Methods for secure cryptogram generation

• US 9,813,245 B2
• Filed: 08/31/2015
• Issued: 11/07/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 08/29/2014
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Visa International Service Association (Visa, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Visa International Service Association (Visa, Inc.)
• Inventors: Le Saint, Eric, Gordon, James, Joshi, Roopesh
• Primary Examiner(s): Shehni, Ghazal
• Application Number:
  US14/841,589
• Publication Number:
  US 20160065370A1
• Time in Patent Office: 799 Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority

Abstract

Embodiments of the invention introduce efficient methods for securely generating a cryptogram by a user device, and validating the cryptogram by a server computer. In some embodiments, a secure communication can be conducted whereby a user device provides a cryptogram without requiring the user device to persistently store an encryption key or other sensitive data used to generate the cryptogram. For example, the user device and server computer can mutually authenticate and establish a shared secret. Using the shared secret, the server computer can derive a session key and transmit key derivation parameters encrypted using the session key to the user device. The user device can also derive the session key using the shared secret, decrypt the encrypted key derivation parameters, and store the key derivation parameters. Key derivation parameters and the shared secret can be used to generate a single use cryptogram key. The cryptogram key can be used to generate a cryptogram for conducting secure communications.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method comprising:

determining, by a user device, an ephemeral key pair comprising an ephemeral public key and an ephemeral private key;

sending, by the user device, a provisioning request message including the ephemeral public key to a provisioning server computer;

receiving, by the user device, a provisioning response message including encrypted credentials from the provisioning server computer;

determining, by the user device, a response shared secret using the ephemeral private key and a static server public key;

decrypting, by the user device, the encrypted credentials using the response shared secret to determine credentials;

obtaining key derivation parameters from the credentials; and

deriving a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret using the key derivation parameters, the first cryptogram key operable to generate a first cryptogram for use in a first secure communication with a validation server computer.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the credentials include a limited use key that is used, by the user device, to derive the first cryptogram key, wherein the validation server computer has access to the limited use key.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:

generating, by the user device, a request shared secret using the ephemeral private key and a static server public key; and

encrypting, by the user device, request data using the request shared secret to obtain encrypted request data, wherein the provisioning request message includes the encrypted request data.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the response shared secret is determined using a blinded key that is derived from the static server public key, thereby using the static server public key to determine the response shared secret, and wherein the provisioning response message also includes the blinded key.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the response shared secret is determined without a blinded key, wherein the credentials include a cryptographic nonce, and wherein the first cryptogram key is further derived using the cryptographic nonce.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:

updating, by the user device, the response shared secret to determine an updated shared secret using update parameters, the credentials including the update parameters;

deriving, by the user device, a second cryptogram key using the updated shared secret and the key derivation parameters;

generating, by the user device, a second cryptogram using the second cryptogram key; and

conducting, by the user device, a second secure communication with the validation server computer using the second cryptogram.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, further comprising:

generating, by the user device, new shared secrets for each of a plurality of new secure communications, each new shared secret generated using a previous shared secret and the update parameters;

deriving, by the user device, new cryptogram keys using the new shared secrets and the key derivation parameters;

generating, by the user device, new cryptograms using the new cryptogram key; and

conducting, by the user device, the new secure communications with the validation server computer using the new cryptograms.

8. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, wherein the second cryptogram is further generated using data based on cryptogram derivation parameters included in the credentials, and wherein the second secure communication is an authorization request, wherein the second cryptogram authenticates at least one element of the authorization request.

9. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, wherein the deriving of the second cryptogram key also uses the key derivation parameters included in the credentials.

10. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving, by the user device, first registration data;

encrypting, by the user device, the first registration data using the first cryptogram key to generate the first cryptogram, the first cryptogram being a registration cryptogram; and

sending, by the user device, the registration cryptogram to a registration server computer, wherein the registration server computer authenticates the user device using the registration cryptogram.

11. The computer-implemented method of claim 10, further comprising:

storing, by the user device, the response shared secret, and wherein sending the registration cryptogram to the registration server computer comprises encrypting the registration cryptogram using the response shared secret.

