Inhibiting access to sensitive vehicle diagnostic data

• US 9,477,843 B2
• Filed: 06/11/2014
• Issued: 10/25/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 06/11/2014
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC (General Motors Company)
• Original Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC (General Motors Company)
• Inventors: Nairn, David M., Huang, Stephan, K, Muralikrishnan
• Primary Examiner(s): Jen, Ian
• Application Number:
  US14/302,162
• Publication Number:
  US 20150363606A1
• Time in Patent Office: 867 Days
• Field of Search: 701/29.6
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6218 to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/78 to assure secure storage of data address-based protection against unauthorised use of memory G06F12/14; record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings G06K19/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1491 using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment

Abstract

A vehicle system and method of secure communication between a vehicle and an external device communicating with the vehicle in a diagnostics mode. The method includes the steps of: receiving a first diagnostic request at an electronic control unit (ECU) from the external device; determining an increased risk of security breach at the ECU based on the [nature of the] first request; and when it is determined that the increased risk exists, providing a misinformative response.

Claims

1. A method of secure communication between a vehicle and an external device communicating with the vehicle in a diagnostics mode, comprising the steps of:

receiving a first diagnostic request at an electronic control unit (ECU) from the external device;

determining an increased risk of security breach at the ECU based on the first request; and

when it is determined that the increased risk exists, providing a misinformative response, wherein the misinformative response purposely misdirects the requesting external device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first diagnostic request is a memory read-request associated with a memory address of the ECU.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the determining step includes determining whether the memory address is within a range of restricted-access addresses.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising determining that the memory address is within the range of restricted-access addresses, wherein the providing step includes responding to the first request with non-sensitive data associated with one or more unrestricted-access addresses.

5. The method of claim 4, further comprising the step of preconfiguring the misinformative response prior to receiving the first diagnostic request, wherein the preconfiguration associates the non-sensitive data of at least one unrestricted-access memory address with at least one restricted-access memory address.

6. The method of claim 4, further comprising receiving a second diagnostic request at the ECU, and when the first request is the same as the second request, providing the same misinformative response.

7. The method of claim 4, further comprising receiving a second diagnostic request at the ECU, and when the first request is not the same as the second request, providing a different misinformative response.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein communication between the ECU and external device is according to ISO-14229.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the first diagnostic request is a Read_Memory_by_Address request.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the first diagnostic request is part of a malicious attack.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the misinformative response does not include error code data associated with an out-of-range message.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the misinformative response is not dynamically generated.

13. A method of secure communication between a vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) and an external device communicating with the ECU in a diagnostics mode, comprising the steps of:

preconfiguring a static, misinformative response to a diagnostic request for sensitive data;

receiving a first diagnostic request from the external device, the first diagnostic request being at least a portion of a malicious attack;

determining that the first diagnostic request is for the sensitive data; and

providing the misinformative response, wherein the misinformative response purposely misdirects the requesting external device from the sensitive data.

14. The method of claim 13, further comprising receiving a second diagnostic request requesting the same sensitive data as the first diagnostic request and providing the same misinformative response.

15. The method of claim 13, wherein communication between the ECU and external device is according to ISO-14229.

16. The method of 13, wherein the misinformative response does not include error code data associated with an out-of-range message.