Spoofing protection protocol for network-connected things

• US 9,985,945 B2
• Filed: 10/22/2015
• Issued: 05/29/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 10/22/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: SAP SE
• Original Assignee: SAP SE
• Inventors: El Khoury, Paul, Kling, Oliver
• Primary Examiner(s): AVERY, JEREMIAH L
• Application Number:
  US14/920,234
• Publication Number:
  US 20170118187A1
• Time in Patent Office: 950 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1408 by monitoring network traffic monitoring network traffic per se H04L43/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks

Abstract

A protocol controller may execute a spoofing protection protocol for verifying a message received over a network from a network-connected thing, in the presence of a spoofed message transmitted from a spoofed thing illicitly representing the network-connected thing. The protocol controller may include a message handler configured to implement the spoofing protection protocol, including receiving a message identified as originating from the network-connected thing, executing a verification of a transmission characteristic of the message against an expected transmission characteristic previously stored with respect to the network-connected thing within a transmission characteristic repository, and determining whether the message originated from the network-connected thing, based on the verification.

Claims

1. A system for implementing a spoofing protection protocol for verifying a message received over a network from a network-connected thing, in the presence of a spoofed message transmitted from a spoofed thing illicitly representing the network-connected thing, the system including instructions recorded on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, and executable by at least one processor, wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:

control a transmission characteristic of the network-connected thing;

store the controlled transmission characteristic within a transmission characteristic repository;

receive a message identified as originating from the network-connected thing;

execute a verification of a received transmission characteristic of the message against the controlled transmission characteristic previously stored with respect to the network-connected thing within the transmission characteristic repository, and

determine whether the message originated from the network-connected thing, based on the verification.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the instructions, when executed, are further configured to cause the at least one processor to execute the verification including determining that the message shares the controlled transmission characteristic with a second message addressed as having been received from the network-connected thing, and therefore exceeds an expected number of messages from the network-connected thing having the controlled transmission characteristic.

3. The system of claim 1, wherein the instructions, when executed, are further configured to cause the at least one processor to execute the verification including determining that the message does not possess the controlled transmission characteristic, and identifying the message as violating the spoofing protection protocol.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the instructions, when executed, are further configured to cause the at least one processor to change the controlled transmission characteristic, based on the verification.

5. The system of claim 1, wherein the controlled transmission characteristic includes transmission within an expected time window.

6. The system of claim 1, wherein the controlled transmission characteristic includes a location parameter specifying transmission of the message in accordance therewith.

7. The system of claim 6, wherein the location parameter specifies a geophysical location or route of the network-connected thing.

8. The system of claim 6, wherein the location parameter specifies a network address of the network-connected thing.

9. The system of claim 1, wherein the controlled transmission characteristic includes transmission within an expected time window and a location parameter specifying transmission of the message in accordance therewith, and wherein the verification includes selecting one or both, based on a previous verification of a preceding message from the network-connected thing.

10. The system of claim 1, wherein the instructions, when executed, are further configured to cause the at least one processor to send a request to the network-connected thing using a backchannel to complete the verification.

11. A computer-implemented method for executing instructions stored on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, the method comprising:

directing a network-connected thing to transmit messages within an expected plurality of time windows;

directing the network-connected thing to transmit the messages with an expected location parameter of the network-connected thing;

receiving a message identified as originating from the network-connected thing and identified as potentially being a spoofed message transmitted from a spoofed thing illicitly representing the network-connected thing;

selecting one or both of the expected plurality of time windows and the expected location parameter; and

executing a verification of the message as originating from the network-connected thing, based on the selecting.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein the executing the verification includes determining that the message shares an expected time window of the plurality of time windows with a second message addressed as having been received from the network-connected thing and therefore exceeds an expected number of messages from the network-connected thing within the expected time window.

13. The method of claim 11, wherein the executing the verification includes determining that the message is outside of an expected time window of the plurality of time windows, and thereafter treating the message as the potential spoofed message.

14. The method of claim 11, wherein the executing the verification includes determining that the message either does not have the expected location parameter or shares the expected location parameter with a second message addressed as having been received from the network-connected thing, and thereafter treating the message as the potential spoofed message.

15. The method of claim 11, comprising sending a backchannel message to the network-connected thing as part of the spoofing protection protocol and to verify an identity thereof.

16. A computer program product, the computer program product being tangibly embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium and comprising instructions that, when executed, are configured to cause at least one computing device to:

store a spoofing protection protocol specifying at least one transmission characteristic of at least one message to be sent by a network-connected thing;

direct the network-connected thing to execute message transmissions in accordance with the spoofing protection protocol, including using the at least one transmission characteristic;

receive, in accordance with the spoofing protection protocol, a message identified as originating from the network-connected thing and identified as potentially being a spoofed message transmitted from a spoofed thing illicitly representing the network-connected thing;

select, based on the message and in accordance with the spoofing protection protocol, the at least one transmission characteristic as including one or both of an expected plurality of time windows in which messages from the network-connected thing are expected to be received and an expected location parameter of the network-connected thing;

verify whether the at least one transmission characteristic complies with the spoofing protection protocol; and

send, in a case where the transmission characteristic does not comply with the spoofing protection protocol, a backchannel message to the network-connected thing to verify an identify thereof.

17. The computer program product of claim 16, wherein the instructions, when executed, are further configured to select one or both of the expected plurality of time windows and the expected location parameter for use in verification of the message, based on a previous verification of a preceding message from the network-connected thing.

18. The computer program product of claim 16, wherein a second backchannel message is sent at an interval that is independent of receipt of the message.

19. The computer program product of claim 16, wherein the backchannel message alters one or more parameter values of the at least one transmission characteristic.

20. The computer program product of claim 16, wherein the instructions, when executed, are further configured to:

determine that the message does not possess the at least one transmission characteristic; and

discard the message from use within the spoofing protection protocol.