12. The computer-implemented method of claim 10, further comprising:

receiving, by the user device, second registration data;

generating, by the user device, a second ephemeral key pair comprising a second ephemeral public key and a second ephemeral private key;

sending, by the user device to the registration server computer, a renewal request message including the registration cryptogram and the second ephemeral public key;

receiving, by the user device, a renewal response message including second key derivation parameters;

deriving, by the user device, a second cryptogram key using the second key derivation parameters;

generating, by the user device, a second registration cryptogram using the second cryptogram key and the second registration data; and

sending, by the user device, the second registration cryptogram to the registration server computer, wherein the second registration cryptogram authenticates the user device.

13. The computer-implemented method of claim 12, wherein the renewal request message further includes a hash of the second registration data.

14. A computer-implemented method comprising:

receiving, by a server computer, a provisioning request message including an ephemeral public key from a user device;

determining, by the server computer, a request shared secret using the ephemeral public key and a static server private key;

generating, by the server computer, a response shared secret using the static server private key and the ephemeral public key;

obtaining key derivation parameters for deriving a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret;

encrypting, by the server computer, credentials using the response shared secret to determine encrypted response data, the credentials including the key derivation parameters; and

sending, by the server computer, to the user device, a provisioning response message including the encrypted response data.

15. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the server computer acts as a validation server, the method further comprising:

receiving, by the server computer from the user device, a user cryptogram for validating a secure communication;

deriving a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret using the key derivation parameters;

generating a first cryptogram using the first cryptogram key and cryptogram derivation parameters, the credentials including the cryptogram derivation parameters; and

validating, by the server computer, the user cryptogram by comparing the user cryptogram to the first cryptogram.

16. The computer-implemented method of claim 15, further comprising:

updating, by the server computer, the response shared secret to determine an updated shared secret;

receiving, by the server computer from the user device, a new cryptogram for validating a new secure communication;

deriving a second cryptogram key from the updated shared secret using the key derivation parameters;

generating a second cryptogram using the second cryptogram key and the cryptogram derivation parameters; and

validating, by the server computer, the new cryptogram by comparing the new cryptogram to the second cryptogram.

17. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the server computer acts as a registration server, the method further comprising:

providing, by the server computer, first registration data to the user device;

receiving, by the server computer, a user registration cryptogram from the user device;

deriving a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret using the key derivation parameters;

encrypting, by the server computer, the first registration data using the first cryptogram key to generate a first registration cryptogram; and

verifying, by the server computer, the user registration cryptogram by comparing the user registration cryptogram to the first registration cryptogram, wherein the user device is authenticated if the first registration cryptogram is verified.

18. The computer-implemented method of claim 17, wherein the first registration data includes a one-time password.

19. The computer-implemented method of claim 17, wherein the server computer acts as a renewal server and further comprising:

sending second registration data to the user device;

receiving a renewal request message from the user device, the renewal request message including the user registration cryptogram and a second ephemeral public key from the user device;

validating the user registration cryptogram;

sending a renewal response message to the user device including second key derivation parameters;

receiving a second registration cryptogram from the user device; and

validating the second registration cryptogram using the second registration data.

20. A computer system, comprising:

a memory that stores computer-executable instructions; and

a processor configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to;

determine an ephemeral key pair comprising an ephemeral public key and an ephemeral private key;

send a provisioning request message including the ephemeral public key to a provisioning server computer;

receive a provisioning response message including encrypted credentials from the provisioning server computer;

determine a response shared secret using the ephemeral private key and a static server public key;

decrypt the encrypted credentials using the response shared secret to determine credentials;

obtain key derivation parameters from the credentials; and

derive a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret using the key derivation parameters, the first cryptogram key operable to generate a first cryptogram for use in a first secure communication with a validation server computer.

21. The computer system of claim 20, wherein the credentials include a limited use key that is used, by the processor, to derive the first cryptogram key, wherein the validation server computer has access to the limited use key.

22. The computer system of claim 20, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

generate a request shared secret using the ephemeral private key and a static server public key; and

encrypt request data using the request shared secret to obtain encrypted request data, wherein the provisioning request message includes the encrypted request data.

23. The computer system of claim 20, wherein the response shared secret is determined using a blinded key that is derived from the static server public key, thereby using the static server public key to determine the response shared secret, and wherein the provisioning response message also includes the blinded key.

24. The computer system of claim 20, wherein the response shared secret is determined without a blinded key, wherein the credentials include a cryptographic nonce, and wherein the first cryptogram key is further derived using the cryptographic nonce.

