Wireless firmware updates

• US 9,894,066 B2
• Filed: 10/14/2015
• Issued: 02/13/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 07/30/2014
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Master Lock Company LLC (Fortune Brands Innovations, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Master Lock Company LLC (Fortune Brands Innovations, Inc.)
• Inventors: Conrad, Nathan
• Primary Examiner(s): Armouche, Hadi
• Assistant Examiner(s): TAYLOR, SAKINAH W
• Application Number:
  US14/883,524
• Publication Number:
  US 20160036814A1
• Time in Patent Office: 853 Days
• Field of Search: 713185
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 2009/00825 remotely by lines or wireless communication
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/00309 operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/068 using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0876 based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/102 Entity profiles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/34 involving the movement of software or configuration parameters network booting or remote initial program loading [RIPL] G06F9/4416
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/08 Access security
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/35 Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/43 using shared identity modules, e.g. SIM sharing
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/80 Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Abstract

Disclosed are methods and devices for securely updating firmware of locking devices. One method includes receiving a lock identifier from a locking device; determining that the lock identifier is associated with a user profile by comparing the lock identifier to a set of lock identifiers; receiving a firmware update packet from a server, wherein the firmware packet is encrypted by a lock key; transmitting the firmware update packet to the lock; decrypting the firmware update using the lock key; validating the encrypted firmware update; and installing the firmware update.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

receiving, at a user device, from a server, one or more firmware update packets, and wherein the one or more firmware update packets are encrypted by a lock key;

transmitting, by the user device, a user profile to a locking device comprising a physical locking component and circuitry configured to control locking and unlocking of the physical locking component, wherein the user profile comprises a user key;

decrypting, by the locking device, the user profile to generate a decrypted user profile, wherein the user profile is decrypted using the lock key;

generating, by the user device, an encrypted firmware update command, the encrypted firmware update command encrypted using the user key of the user profile;

transmitting, by the user device, the encrypted firmware update command and the encrypted firmware update packets to the locking device;

decrypting, by the locking device, the encrypted firmware update command using the user key and the encrypted firmware update packets using the lock key; and

installing, by the locking device, the decrypted firmware update responsive to successfully decrypting the encrypted firmware update command and the encrypted firmware update packets.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

transmitting, by the locking device, a security code to the user device;

wherein the user device generates the encrypted firmware update command using the security code.

3. The method of claim 2, further comprising:

validating, by the locking device, the encrypted command from the user device, wherein validating the encrypted command comprises;

decrypting the encrypted command using the user key obtained from the decrypted user profile;

determining whether the security code is valid; and

authenticating the decrypted command using the user key.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

validating, by the locking device, the encrypted firmware update from the user device, wherein validating the encrypted firmware update comprises;

decrypting the encrypted firmware update using the lock key; and

authenticating the decrypted firmware update using the lock key.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

pulling, by the user device, an audit trail from the locking device prior to installation of the firmware update, the audit trail comprising historical data indicating one or more prior actions performed by the locking device.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

determining whether the user device is within a predetermined proximity of the locking device; and

installing the decrypted firmware update when the user device is within the predetermined proximity.

7. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving, at the user device, a lock identifier from the locking device, the lock identifier associated with the locking device; and

determining, by the user device, that the lock identifier is associated with the user profile on the user device by comparing the lock identifier to a set of lock identifiers on the user device.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising:

notifying, by the server, each of a plurality of user devices associated with the user profile that a firmware update has become available.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the lock key is stored on the server and the locking device and not stored on the user device.

10. One or more computer-readable storage media having instructions stored thereon that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to implement operations including:

receiving, from a server, one or more firmware update packets, wherein the one or more firmware update packets are encrypted by a lock key;

transmitting a user profile to a locking device comprising a physical locking component and circuitry configured to control locking and unlocking of the physical locking component, wherein the user profile comprises a user key;

generating an encrypted firmware update command, the encrypted firmware update command encrypted using the user key of the user profile; and

transmitting the encrypted firmware update command and the encrypted firmware update packets to the locking device, the locking device configured to decrypt the encrypted firmware update command using the user key extracted from the user profile, decrypt the encrypted firmware update packets using the lock key, and install the decrypted firmware update in response to successfully decrypting the encrypted firmware update command and the encrypted firmware update packets.

11. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:

validating, by the locking device, the encrypted firmware update from the user device, wherein validating the encrypted firmware update comprises;

decrypting the encrypted firmware update using the lock key;

authenticating the decrypted firmware update using the lock key.

12. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:

pulling an audit trail from the locking device prior to installation of the firmware update, the audit trail comprising historical data indicating one or more prior actions performed by the locking device.

13. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving, from the server, a notification that the firmware update has become available; and

generating a notification to a user indicating the firmware update is available.

14. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:

preventing the user from accessing the locking device during the firmware update.

15. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving a lock identifier from the locking device, the lock identifier associated with the locking device; and

determining that the lock identifier is associated with the user profile on a user device by comparing the lock identifier to a set of lock identifiers.

16. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 15, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving a security code from the locking device, wherein generating the encrypted firmware update command comprises using the security code to generate the encrypted firmware update command.

17. A locking device comprising:

a physical locking component;

circuitry that controls locking and unlocking of the physical locking component, wherein the circuitry is configured to;

receive an encrypted user profile from a user device, the user profile encrypted by a server using a lock key and comprising a user key;

decrypting the user profile to generate a decrypted user profile, wherein the user profile is decrypted using the lock key;

receive a firmware update command from the user device, wherein the firmware update command is encrypted using the user key;

receive one or more firmware update packets from the user device, wherein the one or more firmware update packets are encrypted by the server using the lock key;

decrypt the encrypted firmware update command using the user key;

decrypt the encrypted firmware update packets using the lock key; and

install the decrypted firmware update responsive to successfully decrypting the firmware update command and the firmware update packets.

18. The locking device of claim 17, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

validate the encrypted firmware update from the user device, wherein to validate the encrypted firmware update, the circuitry is further configured to;

decrypt the encrypted firmware update using the lock key; and

authenticate the decrypted firmware update using the lock key.

19. The locking device of claim 17, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

transmit an audit trail to the user device prior to installation of the firmware update, the audit trail comprising historical data indicating one or more prior actions performed by the locking device.

20. The locking device of claim 17, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

determine whether the user device is within a predetermined proximity of the locking device; and

install the decrypted firmware update when the user device is within the predetermined proximity.

21. The locking device of claim 17, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

prevent access to the locking device when the locking device is updating the firmware.

22. The locking device of claim 17, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

transmit a lock identifier to the user device, the lock identifier associated with the locking device.

23. The locking device of claim 22, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

transmit a security code to the user device, wherein the user device is configured to use the security code to generate the firmware update command

prevent access to the locking device when the locking device is updating the firmware.

24. The locking device of claim 23, wherein the circuitry is further configured to:

validate the encrypted command from the user device, wherein to validate the encrypted command, the circuitry is further configured to;

decrypt the encrypted command using the user key obtained from the decrypted user profile;

determine whether the security code is valid; and

authenticate the decrypted command using the user key.