Digital certificate issuer-correlated digital signature verification

• US 9,749,139 B2
• Filed: 06/28/2016
• Issued: 08/29/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 06/25/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Dixon, Bret W., Rumsey, Jonathan L.
• Primary Examiner(s): KIM, TAE K
• Application Number:
  US15/194,882
• Publication Number:
  US 20160308681A1
• Time in Patent Office: 427 Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/64 Self-signed certificates
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/72 Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3265 using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model

Abstract

A message including a digital signature of a message originator is received at a processor. In response to determining that the message originator is authorized by a data protection policy to originate the message, a determination is made as to whether a specific authorized certificate issuer is configured for the message originator within a data protection policy. In response to determining that the specific authorized certificate issuer is configured for the message originator within the data protection policy, a determination is made as to whether a message originator certificate used to generate the digital signature of the message originator is issued by the specific authorized certificate issuer configured for the message originator within the data protection policy.

Claims

1. A method, comprising:

receiving, at a processor, a message comprising a digital signature of a message originator;

determining, in response to determining that the message originator is authorized by a data protection policy to originate the message, whether a specific authorized certificate issuer is required for the message originator within the data protection policy; and

in response to determining that the specific authorized certificate issuer is required for the message originator within the data protection policy;

determining whether a message originator certificate used to generate the digital signature of the message originator is issued by the specific authorized certificate issuer required for the message originator within the data protection policy.

2. The method of claim 1, where determining whether the message originator certificate used to generate the digital signature of the message originator is issued by the specific authorized certificate issuer required for the message originator within the data protection policy comprises:

identifying an indicated certificate issuer of the message originator identified within the message originator certificate;

comparing the indicated certificate issuer of the message originator identified within the message originator certificate with the specific authorized certificate issuer required for the message originator within the data protection policy; and

determining whether the indicated certificate issuer matches the specific authorized certificate issuer required for the message originator within the data protection policy.

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising identifying, in response to determining that the message originator certificate used to generate the digital signature is not issued by the specific authorized certificate issuer required for the message originator within the data protection policy, the digital signature as an invalid digital signature.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising identifying, in response to determining that the message originator certificate used to generate the digital signature is issued by the specific authorized certificate issuer required for the message originator within the data protection policy, the digital signature as a valid digital signature.

5. The method of claim 4, further comprising verifying, in response to identifying the digital signature as the valid digital signature, the digital signature of the message originator within the received message.

6. The method of claim 1, where determining, in response to determining that the message originator is authorized by the data protection policy to originate the message, whether the specific authorized certificate issuer is required for the message originator within the data protection policy comprises determining whether a mandatory certificate issuer tag is specified within the data protection policy as a separate tag relative to an authorized originator tag within the data protection policy.