Embedded universal integrated circuit card supporting two-factor authentication

• US 9,961,060 B2
• Filed: 06/25/2015
• Issued: 05/01/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 11/19/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: John A. Nix
• Original Assignee: Network-1 Technologies, Inc.
• Inventors: Nix, John A.
• Primary Examiner(s): Najjar, Saleh
• Assistant Examiner(s): Teng, Louis
• Application Number:
  US14/751,119
• Publication Number:
  US 20150296379A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,041 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H04B 1/3816 Mechanical arrangements for accommodating identification devices, e.g. cards or chips; with connectors for programming identification devices
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/101 Access control lists [ACL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0819 Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/03 Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/35 Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/40 Security arrangements using identity modules
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/18 Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data

Abstract

A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a profile for the eUICC. The profile can include a first and second shared secret key K for authenticating with a wireless network. The first shared secret key K can be encrypted with a first key, and the second shared secret key K can be encrypted with a second key. The module can (i) receive the first key, (ii) decrypt the first shared secret key K with the first key, and (iii) subsequently authenticate with the wireless network using the plaintext first shared secret key K. The wireless network can authenticate the user of the module using a second factor. The module can then (i) receive the second key, (ii) decrypt the second shared secret key K, and (iii) authenticate with the wireless network using the second shared secret key K. The module can comprise a mobile phone.

Claims

1. A method to support remotely changing network access credentials, the method performed by an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC), the method comprising:

recording, by the eUICC, an eUICC private key, an eUICC public key, an eUICC subscription manager public key, a symmetric key, and an eUICC identity;

sending the eUICC identity and a first digital signature using the eUICC private key, wherein the eUICC processes the first digital signature for a first pseudo-random number received by the eUICC, wherein the first pseudo-random number is received by the eUICC with a second digital signature, and wherein the eUICC verifies the second digital signature using the subscription manager public key;

receiving, by the eUICC, a first encrypted profile, wherein the eUICC uses the symmetric key to decrypt at least a portion of the first encrypted profile, wherein the portion includes a first key K and a first network module identity;

sending, by the eUICC, the first network module identity, receiving a second pseudo-random number, processing a first response value (RES) using the first key K, and sending the first RES;

receiving, by the eUICC, a server public key, wherein the eUICC uses a key exchange algorithm, the eUICC private key, and the received server public key to derive a profile key, wherein the key exchange algorithm uses at least, in part, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, wherein the eUICC uses the profile key to decrypt a second encrypted profile, and wherein the second encrypted profile includes a second key K and a second network module identity; and

,

sending, by the eUICC, the second network module identity, receiving a third pseudo-random number, processing a second RES using the second key K, and sending the second RES.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first network module identity comprises a first international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) and the second network module identity comprises a second IMSI.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein a hardware module includes the eUICC, and wherein the hardware module accesses an IP network after sending the first RES, and wherein a user accesses a user interface of the hardware module to authenticate with a mobile network operator before the eUICC receives the key exchange token.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising the eUICC using (i) the server public key, and (ii) the eUICC private key, with the key exchange algorithm to derive the profile key, wherein the server public key is received by the eUICC after the eUICC sends the first RES.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the key exchange algorithm outputs the profile key, and wherein the key exchange algorithm comprises an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange and the server public key uses a base point G common with the eUICC private key.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising the eUICC:

receiving an encrypted key exchange token after sending the eUICC identity; and

,

decrypting the key exchange token using the symmetric key and a symmetric ciphering algorithm.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein a hardware module includes the eUICC, wherein the hardware module sends the eUICC identity to an eUICC subscription manager, wherein the hardware module receives the first and the second encrypted profiles from the eUICC subscription manager, and wherein the eUICC subscription manager receives the portion from a mobile network operator.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein a hardware module includes the eUICC, wherein the eUICC comprises a surface mount package soldered onto a circuit board of the hardware module, wherein the hardware module records the second key K in a protected nonvolatile memory after decrypting the second encrypted profile.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the first key K comprises a null value, wherein a hardware module includes the eUICC, wherein the hardware module accesses an IP network after sending the first RES, and wherein the hardware module uses a transport layer security for a user to authenticate with a mobile network operator before the hardware module receives the key exchange token.

