Method and apparatus for enabling machine to machine communication

• US 9,826,335 B2
• Filed: 01/21/2009
• Issued: 11/21/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 01/18/2008
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: InterDigital Patent Holdings, Inc. (InterDigital, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: InterDigital Patent Holdings, Inc. (InterDigital, Inc.)
• Inventors: Cha, Inhyok, Shah, Yogendra C., Schmidt, Andreas U., Meyerstein, Michael V.
• Primary Examiner(s): TRAN, ELLEN C
• Application Number:
  US12/863,009
• Publication Number:
  US 20110265158A1
• Time in Patent Office: 3,226 Days
• Field of Search: 726 2, 726 3, 726 6
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/57 Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/575 Secure boot
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2101 Auditing as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2105 Dual mode as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2151 Time stamp
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2153 Using hardware token as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/12 Applying verification of the received information cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/10 in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network software deployment G06F8/60; multiprogramming arrangements G06F9/46
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/125 involving control of end-device applications over a network
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/08 Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting key management in a packet data network H04L63/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/08 Access security
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/10 Integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/35 Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/75 Temporary identity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 24/00 Supervisory, monitoring or testing arrangements
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/00 : Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/50 : Service provisioning or reconfiguring
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 : Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/06 : Registration at serving network Location Register, VLR or user mobility server
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/22 : with access to wired networks

Abstract

A method and apparatus for performing secure Machine-to-Machine (M2M) provisioning and communication is disclosed. In particular a temporary private identifier, or provisional connectivity identification (PCID), for uniquely identifying machine-to-machine equipment (M2ME) is also disclosed. Additionally, methods and apparatus for use in validating, authenticating and provisioning a M2ME is also disclosed. The validation procedures disclosed include an autonomous, semi-autonomous, and remote validation are disclosed. The provisioning procedures include methods for re-provisioning the M2ME. Procedures for updating software, and detecting tampering with the M2ME are also disclosed.

Claims

1. In a system comprising a visited network operator (VNO), a registration operator (RO), and a machine-to-machine equipment (M2ME) having a trusted environment (TRE), wherein the VNO, RO, and M2ME communicate via a network, a method performed by the M2ME, the method comprising:

transmitting, to the VNO, a network attach request message comprising a temporary private identifier;

authenticating with the VNO using the temporary private identifier, the temporary private identifier being a provisional connectivity identification (PCID) valid for a validity period;

generating, by the TRE, security-critical executable code and sending the security-critical executable code to a platform verification authority;

receiving authentication vectors if the platform verification authority validates an integrity, using the security-critical executable code, of the TRE that is within the M2ME;

after the M2ME is authenticated with the VNO and after the TRE is validated by the platform verification authority, establishing IP connectivity with the RO via the VNO;

receiving a manageable identity (MID) from the RO;

provisioning the MID on the M2ME and reporting a success message to the RO; and

when the validity period expires, removing the PCID such that another M2ME can use the PCID.

2. The method of claim 1, the method further comprising:

validating the M2ME; and

based on the validation of the M2ME, sending a validation success message or a validation failure message to the platform verification authority via the VNO.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the validation of the M2ME is at least partially determined based on a validation procedure performed by the trusted environment (TRE) within the M2ME.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the validation procedure is performed autonomously within the M2ME.

5. The method of claim 3, where in the validation procedure is performed semi-autonomously by the M2ME.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the MID comprises at least one of a universal mobile telecommunications (UMTS) subscriber identity module (USIM) function, credentials, or configuration information which enable the M2ME to authenticate with a selected home operator (SHO).

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the RO comprises an initial connectivity function (ICF), a discovery and registration function (DRF), and a download and provisioning function (DPF).

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the initial connectivity function (ICF), the discovery and registration function (DRF), and the download and provisioning function (DPF) are separate entities in the network.

9. A machine-to-machine equipment (M2ME) configured to communicate, via a network, with a visited network operator (VNO) and a registration operator (RO), the M2ME having a trusted environment (TRE), the M2ME comprising:

a memory comprising executable instructions; and

a processor in communication with the memory, the instructions, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to effectuate operations comprising;

transmitting, to the VNO, a network attach request message comprising a temporary private identifier;

authenticating with the VNO using the temporary private identifier, the temporary private identifier being a provisional connectivity identification (PCID) valid for a validity period;

generating, by TRE, security-critical executable code and sending the security-critical executable code to a platform verification authority;

receiving authentication vectors if the platform verification authority validates an integrity, using the security-critical executable code, of the TRE that is within the M2ME;

after the M2ME is authenticated with the VNO and after the TRE is validated by the platform verification authority, establishing IP connectivity with the RO via the VNO;

receiving a manageable identity (MID) from the RO;

provisioning the MID on the M2ME and reporting a success message to the RO; and

when the validity period expires, removing the PCID such that another M2ME can use the PCID.

10. The M2ME of claim 9, wherein the processor is further configured to execute the instructions to perform operations comprising:

validating the M2ME; and

based on the validation of the M2ME, sending a validation success message or a validation failure message to platform verification authority via the VNO.

11. The M2ME of claim 10, wherein the validation of the M2ME is at least partially determined based on a validation procedure performed by the trusted environment (TRE) within the M2ME.

12. The M2ME of claim 11, wherein the validation procedure is performed autonomously within the M2ME.

13. The M2ME of claim 11, where in the validation procedure is performed semi-autonomously by the M2ME.

14. The M2ME of claim 9, wherein the MID comprises at least one of a universal mobile telecommunications (UMTS) subscriber identity module (USIM) function, credentials, or configuration information which enable the M2ME to authenticate with a selected home operator (SHO).

15. The M2ME of claim 9, wherein the RO comprises an initial connectivity function (ICF), a discovery and registration function (DRF), and a download and provisioning function (DPF).

16. The M2ME of claim 15, wherein the initial connectivity function (ICF), the discovery and registration function (DRF), and the download and provisioning function (DPF) are separate entities in the network.