Systems, devices, and methods for authentication in an analyte monitoring environment

• US 10,110,603 B2
• Filed: 12/02/2016
• Issued: 10/23/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 12/27/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Abbott Diabetes Care Incorporated (Abbott Laboratories Incorporated)
• Original Assignee: Abbott Diabetes Care Incorporated (Abbott Laboratories Incorporated)
• Inventors: Love, Michael R., Sloan, Mark, Berman, Glenn, Crouther, Nathan, Porat, Gil
• Primary Examiner(s): Mehedi, Morshed
• Application Number:
  US15/367,922
• Publication Number:
  US 20170093869A1
• Time in Patent Office: 690 Days
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 2560/0266 for monitoring or limiting apparatus function
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/0004 characterised by the type of physiological signal transmitted
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/002 Monitoring the patient using a local or closed circuit, e.g. in a room or building A61B5/0017 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/1451 for interstitial fluid
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/14532 for measuring glucose, e.g. by tissue impedance measurement
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/14865 invasive, e.g. introduced into the body by a catheter or needle or using implanted sensors
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/1495 Calibrating or testing of in-vivo probes
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/7221 Determining signal validity, reliability or quality A61B5/7207 and A61B5/7217 take precedence
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/742 using visual displays A61B5/339 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: A61B 5/7495 using a reader or scanner device, e.g. barcode scanner
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 7/58 Random or pseudo-random number generators
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/71 Hardware identity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/77 Graphical identity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/02 Services making use of location information
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/029 Location-based management or tracking services
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/80 Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Abstract

Systems, devices, and methods are provided that allow the authentication of devices within analyte monitoring systems. The analyte monitoring systems can be in vivo systems and can include a sensor control device with a sensor and accompanying circuitry, as well as a reader device for communicating with the sensor control device. The analyte monitoring systems can interface with a trusted computer system located at a remote site. Numerous techniques of authentication are disclosed that can enable the detection of counterfeit components, such as a counterfeit sensor control device.

Claims

1. A method of authentication in an in vivo analyte monitoring system, comprising:

receiving a private key by a reader device, wherein the private key is supplied by a package for a sensor control device, wherein the sensor control device comprises a sensor and analyte monitoring circuitry and the sensor is adapted to be inserted into the body of a user;

authenticating the private key using a public key stored within the reader device;

if the reader device determines that the private key is authentic and if the sensor has been inserted into the body of the user, then;

reading, with the reader device, information indicative of an analyte level of the user from the sensor control device; and

displaying the analyte level on a display of the reader device; and

if the reader device determines that the private key is not authentic, then terminating operation of the reader device with the sensor control device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the private key by the reader device comprises:

scanning a barcode on the package for the sensor control device with an optical scanner of the reader device, wherein the barcode is representative of the private key.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the private key by the reader device comprises:

scanning the package for the sensor control device with a near field communication (NFC) device, wherein the package comprises an element adapted to provide information representative of the private key in response to an NFC scan.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the private key is printed on the package for the sensor control device and, wherein the method further comprises reading, by a human, the private key from the package, and wherein the private key is input manually into the reader device.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising sending an identification request from the reader device over the local wireless communication path to the sensor control device, wherein the sensor control device sends an identifier to the reader device in response to receipt of the identification request.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the reader device communicates with the sensor control device over a local wireless communication path using:

a near field communication (NFC) protocol;

a radio frequency identification (RFID) protocol;

a Bluetooth protocol;

or a Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the reader device is a smart phone, a tablet, a smart glass, or a smart glasses.

8. A method of authentication in an in vivo analyte monitoring system, comprising:

digitally signing data with a private key, wherein the private key has a corresponding public key, wherein the digitally signed data includes at least one calibration parameter for a sensor of a sensor control device, wherein the sensor control device comprises the sensor and analyte monitoring circuitry, wherein the sensor is configured to be inserted into a body of a user, and wherein the at least one calibration parameter accounts for a variation in the sensor'"'"'s manufacturing process and a time-varying parameter of the sensor;

storing the digitally signed data in the memory of the sensor control device; and

storing the corresponding public key in the memory of a reader device, wherein the reader device is capable of receiving the digitally signed data from the sensor control device and wherein the reader device is programmed to verify that the digitally signed data is authentic using the public key.

9. The method of claim 8, further comprising:

storing the at least one calibration parameter, in addition to the digitally signed data, in the memory of the sensor control device.

10. The method of claim 8, wherein the reader device is capable of receiving the at least one calibration parameter from the sensor control device,

wherein the reader device is programmed to compare the received at least one calibration parameter with the at least one calibration parameter that was digitally signed,

wherein the reader device is programmed to operate normally with the sensor control device if the received at least one calibration parameter matches the at least one calibration parameter that was digitally signed, and

wherein the reader device is programmed to cease operation with the sensor control device if the received at least one calibration parameter does not match the at least one calibration parameter that was digitally signed.

11. The method of claim 8, further comprising encrypting the digitally signed data prior to storing the digitally signed data in the memory of the sensor control device.

12. The method of claim 8,

wherein the reader device is capable of receiving an identifier from the sensor control device;

wherein the reader device is programmed to determine, by reference to a registration database, whether the identifier is or is not authentic; and

wherein the reader device is capable of receiving an authentication result, wherein the authentication result indicates whether the identifier is or is not authentic.

13. The method of claim 8, wherein the reader device is programmed to determine that the identifier is authentic if it is not associated in a registration database, with a used sensor control device or a counterfeit sensor control device.

14. The method of claim 13,

wherein the reader device is programmed to update the registration database to reflect that the identifier is now associated with a used sensor control device if the identifier is determined to be authentic.

15. The method of claim 14,

wherein the reader device is programmed to download at least a portion of the registration database.

16. The method of claim 12, wherein the identifier comprises a serial number of the sensor control device.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the identifier further comprises a random number.