Key derivation for a module using an embedded universal integrated circuit card

• US 10,187,206 B2
• Filed: 08/18/2017
• Issued: 01/22/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 09/10/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: John A. Nix
• Original Assignee: Network-1 Technologies, Inc.
• Inventors: Nix, John A.
• Primary Examiner(s): Cervetti, David Garcia
• Application Number:
  US15/680,758
• Publication Number:
  US 20170373845A1
• Time in Patent Office: 522 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/35 communicating wirelessly
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/445 by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2105 Dual mode as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2107 File encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2115 Third party
• CPC Class Codes: H04J 11/00 Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codesH04J13/00 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2854 Wide area networks, e.g. public data networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/72 Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/045 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0464 using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/04 specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 : involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0816 : Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 : involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 : Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 : Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 : Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 : Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 : including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 : involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3239 : involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3249 : using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/02 : Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/033 : of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 : Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 : using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/40 : Security arrangements using identity modules
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 : Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 40/005 : Routing actions in the presence of nodes in sleep or doze mode
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0216 : using a pre-established activity schedule, e.g. traffic indication frame
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0235 : where the received signal is a power saving command
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0277 : according to available power supply, e.g. switching off when a low battery condition is detected
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/27 : Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/082 : for traffic bypassing of mobility servers, e.g. location registers, home PLMNs or home agents
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 80/04 : Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/12 : WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/12 : Access point controller devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 999/99 : dummy group
• CPC Class Codes: Y02D 30/70 : in wireless communication networks

Abstract

A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a received eUICC profile and a set of cryptographic algorithms. The received eUICC profile can include an initial shared secret key for authentication with a wireless network. The module can receive a key K network token and send a key K module token to the wireless network. The module can use the key K network token, a derived module private key, and a key derivation function to derive a secret shared network key K that supports communication with the wireless network. The wireless network can use the received key K module token, a network private key, and the key derivation function in order to derive the same secret shared network key K derived by the module. The module and the wireless network can subsequently use the mutually derived key K to communicate using traditional wireless network standards.

Claims

1. A method for securely distributing a profile from a subscription manager system to a module comprising the steps of:

(a) recording, in memory operatively connected to the subscription manager system, a digital signature algorithm comprising an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm;

(b) recording, by the memory operatively connected to the subscription manager system, a server private key and a corresponding server public key, wherein the server public key and the server private key use elliptic curve cryptography;

(c) recording, by the memory operatively connected to the subscription manager system, a symmetric ciphering algorithm, wherein the symmetric ciphering algorithm comprises an Advanced Encryption Standard with a 128 bit key length;

(d) receiving, by the subscription manager system, a certificate associated with the module from a module provider system associated with a module provider, wherein the certificate includes a module public key;

(e) receiving, by the subscription manager system, a challenge from the module;

(f) generating, by the subscription manager system, a network private key and a corresponding network public key, using a key pair generation algorithm;

(g) sending the generated network public key to the module; and

(h) sending a digital signature and the challenge to the module, wherein the digital signature is generated using the server private key and the digital signature algorithm;

(i) generating, by the subscription manager system, a mutually derived shared key using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman based on at least;

(1) the module public key, and

(2) the network private key;

wherein the mutually derived shared key is derived by the module based on at least;

(i) a module private key associated with the module public key, and

(ii) the network public key;

(j) encrypting, by the subscription manager system, the profile using;

(1) the symmetric ciphering algorithm, and

(2) the mutually derived shared key;

(k) sending, from the subscription manager system to the module, the encrypted profile, wherein the profile includes network access credentials for a wireless network.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

(1) sending, from the subscription manager system to the module, the generated network public key after the module authenticates with a network associated with the subscription manager system.

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

(1) generating the network public key using an elliptic curve algorithm based on a first elliptic curve, wherein the module public key is generated using the elliptic curve algorithm using the first elliptic curve.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the certificate associated with the module further comprises the first elliptic curve.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising sending the generated network public key to the module without a certificate for the network public key.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the network access credentials include an international mobile subscriber identity and a key K.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the module receives the server public key using a domain name and downloading the server public key.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the module provider further services the module and loads an initial profile into the module, and wherein the encrypted profile is received by the module using the initial profile to connect with an initial wireless network.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein prior to step (e), a server associated with the subscription manager system has recorded a pre-shared secret key, and the module has recorded the pre-shared secret key.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the module includes an embedded universal integrated circuit card, and wherein the embedded universal integrated circuit card records in second memory within the embedded universal integrated circuit card the module private key and the profile.

11. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

(1) generating, by the subscription manager system, the mutually derived shared key using American National Standards Institute standard X-9.63.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the sending step (h) occurs before the generating step (i).

13. The method of claim 1, wherein the sending step (h) occurs after the generating step (i).