Systems, methods, and devices for secure device-to-device discovery and communication

• US 9,893,894 B2
• Filed: 09/23/2015
• Issued: 02/13/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 03/13/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Apple Inc.
• Original Assignee: Intel IP Corporation (Intel Corporation)
• Inventors: Stojanovski, Alexandre S., Adrangi, Farid
• Primary Examiner(s): Patel, Ashok
• Assistant Examiner(s): Almamun, Abdullah
• Application Number:
  US14/863,168
• Publication Number:
  US 20160269185A1
• Time in Patent Office: 874 Days
• Field of Search: 713176
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/72 Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/083 involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3252 using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/14 Direct-mode setup
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/005 Discovery of network devices, e.g. terminals

Abstract

A user equipment (UE) is configured to send a direct communication request to a peer UE, wherein the direct communication request comprises a signature authenticating an identity of the UE. The UE is configured to process a direct communication response from the peer UE to authenticate an identity of the peer UE, wherein the direct communication response comprises a signature authenticating the identity of the peer UE. In response to processing the direct communication response from the peer UE to authenticate the identity of the peer UE, the UE is configured to engage in direct communication with the peer UE.

Claims

1. User equipment (UE), comprising:

a memory device to store instructions; and

a baseband processor to execute the instructions to;

process a discovery response message from a peer UE to determine whether or not the discovery response message includes a payload comprising first a shared secret value (SSV);

generate a direct communication request to the peer UE, wherein the direct communication request comprises a first signature authenticating an identity of a user of the UE;

if the discovery response message includes the payload comprising the first SSV, use the first SSV provided in the payload of the discovery response message to encrypt the direct communication request;

if the discovery response message does not include the payload comprising the first SSV, generate a second SSV to share with the peer UE and encode the second SSV into a payload of the direct communication request;

decrypt, using the first SSV if included in the discovery response message, or using the second SSV if the first SSV is not included in the discovery response message, a direct communication response from the peer UE to authenticate an identity of the peer UE, wherein the direct communication response comprises a second signature authenticating the identity of a user of the peer UE; and

in response to the direct communication response from the peer UE to authenticate the identity of the peer UE, engage in direct communication with the peer UE using the first SSV if included in the discovery response message, or using the second SSV if the first SSV is not included in the discovery response message,

wherein common key material, for communication between the UE and the peer UE, is generated and communicated between the UE and the peer UE based on a Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption (SAKKE) scheme.

2. The UE of claim 1, wherein one or more of the first signature authenticating the identity of the user of the UE and the second signature authenticating the identity of the user of the peer UE comprise a signature based on an Elliptic Curve-based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-based Encryption (ECCSI) signature scheme.

3. The UE of claim 1, wherein one or more of the direct communication request and the direct communication response comprise messages for establishment of a secure layer-2 link between the UE and the peer UE.

4. The UE of claim 1, wherein the baseband processor is further configured to agree on the common key material for communication between the UE and the peer UE, wherein the common key material is used for encoding or decoding communications between the UE and the peer UE.

5. The UE in claim 4, wherein the baseband processor is configured to agree on the common key material by generating the common key material for communication to the peer UE or processing the common key material received from the peer UE.

6. The UE in claim 5, wherein the common key material is included as part of a SAKKE payload within the direct communication request or the direct communication response.

7. The UE of claim 1, wherein one or more of the first signature authenticating the identity of the user of the UE and the second signature authenticating the identity of the user of the peer UE is computed over one or more other parameters in a corresponding message for message integrity protection.

8. A baseband processor comprising:

memory to store an identity of a user corresponding to the baseband processor; and

circuitry to;

discover, based on a discovery response message, a proximal user equipment (UE);

determine whether the discovery response message includes a first shared secret value (SSV);

format a message comprising a payload authenticating the identity of the user corresponding to the baseband processor to send to the proximal UE;

if the discovery response message includes the first SSV, encrypt the message comprising the payload using the first SSV;

if the discovery response message does not include the first SSV, generate a second SSV to include in the payload to share with the proximal UE;

authenticate an identity of a user of the proximal UE; and

communicate directly with the proximal UE to encrypt and decrypt direct messages using the first or second SSV,

wherein common key material, for communication with the proximal UE, is generated and communicated with the proximal UE based on a Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption (SAKKE) scheme.

9. The baseband processor of claim 8, wherein the message comprises a message to establish direct communication between a UE corresponding to the baseband processor and the at least one of the one or more proximal UE.

10. The baseband processor of claim 8, wherein the circuitry is further configured to determine a secret key for communication between the proximal UE and a UE corresponding to the baseband processor, wherein the circuitry is configured to encode or decode communications between the proximal UE and a UE corresponding to the baseband processor based on the secret key.

11. The baseband processor of claim 8, wherein the payload comprises the identity of the user corresponding to the baseband processor and a signature based on an Elliptic Curve-based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-based Encryption (ECCSI) signature scheme.