Protection against tamper using in-rush current

• US 9,755,649 B1
• Filed: 02/09/2015
• Issued: 09/05/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 02/09/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Xilinx, Inc. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Xilinx, Inc. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.)
• Inventors: Singhal, Richa, Jordan, Edmond, Ansari, Ahmad R.
• Primary Examiner(s): Richardson, Jany
• Application Number:
  US14/617,424
• Time in Patent Office: 939 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H03K 19/17768 for security

Abstract

A method for protecting an integrated circuit device against security violations includes monitoring a component of the integrated circuit device for security violations. A security violation of the component of the integrated circuit device is then identified. The component of the integrated circuit device is then internally destroyed in response to the identified security violation by providing current to the component beyond a tolerable limit of the component.

Claims

1. A method for protecting an integrated circuit device against security violations, comprising:

monitoring a characteristic of a component of the integrated circuit device for security violations;

identifying a security violation of the component of the integrated circuit device, wherein the act of identifying the security violation comprises identifying an attempted security breach of the integrated circuit device, wherein the act of identifying the security violation of the component of the integrated circuit device comprises determining whether the characteristic of the component being monitored has a variation that is outside a threshold, and wherein the act of identifying the security violation comprises identifying a voltage change, identifying a frequency characteristic change, or identifying a security key-code change; and

in response to the identified security violation, performing an act comprising (a) internally destroying the component of the integrated circuit device by providing current to the component beyond a tolerable limit of the component, (b) powering down the integrated circuit device, (c) restarting the component, or (d) taking no action.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein destroying the component of the integrated circuit device in response to the identified security violation comprises:

providing a first amount of current to the component;

verifying the destruction of the component; and

providing one or more additional amounts of current to the component until the destruction of the component is verified.

3. The method of claim 1, further comprises:

internally destroying one or more other components of the integrated circuit device in response to the identified security violation by providing current to the one or more other components beyond tolerable limits for the one or more components.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein internally destroying the component and the one or more other components of the integrated circuit device comprises destroying all of the components that are in the same domain of the integrated circuit device or that are associated with the security violation.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprises:

burning an eFuse of the integrated circuit devices in response to the identified security violation, the eFuse having computer logic that is etched or hard-coded.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the component is located within a processing system (PS) domain of the integrated circuit device, or within a programmable logic (PL) domain of the integrated circuit device.

7. The method of claim 1, further comprising determining that the security violation is directed at accessing sensitive information before internally destroying the component of the integrated circuit device.

8. The method of claim 1, further comprising identifying a type of the identified security violation from a plurality of different types of security violations, or identifying a level of treat of the identified security violation from a plurality of different levels of threat;

wherein the act is in line with the identified type of the identified security violation, or is in line with the identified level of threat.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the component comprises a memory, and wherein the method further comprises destroying an additional component of the integrated circuit device in response to the identified security violation, wherein the additional component is different from the memory.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the component being monitored is in a processing system (PS) domain, and wherein the method further comprises monitoring an additional component of the integrated circuit in a programmable logic (PL) domain for security violations.

11. An integrated circuit device, comprising:

a processor system (PS) domain;

a programmable logic (PL) domain; and

a power management module configured to, in response to an identified security violation of the integrated circuit device, (a) internally destroy one or more components of the integrated circuit device by providing current to the one or more components beyond tolerable limits of the one or more components, (b) power down the integrated circuit device, (c) restart the one or more components, or (d) take no action, wherein the security violation comprises an attempted security breach of the integrated circuit device;

wherein the identified security violation comprises an identified variation of a characteristic of the one or more components being monitored, the identified variation comprising voltage change, an identified frequency characteristic change, or an identified security key-code change.

12. The integrated circuit device of claim 11, wherein the power management module is located within the processor system (PS) domain or within the programmable logic (PL) domain.

13. The integrated circuit device of claim 11, further comprising a tamper module configured to identify security violations of the one or more components.

14. The integrated circuit device of claim 13, wherein the tamper module is located within the processor system (PS) domain and configured to identify security violations of components within the processor system (PS) domain, or is located within the programmable logic (PL) domain and configured to identify security violations of components within the programmable logic (PL) domain.

15. The integrated circuit device of claim 13, wherein the tamper module is located within the processor system (PS) domain and configured to identify security violations of components within the programmable logic (PL) domain and those of components within the processor system (PS) domain.

16. The integrated circuit device of claim 11, further comprising:

one or more eFuses for dynamically reprogramming the integrated circuit device, the one or more eFuses having computer logic that is etched or hard-coded; and

wherein the power management module is further configured to burn the one or more eFuses in response to the identified security violation.

17. The integrated circuit device of claim 11, wherein the power management module is configured to identify a type of the identified security violation from a plurality of different types of security violations, or to identify a level of threat of the identified security violation from a plurality of different levels of threat;

and

wherein the power management module is configured to perform one of the acts of (a)-(d) that is in line with the identified type of the identified security violation, or that is in line with the identified level of threat.

18. The integrated circuit device of claim 11, wherein the one or more components comprise a memory, and wherein the power management module is configured to destroy an additional component of the integrated circuit device in response to the identified security violation, wherein the additional component is different from the memory.

19. The integrated circuit device of claim 11, wherein the one or more components comprise a first component in the PS domain, and a second component in the PL domain.