Trusted service manager (TSM) architectures and methods

• US 9,852,418 B2
• Filed: 03/11/2013
• Issued: 12/26/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 06/06/2008
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: PayPal, Inc. (PayPal Holdings, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: PayPal, Inc. (PayPal Holdings, Inc.)
• Inventors: Mardikar, Upendra
• Primary Examiner(s): OBEID, MAMON A
• Application Number:
  US13/794,025
• Publication Number:
  US 20130198086A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,751 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/1085 involving automatic teller machines [ATMs]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/20 Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/204 comprising interface for record bearing medium or carrier for electronic funds transfer or payment credit
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3223 Realising banking transactions through M-devices
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3227 using secure elements embedded in M-devices
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3265 characterised by personalisation for use
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3278 RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/367 involving electronic purses or money safes
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/382 insuring higher security of transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3821 Electronic credentials
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3829 involving key management
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40 Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/4012 Verifying personal identification numbers [PIN]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40145 Biometric identity checks
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/00 Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/257 electronically G07C9/26 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/0826 Embedded security module
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 : using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0861 : using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using biological data H04L9/3231
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3231 : Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using biometrical features in a packet data network H04L63/0861
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 : using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/80 : Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Abstract

A client device comprises a first secure element and a second secure element. The first secure element comprises a first computer-readable medium having a payment application comprising instructions for causing the client device to initiate a financial transaction. The second secure element comprises a second computer-readable medium having a security key, a payment instrument, stored authentication data and instructions for generating a secure payment information message responsive to the payment application. The secure payment information message comprises the payment instrument and is encrypted in accordance with the security key.

Claims

1. A trusted service manager (TSM) server comprising:

a non-transitory machine-readable memory containing instructions to facilitate transactions via short message service (SMS) over a network; and

one or more hardware processors coupled to the non-transitory machine-readable memory and configured to read instructions from the non-transitory machine-readable memory to cause the TSM server to perform operations comprising;

generating a random key for a client device;

encrypting the random key using a public certificate of the client device;

transmitting, via a first encrypted channel, the random key to a crypto secure element included in the client device;

registering the client device with the TSM server via the crypto secure element by storing authentication data in the crypto secure element, the client device being registered exclusive of an app secure element that is physically separate from the crypto secure element, wherein the random key, the authentication data, and data corresponding to a payment instrument are excluded from the app secure element;

signing a payment application using a public key of the TSM server;

transmitting, via a second encrypted channel, the payment application to the app secure element of the client device;

after the transmitting the payment application to the app secure element, receiving, from the payment application, an encrypted SMS message comprising a payment certificate and an address of a service provider (SP), wherein the payment certificate is sent from the crypto secure element to the payment application in response to the crypto secure element authenticating biometric information of a user associated with the client device inputted to the crypto secure element via a secure tunnel, and wherein the SMS message from the client device is encrypted in accordance with the random key;

decrypting the SMS message using the random key and determining the address of the SP;

re-encrypting the SMS message using a second stored key corresponding to the SP; and

forwarding the re-encrypted SMS message to the SP.

2. The trusted service manager server of claim 1, wherein the operations further comprise:

signing a second payment application using the public key of the TSM server, the second payment application corresponding to a second SP that is different from the SP; and

transmitting the second payment application to the app secure element, wherein the transmitting the payment application and the transmitting the second payment application are performed based on the registering the client device with the TSM server.

3. The trusted service manager server of claim 1, wherein the random key is established using Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange.

4. The trusted service manager server of claim 1, wherein the encrypted SMS message is a secure SMS message addressed to the trusted service manager (TSM) and comprising the address for the service provider (SP) to which the TSM server is to forward the encrypted SMS message.

5. The trusted service manager server of claim 1, wherein the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached.

6. The trusted service manager server of claim 1, wherein:

the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached, and

the SHA-512 HMAC is 64 bytes in binary and truncation is used to bring data to 32 bytes of BASE-64 encoding.