10. A system for remotely changing network access credentials, the system comprising:

a nonvolatile memory for recording an eUICC private key, an eUICC public key, and eUICC subscription manager public key, a symmetric key, and an eUICC identity;

an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card for sending the eUICC identity and a first digital signature using the eUICC private key, wherein the eUICC processes the first digital signature for a first pseudo-random number received by the eUICC, wherein the first pseudo-random number is received by the eUICC with a second digital signature, and wherein the eUICC verifies the second digital signature using the subscription manager public key;

a system bus connected to the eUICC for receiving a first encrypted profile, wherein the eUICC uses the symmetric key to decrypt at least a portion of the first encrypted profile, wherein the portion includes a first key K and a first network module identity;

an eUICC driver, for receiving from the eUICC the first network module identity, for receiving a second pseudo-random number (RAND), and for sending a first response (RES) from the eUICC to a network application;

a processor in the eUICC for receiving a server public key, for deriving a profile key using a key exchange algorithm, the eUICC private key, and the received server public key, wherein the key exchange algorithm uses at least, in part, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, wherein the processor uses the profile key to decrypt a second encrypted profile, and wherein the second encrypted profile includes a second key K and a second network module identity; and

,

the network application for sending the second network module identity, for receiving a third pseudo-random number, and for sending a second RES, wherein the second RES is processed using the second key K.

11. The system of claim 10, wherein a user authenticates with a mobile network operator (i) after the eUICC driver sends the first RES to the network application and authenticates using the first key K1, and (ii) before the processor receives the server public key.

12. The system of claim 10, wherein the processor (A) derives the profile key using a key exchange token, the eUICC private key, and a public key for the eUICC before (B) decrypting the second profile with the derived profile key, wherein the key exchange token comprises a public key for the mobile network operator.

13. The system of claim 10, wherein the first profile is decrypted with the derived profile key and a symmetric ciphering algorithm, wherein the decrypted first profile includes the first network module identity as a plaintext, and wherein the network application authenticates with a wireless network using the plaintext first network module identity.

14. The system of claim 10, an eUICC subscription manager encrypts the second profile with a symmetric ciphering algorithm and the symmetric key, wherein a mobile network operator sends the second profile to the eUICC subscription manager as a ciphertext, and wherein the eUICC subscription manager includes the ciphertext in the second encrypted profile.

15. The system of claim 10, wherein a physical universal integrated circuit card (UICC) includes the eUICC, wherein the network application communicates with the UICC using an UICC driver, and wherein the network application sends the eUICC the server public key using the UICC driver.

16. A system for remotely changing network access credentials, the system comprising:

a nonvolatile memory for recording an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) identity, an eUICC private key, a first symmetric key, and an address, wherein the eUICC private key is associated with an eUICC public key;

a network interface for sending the eUICC identity to the address, for receiving an encrypted first profile and an encrypted server public key after sending the eUICC identity, wherein the encrypted server public key is decrypted with a symmetric ciphering algorithm and the first symmetric key, wherein a profile key is derived using at least, in part a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the eUICC private key, and the decrypted server public key, wherein the encrypted first profile is decrypted with the derived profile key, and wherein the decrypted first profile includes a first key K1;

a network application for authenticating with a wireless network using the first key K1, and for receiving a key exchange token;

a processor for deriving a second symmetric key using the key exchange token and a key derivation algorithm; and

an eUICC for receiving a second encrypted profile, wherein the second encrypted profile is decrypted using the second symmetric key, wherein the decrypted second profile includes a second key K2; and

,

the network application for receiving a pseudo-random number (RAND), for calculating a response value (RES) using the RAND and the second key K2, and for sending the RES.

17. The system of claim 16, wherein the processor derives the second symmetric key using the key exchange token, and the eUICC private key.

18. The system of claim 16, further comprising a server for encrypting (i) the first profile using the first symmetric key and (ii) the second profile using the second symmetric key, wherein the server is associated with a mobile network operator.

19. The system of claim 18, wherein the mobile network operator is configured to send the profile to an eUICC subscription manager after the eUICC identity is sent from the network interface to the address.

20. The system of claim 16, further comprising a mobile network operator for deriving the second symmetric key using at least a private key for the key exchange token, and the eUICC public key, and the key derivation algorithm, and wherein the mobile network operator sends the pseudo-random number (RAND), calculates the response value (RES) using the RAND and the second key K2, and receives the RES from a hardware module with the eUICC.

21. The system of claim 16, wherein a hardware module includes the eUICC, and wherein the hardware module accesses an IP network after authenticating with the wireless network using the first key K1, and wherein a user accesses a user interface of the hardware module to authenticate with a mobile network operator before the network application receives the key exchange token.

22. The system of claim 16, wherein the key derivation algorithm outputs the second symmetric key, and wherein the key derivation algorithm comprises one of (i) an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange and the key exchange token comprises a base point G, and (ii) a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

23. The system of claim 16, wherein a physical universal integrated circuit card (UICC) includes the eUICC, wherein the network application communicates with the UICC using an UICC driver, and wherein the network application sends the eUICC the key exchange token using the UICC driver.