Secure boot with resistance to differential power analysis and other external monitoring attacks

• US 9,569,623 B2
• Filed: 02/09/2015
• Issued: 02/14/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 12/04/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Cryptography Research, Inc. (Rambus Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Cryptography Research, Inc. (Rambus Inc.)
• Inventors: Kocher, Paul C., Rohatgi, Pankaj, Jaffe, Joshua M.
• Primary Examiner(s): Arani, Taghi
• Assistant Examiner(s): Lynch, Sharon
• Application Number:
  US14/617,437
• Publication Number:
  US 20160048684A1
• Time in Patent Office: 736 Days
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1408 by using cryptography for digital transmission H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/556 involving covert channels, i.e. data leakage between processes inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack G06F21/755
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/575 Secure boot
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/755 with measures against power attack
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/76 in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2212/402 Encrypted data
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/034 Test or assess a computer or a system
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2107 File encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2125 Just-in-time application of countermeasures, e.g., on-the-fly decryption, just-in-time obfuscation or de-obfuscation
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2145 Inheriting rights or properties, e.g., propagation of permissions or restrictions within a hierarchy
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 8/71 Version control security arrangements therefor G06F21/57; Configuration management
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/44505 Configuring for program initiating, e.g. using registry, configuration files
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/061 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords H04L9/0861
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/003 for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0631 Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 : Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 : Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 : Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/16 : the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3236 : using cryptographic hash functions
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 : using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/50 : using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Abstract

A computing device includes a secure storage hardware to store a secret value and processing hardware comprising at least one of a cache or a memory. During a secure boot process the processing hardware loads untrusted data into at least one of the cache or the memory of the processing hardware, the untrusted data comprising an encrypted data segment and a validator, retrieves the secret value from the secure storage hardware, derives an initial key based at least in part on an identifier associated with the encrypted data segment and the secret value, verifies, using the validator, whether the encrypted data segment has been modified, and decrypts the encrypted data segment using a first decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a decrypted data segment responsive to verifying that the encrypted data segment has not been modified.

Claims

1. A computing device comprising:

secure storage hardware to store a secret value;

additional storage hardware;

processing hardware coupled to the secure storage hardware, the processing hardware comprising at least one of a cache or a memory; and

an interface between the processing hardware and the additional storage hardware, wherein at least one of the additional storage hardware or the interface is unsecure;

wherein during a secure boot process the processing hardware is to;

receive untrusted data from the additional storage hardware via the interface;

load the untrusted data into at least one of the cache or the memory of the processing hardware, the untrusted data comprising an encrypted data segment and a validator;

retrieve the secret value from the secure storage hardware;

derive an initial key using a path through a key tree based at least in part on an identifier associated with the encrypted data segment and the secret value;

verify, using the validator, whether the encrypted data segment has been modified; and

responsive to verifying that the encrypted data segment has not been modified, decrypt the encrypted data segment using a first decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a decrypted data segment.

2. The computing device of claim 1, wherein:

the additional storage hardware is an unsecure storage hardware; and

the interface is an unsecure interface.

3. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the processing hardware and the secure storage hardware are components of a system on a chip (SOC).

4. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the encrypted data segment comprises at least one of software or firmware, and wherein the processing hardware is further to:

retrieve a minimum acceptable version number for the software or firmware from the secure storage hardware; and

verify that the software or firmware has a version number that is equal to or greater than the minimum acceptable version number.

5. The computing device of claim 4, wherein the untrusted data comprises instructions to update the minimum acceptable version number, and wherein the processing hardware is further to:

update the minimum acceptable version number in accordance with the instructions.

6. The computing device of claim 1,

wherein the path through the key tree is based on the identifier and identifies a plurality of entropy distribution operations used to derive the initial key.

7. The computing device of claim 6, the processing hardware further to:

divide the identifier into a plurality of parts, where each of the plurality of parts determines a leg of the path, and where each leg of the path is associated with a particular entropy distribution operation of the plurality of entropy distribution operations.

8. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the untrusted data comprises a plurality of encrypted data segments, and wherein the processing hardware is further to:

apply an entropy distribution operation to the first decryption key to derive a second decryption key; and

decrypt an encrypted data segment from the plurality of encrypted data segments with the second decryption key.

9. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the untrusted data comprises a plurality of encrypted data segments, and wherein the processing hardware is further to:

receive and decrypt the plurality of encrypted data segments using hash chaining operations comprising;

decrypting a first encrypted data segment of the plurality of encrypted data segments to produce a first plaintext segment comprising a first decrypted data segment and a first hash value;

validating a second encrypted data segment using the first hash value; and

responsive to validating the second encrypted data segment, decrypting the second encrypted data segment of the plurality of encrypted data segments to produce a second plaintext segment comprising a second decrypted data segment and a second hash value.

10. The computing device of claim 1, wherein to verify that the encrypted data segment has not been modified the processing hardware is to:

compute a hash of the encrypted data segment;

generate an expected validator based on performing a plurality of entropy distribution operations on the initial key using the key tree, wherein the hash indicates a path through the key tree, the path identifying the plurality of entropy distribution operations; and

compare the expected validator to the validator.

11. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the untrusted data comprises a plurality of encrypted data segments, and wherein hash chaining operations are performed to decrypt the plurality of encrypted data segments, the hash chaining operations comprising:

cryptographically transforming a first encrypted data segment of the plurality of encrypted data segments to produce a first derived value;

comparing the first derived value with a first expected value;

responsive to determining that the first derived value matches the first expected value, decrypting the first derived value using the first decryption key to produce a first decrypted data segment and a second derived value;

comparing the second derived value with a second expected value; and

responsive to determining that the second derived value matches the second expected value, decrypting the second derived value using a second decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a second decrypted data segment.

12. A method comprising:

during a boot process, loading, by a processing device, untrusted data into at least one of a cache or a memory of the processing device, the untrusted data comprising an encrypted data segment and a validator;

deriving, by the processing device, an initial key using a path through a key tree based at least in part on an identifier associated with the encrypted data segment, a secret value and a plurality of entropy distribution operations;

verifying, using the validator, whether the encrypted data segment has been modified; and

responsive to verifying that the encrypted data segment has not been modified, decrypting the encrypted data segment using a first decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a decrypted data segment.

13. The method of claim 12, further comprising:

executing the decrypted data segment by the processing device, wherein the decrypted data segment comprises at least one of software or firmware.

14. The method of claim 12, further comprising:

responsive to a failure to successfully verify that the encrypted data segment has not been modified, removing the untrusted data from at least one of the cache or the memory.

15. The method of claim 14, further comprising:

after removing the untrusted data from at least one of the cache or the memory, repeating the loading of the untrusted data, the deriving of the initial key, and the verifying of whether the encrypted data segment has been modified.

16. The method of claim 12, wherein the encrypted data segment comprises at least one of software or firmware, the method further comprising:

determining a minimum acceptable version number for the software or firmware; and

verifying that the software or firmware has a version number that is equal to or greater than the minimum acceptable version number.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the untrusted data comprises instructions to update the minimum acceptable version number, the method further comprising:

updating the minimum acceptable version number in accordance with the instructions.

18. The method of claim 12,

wherein the path through the key tree is based on the identifier and identifies the plurality of entropy distribution operations.

19. The method of claim 18, further comprising:

dividing the identifier into a plurality of parts, where each of the plurality of parts determines a leg of the path, and where each leg of the path is associated with a particular entropy distribution operation of the plurality of entropy distribution operations.

20. The method of claim 12, wherein the untrusted data comprises a plurality of encrypted data segments, further comprising:

applying an entropy distribution operation to the first decryption key to derive a second decryption key; and

decrypting an encrypted data segment from the plurality of encrypted data segments with the second decryption key.

21. The method of claim 12, wherein the untrusted data comprises a plurality of encrypted data segments, the method further comprising:

receiving and decrypting the plurality of encrypted data segments using hash chaining operations comprising;

decrypting a first encrypted data segment of the plurality of encrypted data segments to produce a first plaintext segment comprising a first decrypted data segment and a first hash value;

validating a second encrypted data segment using the first hash value; and

responsive to validating the second encrypted data segment, decrypting the second encrypted data segment of the plurality of encrypted data segments to produce a second plaintext segment comprising a second decrypted data segment and a second hash value.

22. The method of claim 12, wherein verifying whether the encrypted data segment has been modified comprises:

computing a hash of the encrypted data segment;

generating an expected validator based on performing an additional plurality of entropy distribution operations on the initial key using the key tree, wherein the hash indicates a path through the key tree, the path identifying the additional plurality of entropy distribution operations; and

comparing the expected validator to the validator.

23. The method of claim 12, wherein the untrusted data comprises a plurality of encrypted data segments, and wherein hash chaining operations are performed to decrypt the plurality of encrypted data segments, the hash chaining operations comprising:

cryptographically transforming a first encrypted data segment of the plurality of encrypted data segments to produce a first derived value;

comparing the first derived value with a first expected value;

responsive to determining that the first derived value matches the first expected value, decrypting the first derived value using the first decryption key to produce a first decrypted data segment and a second derived value;

comparing the second derived value with a second expected value; and

responsive to determining that the second derived value matches the second expected value, decrypting the second derived value using a second decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a second decrypted data segment.

24. A computing device comprising:

secure storage hardware to store a secret value; and

processing hardware coupled to the secure storage hardware, the processing hardware comprising at least one of a cache or a memory, wherein during a secure boot process the processing hardware is to;

load untrusted data into at least one of the cache or the memory of the processing hardware, the untrusted data comprising an encrypted data segment and a validator;

retrieve the secret value from the secure storage hardware;

derive an initial key using a path through a key tree based at least in part on an identifier associated with the encrypted data segment and the secret value;

verify, using the validator, whether the encrypted data segment has been modified;

responsive to verifying that the encrypted data segment has not been modified, decrypt the encrypted data segment using a first decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a decrypted data segment; and

responsive to a failure to successfully verify that the encrypted data segment has not been modified, remove the untrusted data from at least one of the cache or the memory.