Methods and apparatus for establishing a secure communication channel

• US 9,930,035 B2
• Filed: 06/22/2017
• Issued: 03/27/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 07/03/2014
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Apple Inc.
• Original Assignee: Apple Inc.
• Inventors: Yang, Xiangying, Li, Li, Hauck, Jerrold Von
• Primary Examiner(s): Armouche, Hadi
• Assistant Examiner(s): STEINLE, ANDREW J
• Application Number:
  US15/630,710
• Publication Number:
  US 20170289142A1
• Time in Patent Office: 278 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/065 for group communications cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management involving conference or group key H04L9/0833
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/068 using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/105 Multiple levels of security
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0433 Key management protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 999/99 dummy group

Abstract

A method for establishing a secure communication channel between an off-card entity and an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) is provided. The method involves establishing symmetric keys that are ephemeral in scope. Specifically, an off-card entity, and each eUICC in a set of eUICCs managed by the off-card entity, possess long-term Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) information. When a secure communication channel is to be established between the off-card entity and an eUICC, the eUICC and the off-card entity can authenticate one another in accordance with the respectively-possessed PKI information (e.g., verifying public keys). After authentication, the off-card entity and the eUICC establish a shared session-based symmetric key for implementing the secure communication channel. Specifically, the shared session-based symmetric key is generated according to whether perfect or half forward security is desired. Once the shared session-based symmetric key is established, the off-card entity and the eUICC can securely communicate information.

Claims

1. A method by an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC), the method comprising:

at the eUICC, which is associated with a long-term public key (PK_eUICC) and a long-term private key (SK_eUICC);

transmitting, to a server via a wireless device, a request to establish a first secure connection with the server, wherein the eUICC is present in the wireless device, and wherein the server is associated with a long-term public key (PKserver) and a long-term private key (SKserver);

producing a signature by using SK_eUICC;

sending the signature to the server via the wireless device;

authenticating the server using PK_server;

generating an ephemeral public key (ePK_eUICC) and an ephemeral private key (eSK_eUICC);

signing ePK_eUICC using SK_eUICC to produce a signed ePK_eUICC;

providing the signed ePK_eUICC to the server via the wireless device;

receiving, from the server via the wireless device, an ephemeral key (ePK_sewer) that is signed using SK_server;

generating a shared symmetric key using SK_eUICC and ePK_server;

storing, within a security domain of the eUICC, the shared symmetric key;

establishing, at a first time, the first secure connection using the shared symmetric key; and

using, at a second time subsequent to the first time, the shared symmetric key to communicate with the server over a second secure connection.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM).

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, an update to an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC; and

processing the update to the eSIM.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, a command to remove an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC; and

removing the eSIM from the eUICC.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

prior to authenticating the server;

receiving, from the server via the wireless device, PK_server.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the using the shared symmetric key at the second time reduces overhead.

7. An embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) comprising:

a memory; and

one or more processors, wherein the eUICC is present in a wireless device, and wherein the memory includes instructions that when executed by a processor of the one or more processors, cause the eUICC to perform operations comprising;

transmitting, to a server via the wireless device, a request to establish a first secure connection with the server, wherein the server is associated with a long-term public key (PK_server) and a long-term private key (SK_server),

producing a signature by using an eUICC long-term private key (SK_eUICC),

sending the signature to the server via the wireless device,

authenticating the server using PK_server,

generating an ephemeral public key (ePK_eUICC) and an ephemeral private key (eSK_eUICC),

signing ePK_eUICC using SK_eUICC to produce a signed ePK_eUICC,

providing the signed ePK_eUICC to the server via the wireless device,

receiving, from the server via the wireless device, an ephemeral key (ePK_server) that is signed using SK_server,

generating a shared symmetric key using SK_eUICC and ePK_server,

storing, within a security domain of the eUICC, the shared symmetric key,

establishing, at a first time, the first secure connection using the shared symmetric key, and

using, at a second time subsequent to the first time, the shared symmetric key to communicate with the server over a second secure connection.

8. The eUICC of claim 7, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection via the wireless device, an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM).

9. The eUICC of claim 7, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection via the wireless device, an update to an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC; and

processing the update to the eSIM.

10. The eUICC of claim 7, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, a command to remove an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC; and

removing the eSIM from the eUICC.

11. The eUICC of claim 7, wherein the operations further comprise:

prior to authenticating the server;

receiving, from the server via the wireless device, PK_server.

12. The eUICC of claim 7, wherein the using the shared symmetric key at the second time reduces overhead.

13. An apparatus comprising:

an embedded universal integrated circuit card, wherein the eUICC includes a memory; and

one or more processors, wherein the memory includes instructions that when executed by a processor of the one or more processors, cause the eUICC to perform operations comprising;

transmitting, to a server via the apparatus, a request to establish a first secure connection with a server, wherein the request includes PK_eUICC, wherein the server is associated with a long-term public key (PK_server) and a long-term private key (SK_server),

producing a signature by using an eUICC a long-term private key (SK_eUICC),

sending the signature to the server via the apparatus,

authenticating the server using PK_server,

providing PK_eUICC to the server,

receiving, from the server via the apparatus, an ephemeral key (ePK_sewer) that is signed using SK_server,

generating a shared symmetric key using SK_eUICC and ePK_sewer,

storing, within a security domain of the eUICC, the shared symmetric key,

establishing, at a first time, the first secure connection using the shared symmetric key, and

using, at a second time subsequent to the first time, the shared symmetric key to communicate with the server over a second secure connection.

14. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM).

15. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, an update to an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC; and

processing the update to the eSIM.

16. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:

receiving, from the server over the first secure connection, a command to remove an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC; and

removing the eSIM from the eUICC.

17. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:

prior to authenticating the server;

receiving, from the server via the apparatus, PKI information.

18. The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the PKI information comprises PK_server.

19. The apparatus of claim 17, further comprising:

parsing from the PKI information a certificate authority (CA) signature, wherein the authenticating the server comprises verifying the CA signature.

20. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the using the shared symmetric key at the second time reduces overhead.