measured fingerprint does not correspond to a fingerprint of the un-tampered tamper-protected semiconductor module, the generated secret is incorrect. - View Dependent Claims (16, 17)
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Specification