Privacy-preserving measurements of a campaign
First Claim
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
- transforming a set of identifiers indicative of participants that receive an incentive from first processing party, into a set of non-identifiers, and providing the set of non-identifiers to an external processing party, the transforming comprising,computing, by a first computational thread of a processor, a hash function on the identifiers of the participants,generating, by a second computational thread in parallel with the computing the hash function, a random exponent based on a random element, using a random number generator, andexponentiating, by a third computational thread in parallel with the generating the random exponent, the hash function by the random exponent;
receiving a set of encrypted non-identifiers that comprises the set of non-identifiers after an encryption operation is performed by the external processing party, another set of non-identifiers indicative of customers of the external processing party, a set of encrypted spending values associated with the another set of non-identifiers indicative of the customers of the external processing party, and a public cryptographic key, wherein each member of the another set of non-identifiers is associated with a corresponding member of the set of spending values;
encrypting the set of non-identifiers to generate another set of encrypted non-identifiers, and determining an intersection of the set of encrypted non-identifiers and the another set of encrypted non-identifiers to generate a set of common encrypted non-identifiers indicative of an intersection between the participants associated with the first processing party and the customers associated with the external processing party;
identifying a subset of the set of encrypted spending values associated with each of the members in the set of common encrypted non-identifiers; and
computing a total spending value based on the subset of the set of spending values, the computing comprising,performing homomorphic encryption on the subset of the set of spending values to generate encrypted spending information by generating homomorphic encryption values and a randomizing value, and multiplying the homomorphic encryption values and the randomizing value,providing the encrypted spending information to the external processing party, wherein participants associated with encrypted spending information are unidentifiable by the external processing party, wherein the external processing party decrypts the encrypted spending information to generate decrypted spending information comprising a plaintext value,the first processing party receiving the decrypted spending information, andcomputing the total spending value based on the decrypted spending information.
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Accused Products
Abstract
A method of measuring a campaign performance includes transforming identifiers into non-identifiers, and providing the non-identifiers to an external processing party; receiving encrypted non-identifiers comprising the non-identifiers after encryption by the external processing party, other non-identifiers, spending values, and a public cryptographic key, each member of the other non-identifiers being associated with a corresponding member of the spending values; encrypting the non-identifiers to generate other encrypted non-identifiers, and determining an intersection of the encrypted non-identifiers and the other encrypted non-identifiers to generate common encrypted non-identifiers; identifying a subset of the spending values associated with members of the encrypted non-identifiers in the common encrypted non-identifiers; and deriving a total spending value based on the subset of the spending values.
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Citations
6 Claims
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1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
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transforming a set of identifiers indicative of participants that receive an incentive from first processing party, into a set of non-identifiers, and providing the set of non-identifiers to an external processing party, the transforming comprising, computing, by a first computational thread of a processor, a hash function on the identifiers of the participants, generating, by a second computational thread in parallel with the computing the hash function, a random exponent based on a random element, using a random number generator, and exponentiating, by a third computational thread in parallel with the generating the random exponent, the hash function by the random exponent; receiving a set of encrypted non-identifiers that comprises the set of non-identifiers after an encryption operation is performed by the external processing party, another set of non-identifiers indicative of customers of the external processing party, a set of encrypted spending values associated with the another set of non-identifiers indicative of the customers of the external processing party, and a public cryptographic key, wherein each member of the another set of non-identifiers is associated with a corresponding member of the set of spending values; encrypting the set of non-identifiers to generate another set of encrypted non-identifiers, and determining an intersection of the set of encrypted non-identifiers and the another set of encrypted non-identifiers to generate a set of common encrypted non-identifiers indicative of an intersection between the participants associated with the first processing party and the customers associated with the external processing party; identifying a subset of the set of encrypted spending values associated with each of the members in the set of common encrypted non-identifiers; and computing a total spending value based on the subset of the set of spending values, the computing comprising, performing homomorphic encryption on the subset of the set of spending values to generate encrypted spending information by generating homomorphic encryption values and a randomizing value, and multiplying the homomorphic encryption values and the randomizing value, providing the encrypted spending information to the external processing party, wherein participants associated with encrypted spending information are unidentifiable by the external processing party, wherein the external processing party decrypts the encrypted spending information to generate decrypted spending information comprising a plaintext value, the first processing party receiving the decrypted spending information, and computing the total spending value based on the decrypted spending information. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
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Specification