7. The trusted service manager server of claim 1, wherein:

the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached, and

a counter tags the encrypted SMS message for replay protection.

8. A method of facilitating transactions via short message service (SMS) over a network comprising:

generating, by a trusted service manager (TSM) server, a random key for a client device;

encrypting the random key using a public certificate of the client device;

transmitting, via a first encrypted channel, the random key to a crypto secure element included in the client device;

registering the client device with the TSM server via the crypto secure element by storing authentication data in the crypto secure element, the client device being registered exclusive of an app secure element that is physically separate from the crypto secure element, wherein the random key, the authentication data, and data corresponding to a payment instrument are excluded from the app secure element;

signing a payment application using a public key of the TSM server;

transmitting, via a second encrypted channel, the payment application to the app secure element of the client device;

after the transmitting the payment application to the app secure element, receiving, from the payment application, an encrypted SMS message comprising a payment certificate and an address of a service provider (SP), wherein the payment certificate is sent from the crypto secure element to the payment application in response to the crypto secure element authenticating biometric information of a user associated with the client device inputted to the crypto secure element via a secure tunnel, and wherein the SMS message from the client device is encrypted in accordance with the random key;

decrypting the SMS message using the random key and determining the address of the SP;

re-encrypting the SMS message using a second stored key corresponding to the SP; and

forwarding the re-encrypted SMS message to the SP.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the random key comprises AES-256 and SHA-512.

10. The method of claim 8, wherein the random key is established using Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange.

11. The method of claim 8, wherein the encrypted SMS message is a secure SMS message addressed to the trusted service manager (TSM) server and comprising the address for the service provider (SP) to which the TSM server is to forward the encrypted SMS message.

12. The method of claim 8, wherein the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached.

13. The method of claim 8, wherein:

the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached, and

the SHA-512 HMAC is 64 bytes in binary and truncation is used to bring data to 32 bytes of BASE-64 encoding.

14. The method of claim 8, wherein:

the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached, and

a counter tags the encrypted SMS message for replay protection.

15. A non-transitory machine-readable medium having stored thereon machine-readable instructions executable to cause a trusted service manager (TSM) server to perform operations comprising:

generating a random key for a client device;

encrypting the random key using a public certificate of the client device;

transmitting, via a first encrypted channel, the random key to a crypto secure element included in the client device;

registering the client device with the TSM server via the crypto secure element by storing authentication data in the crypto secure element, the client device being registered exclusive of an app secure element that is physically separate from the crypto secure element, wherein the random key, the authentication data, and data corresponding to a payment instrument are excluded from the app secure element;

signing a payment application using a public key of the TSM server;

transmitting, via a second encrypted channel, the payment application to the app secure element of the client device;

after the transmitting the payment application to the app secure element, receiving, from the payment application, an encrypted SMS message comprising a payment certificate and an address of a service provider (SP), wherein the payment certificate is sent from the crypto secure element to the payment application in response to the crypto secure element authenticating biometric information of a user associated with the client device inputted to the crypto secure element via a secure tunnel, and wherein the SMS message from the client device is encrypted in accordance with the random key;

decrypting the SMS message using the random key and determining the address of the SP;

re-encrypting the SMS message using a second stored key corresponding to the SP; and

forwarding the re-encrypted SMS message to the SP.

16. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the random key comprises AES-256 and SHA-512.

17. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the random key is established using Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange.

18. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the encrypted SMS message is a secure SMS message addressed to the trusted service manager (TSM) server and comprising the address for the service provider (SP) to which the TSM is to forward the encrypted SMS message.

19. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached.

20. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 15, wherein:

the encrypted SMS message is sent by a secure SMS, wherein when an SMS is sent, the message is encrypted using AES-256, and SHA-512 HMAC is attached, and

the SHA-512 HMAC is 64 bytes in binary and truncation is used to bring data to 32 bytes of BASE-64 encoding.