Secure virtual sector erasure method and system

• US 9,519,433 B2
• Filed: 05/13/2015
• Issued: 12/13/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 05/13/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Vsector Security Technologies, LLC
• Original Assignee: Vsector Security Technologies, LLC
• Inventors: Jones, Jeffrey A., Oken, Michael Lawrence, Weber, Martin
• Primary Examiner(s): Armouche, Hadi
• Assistant Examiner(s): Shayanfar, Ali
• Application Number:
  US14/711,153
• Publication Number:
  US 20160335004A1
• Time in Patent Office: 580 Days
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1458 by checking the subject access rights
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1475 in a virtual system, e.g. with translation means
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45562 Creating, deleting, cloning virtual machine instances
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45579 I/O management, e.g. providing access to device drivers or storage
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45587 Isolation or security of virtual machine instances
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/00 Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/62 Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2212/1052 Security improvement
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2143 Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0608 Saving storage space on storage systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0619 in relation to data integrity, e.g. data losses, bit errors
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0641 De-duplication techniques
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0665 at area level, e.g. provisioning of virtual or logical volumes
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/067 Distributed or networked storage systems, e.g. storage area networks [SAN], network attached storage [NAS]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45558 Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/50 Allocation of resources, e.g. of the central processing unit [CPU]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3239 involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD

Abstract

Systems and methods for sanitizing physical storage in cloud computing and virtual environments. When logical storage is decommissioned in a virtual environment, the underlying physical storage is logically disassociated. However, the underlying physical data blocks remain intact until they are overwritten. Since there is no control over when, or even if, the physical data is ever overwritten, the remaining data is susceptible to compromise. The present disclosure provides a secure erase application that securely erases physical storage associated with to-be deleted resources, such as virtual data stores, virtual images, snapshots and raw virtual disks.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

presenting a virtual resource in a user interface;

receiving a selection of the virtual resource, the selection indicating that the virtual resource is to be securely erased;

isolating the selected virtual resource, wherein the isolating comprises;

exclusively locking the selected virtual resource,

stopping execution of virtual machine processes associated with the selected virtual resource, and

disabling a dynamic redistribution of resources to ensure uninterrupted operation;

obtaining access to the selected virtual resource;

securely erasing the selected virtual resource by overwriting all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource; and

confirming that all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource have been overwritten.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising mapping the overwriting to a physical layer associated with the virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein mapping the overwriting is contemporaneous with the overwriting of the virtual sectors.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising issuing a certificate of sanitization indicating secure erasure of the selected virtual resource.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising dereferencing a unique identifier of the selected virtual resource, thereby disassociating a logical layer having the selected virtual resource from the physical layer.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein dereferencing the unique identifier is after overwriting all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein overwriting all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource includes overwriting in compliance with a NIST 800-88 standard.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein overwriting all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource includes overwriting with two passes of random bits and one pass of zero bits.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the confirming that all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource have been overwritten uses a hash value.

10. The method of claim 9, the confirming comprising comparing a first hash value determined from a similarly sized zero-byte data file as the selected virtual resource to another hash value of the selected virtual resource after the overwriting.

11. The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving a target host and user credentials.

12. The method of claim 11, further comprising identifying access privileges identified with the user credentials and wherein presenting the virtual resource in accordance with the access privileges.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein presenting virtual resource corresponding to the access privileges includes presenting only if the user has alteration or deletion privileges.

14. The method of claim 1, further comprising determining an environment processing capacity and throttling the overwriting based on the environment processing capacity.

15. The method of claim 1, further comprising identifying the virtual sectors based on usage in an environment distinguishing between allocation and usage.

16. The method of claim 1, further comprising installing an application for performing the method into a user environment.

17. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium programmed with computer readable code that, when executed by a computer processor, causes the processor to:

present a virtual resource in a user interface;

receive a selection of the virtual resource, the selection indicating that the virtual resource is to be securely erased;

isolate the selected virtual resource, wherein to isolate the selected virtual resource, the processor;

exclusively locks the selected virtual resource,

stops execution of virtual machine processes associated with the selected virtual resource, and

disables a dynamic redistribution of resources to ensure uninterrupted operation;

obtain access to the selected virtual resource;

securely erase the selected virtual resource by overwriting all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource; and

confirm that all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource have been overwritten.

18. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

map the overwriting to a physical layer associated with the virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource.

19. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

issue a certificate of sanitization indicating secure erasure of the selected virtual resource.

20. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

dereference a unique identifier of the selected virtual resource, to disassociate a logical layer having the selected virtual resource from the physical layer.

21. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

overwrite all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource in compliance with a NIST 800-88 standard.

22. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

confirm that all virtual sectors of the selected virtual resource have been overwritten using a hash value.

23. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

receive a target host and user credentials.

24. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

determine an environment processing capacity and throttle the overwriting based on the environment processing capacity.

25. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the computer readable code further configures the processor to:

identify the virtual sectors based on usage in an environment distinguishing between allocation and usage.