Key derivation for a module using an embedded universal integrated circuit card

• US 9,742,562 B2
• Filed: 04/15/2016
• Issued: 08/22/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 09/10/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: John A. Nix
• Original Assignee: M2M and IoT Technologies LLC
• Inventors: Nix, John A.
• Primary Examiner(s): CERVETTI, DAVID GARCIA
• Application Number:
  US15/130,146
• Publication Number:
  US 20160234020A1
• Time in Patent Office: 494 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/35 communicating wirelessly
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/445 by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2105 Dual mode as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2107 File encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2115 Third party
• CPC Class Codes: H04J 11/00 Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codesH04J13/00 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2854 Wide area networks, e.g. public data networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/72 Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/045 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0464 using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/04 specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 : involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0816 : Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 : involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 : Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 : Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 : Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 : Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 : including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 : involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3239 : involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3249 : using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/02 : Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/033 : of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 : Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 : using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/40 : Security arrangements using identity modules
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 : Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 40/005 : Routing actions in the presence of nodes in sleep or doze mode
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0216 : using a pre-established activity schedule, e.g. traffic indication frame
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0235 : where the received signal is a power saving command
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0277 : according to available power supply, e.g. switching off when a low battery condition is detected
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/27 : Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/082 : for traffic bypassing of mobility servers, e.g. location registers, home PLMNs or home agents
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 80/04 : Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/12 : WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/12 : Access point controller devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 999/99 : dummy group
• CPC Class Codes: Y02D 30/70 : in wireless communication networks

Abstract

A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a received eUICC profile and a set of cryptographic algorithms. The received eUICC profile can include an initial shared secret key for authentication with a wireless network. The module can receive a key K network token and send a key K module token to the wireless network. The module can use the key K network token, a derived module private key, and a key derivation function to derive a secret shared network key K that supports communication with the wireless network. The wireless network can use the received key K module token, a network private key, and the key derivation function in order to derive the same secret shared network key K derived by the module. The module and the wireless network can subsequently use the mutually derived key K to communicate using traditional wireless network standards.

Claims

1. A method for a module using an embedded integrated circuit card (eUICC) to support authentication, the method comprising the module:

reading a module identity from a protected memory and sending the module identity to an eUICC subscription manager;

reading an eUICC subscription manager public key from the protected memory;

authenticating the eUICC subscription manager using the eUICC subscription manager public key;

receiving a first profile for the eUICC, wherein the first profile includes a first network module identity and a first key K, and wherein the module sends the module identity to the eUICC subscription manager before receiving the first profile;

using the eUICC, the first network module identity, and the first key K to authenticate with a first wireless network;

receiving from an eUICC subscription manager a server public key after authenticating with the first key K;

deriving a shared secret key using (i) the received server public key, (ii) an eUICC private key, and (iii) a shared secret algorithm;

receiving a second profile for the eUICC, wherein the module decrypts the second profile using the derived shared secret key, wherein the decrypted second profile includes a second network module identity and a second key K; and

authenticating with a second wireless network using the second network module identity and the second key K.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising authenticating with the second wireless network using the decrypted second profile, wherein the module (i) sends the second network module identity, (ii) receives a random number (RAND), (iii) uses the RAND, the second key K, and a set of cryptographic algorithms to calculate a response (RES), and (iv) sends the RES to the second wireless network.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first profile includes a first set of cryptographic parameters and the second profile includes a second set of cryptographic parameters, and wherein the module uses (i) the first set of cryptographic parameters to authenticate with the first wireless network and (ii) the second set of cryptographic parameters to authenticate with the second wireless network.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the module uses an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm with the server public key, and wherein the module uses a symmetric ciphering algorithm with the derived shared secret key to decrypt the second profile.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the first network module identity used with the first key K comprises a first international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), and wherein the second network module identity used with the second key K comprises a second IMSI.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the eUICC subscription manager derives the server public key and a server private key using a key pair generation algorithm, and wherein the eUICC subscription manager uses the server private key and the eUICC public key to derive the second shared secret key.

7. A method for a module using an embedded integrated circuit card (eUICC) to support authentication, the method comprising the module:

reading a module identity from a protected memory and sending the module identity to an eUICC subscription manager;

receiving a first profile for the eUICC, wherein the first profile includes a first network module identity and a first key K;

using the eUICC, the first network module identity, and the first key K to authenticate with a first wireless network;

receiving from an eUICC subscription manager a server public key after authenticating with the first key K;

deriving a shared secret key using (i) the received server public key, (ii) an eUICC private key, and (iii) a shared secret algorithm;

receiving a second profile for the eUICC, wherein the module decrypts the second profile using the derived shared secret key, wherein the decrypted second profile includes a second network module identity and a second key K; and

authenticating with a second wireless network using the second network module identity and the second key K, wherein the module (i) sends the second network module identity, (ii) receives a random number (RAND), (iii) uses the RAND, the second key K, and a set of cryptographic algorithms to calculate a response (RES), and (iv) sends the RES to the second wireless network.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising:

reading an eUICC subscription manager public key from the protected memory;

authenticating the eUICC subscription manager using the eUICC subscription manager public key; and

sending the module identity to the eUICC subscription manager before receiving the first profile.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the first profile includes a first set of cryptographic parameters and the second profile includes a second set of cryptographic parameters, and wherein the module uses (i) the first set of cryptographic parameters to authenticate with the first wireless network and (ii) the second set of cryptographic parameters to authenticate with the second wireless network.

10. The method of claim 7, wherein the module uses an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm with the server public key, and wherein the module uses a symmetric ciphering algorithm with the derived shared secret key to decrypt the second profile.

11. The method of claim 7, wherein the first network module identity used with the first key K comprises a first international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), and wherein the second network module identity used with the second key K comprises a second IMSI.