25. The computer system of claim 20, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

update the response shared secret to determine an updated shared secret using update parameters, the credentials including the update parameters;

derive a second cryptogram key using the updated shared secret and the key derivation parameters;

generate a second cryptogram using the second cryptogram key; and

conduct a second secure communication with the validation server computer using the second cryptogram.

26. The computer system of claim 25, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

generate new shared secrets for each of a plurality of new secure communications, each new shared secret generated using a previous shared secret and the update parameters;

derive new cryptogram keys using the new shared secrets and the key derivation parameters;

generate new cryptograms using the new cryptogram key; and

conduct the new secure communications with the validation server computer using the new cryptograms.

27. The computer system of claim 25, wherein the second cryptogram is further generated using data based on cryptogram derivation parameters included in the credentials, and wherein the second secure communication is an authorization request, wherein the second cryptogram authenticates at least one element of the authorization request.

28. The computer system of claim 25, wherein the deriving of the second cryptogram key also uses the key derivation parameters included in the credentials.

29. The computer system of claim 20, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

receive first registration data;

encrypt the first registration data using the first cryptogram key to generate the first cryptogram, the first cryptogram being a registration cryptogram; and

send the registration cryptogram to a registration server computer, wherein the registration server computer authenticates the user device using the registration cryptogram.

30. The computer system of claim 29, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

store the response shared secret, and wherein sending the registration cryptogram to the registration server computer comprises encrypting the registration cryptogram using the response shared secret.

31. The computer system of claim 29, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

receive second registration data;

generate a second ephemeral key pair comprising a second ephemeral public key and a second ephemeral private key;

send, to the registration server computer, a renewal request message including the registration cryptogram and the second ephemeral public key.

receive a renewal response message including second key derivation parameters;

derive a second cryptogram key using the second key derivation parameters;

generate a second registration cryptogram using the second cryptogram key and the second registration data; and

send the second registration cryptogram to the registration server computer,

wherein the second registration cryptogram authenticates the user device.

32. The computer system of claim 31, wherein the renewal request message further includes a hash of the second registration data.

33. A computer system, comprising:

a memory that stores computer-executable instructions; and

a processor configured to access the memory and execute the computer- executable instructions to;

receive a provisioning request message including an ephemeral public key from a user device;

determine a request shared secret using the ephemeral public key and a static server private key;

generate a response shared secret using the static server private key and the ephemeral public key;

obtain key derivation parameters for deriving a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret;

encrypt credentials using the response shared secret to determine encrypted response data, the credentials including the key derivation parameters; and

send, to the user device, a provisioning response message including the encrypted response data.

34. The computer system of claim 33, wherein the computer system acts as a validation server and the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

receive, from the user device;

a user cryptogram for validating a secure communication;

derive a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret using the key derivation parameters;

generate a first cryptogram using the first cryptogram key and cryptogram derivation parameters, the credentials including the cryptogram derivation parameters; and

validate the user cryptogram by comparing the user cryptogram to the first cryptogram.

35. The computer system of claim 34, wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

update the response shared secret to determine an updated shared secret;

receive, from the user device, a new cryptogram for validating a new secure communication;

derive a second cryptogram key from the updated shared secret using the key derivation parameters;

generate a second cryptogram using the second cryptogram key and the cryptogram derivation parameters; and

validate the new cryptogram by comparing the new cryptogram to the second cryptogram.

36. The computer system of claim 33, wherein the computer system acts as a registration server and the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

provide first registration data to the user device;

receive a user registration cryptogram from the user device;

derive a first cryptogram key from the response shared secret using the key derivation parameters;

encrypt the first registration data using the first cryptogram key to generate a first registration cryptogram; and

verify the user registration cryptogram by comparing the user registration cryptogram to the first registration cryptogram, wherein the user device is authenticated if the first registration cryptogram is verified.

37. The computer system of claim 36, wherein the first registration data includes a one-time password.

38. The computer system of claim 36, wherein the computer system acts as a renewal server and wherein the processor is further configured to access the memory and execute the computer-executable instructions to:

send second registration data to the user device;

receive a renewal request message from the user device, the renewal request message including the user registration cryptogram and a second ephemeral public key from the user device;

validate the user registration cryptogram;

send a renewal response message to the user device including second key derivation parameters;

receive a second registration cryptogram from the user device; and

validate the second registration cryptogram using the second registration data.