ID-based control unit-key fob pairing

• US 10,358,113 B2
• Filed: 10/28/2016
• Issued: 07/23/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 07/17/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Original Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Inventors: Ho, Jin-Meng, Peeters, Eric
• Primary Examiner(s): Patel, Haresh N
• Application Number:
  US15/337,170
• Publication Number:
  US 20170048701A1
• Time in Patent Office: 998 Days
• Field of Search: 713172
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/23 using reflectors
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/25 using filters
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/27 using semi-transparent optical elements
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/31 Virtual images
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/334 Projection means
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/349 Adjustment of brightness
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/77 Instrument locations other than the dashboard
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/00 Instruments specially adapted for vehicles; Arrangement of instruments in or on vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/213 Virtual instruments
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/23 Head-up displays [HUD] optical aspects of head-up displays G02B27/01
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/60 Instruments characterised by their location or relative disposition in or on vehicles arrangements of lighting devices on dashboards B60Q3/10
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 2325/108 Encryption
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/24 using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 2027/0118 comprising devices for improving the contrast of the display / brillance control visibility
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 26/0833 the reflecting element being a micromechanical device, e.g. a MEMS mirror, DMD G02B26/0825 takes precedence; micromechanical devices in general B81B
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/01 Head-up displays
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/0101 characterised by optical features G02B27/0172 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 5/30 Polarising elements light-modulating devices with active elements G02F1/00
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10227 loading programming parameters or programs into the interrogator, e.g. for configuring the interrogator
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 2009/00769 with data transmission performed by wireless means
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/00309 : operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4012 : Beam combining, e.g. by the use of fibres, gratings, polarisers, prisms
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4093 : Red, green and blue [RGB] generated directly by laser action or by a combination of laser action with nonlinear frequency conversion
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 : Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 : Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 : Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 : Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 : wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 : for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 : using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0838 : Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 : with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 : involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 : involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 : using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 : using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3129 : scanning a light beam on the display screen scanning a light beam on a screen in displays other than projection devices G09G3/02; scanning systems in general G02B26/10; projectors using laser light sources in general H04N9/3161
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3155 : for controlling the light source light source control per se H05B35/00 – H05B47/00; control of an illumination source for displays in general G09G3/3406
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3167 : for polarizing the light beam polarizing optical systems per se G02B27/28
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/50 : Secure pairing of devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/11 : by determining the brightness or colour temperature of ambient light
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/14 : by determining electrical parameters of the light source
• CPC Class Codes: Y02B 20/40 : Control techniques providing energy savings, e.g. smart controller or presence detection

Abstract

A method for pairing a key fob with a control unit is provided. The key fob executes an ID authenticated key agreement protocol with a pairing device based on a key fob identification to authenticate one another and to generate a first encryption key. The pairing device encrypts a control unit identification using the first encryption key. The key fob receives the encrypted control unit identification transmitted from the pairing device. The key fob then executes an ID authenticated key agreement protocol with the control unit based on the control unit identification to authenticate one another and to generate a second encryption key. The key fob then receives an operational key transmitted from the control unit that is encrypted with the second encryption key.

Claims

1. A key fob device comprising:

a transceiver operable to transmit and receive signals;

memory operable to store a first operational key corresponding to a control unit and a first secret encryption key, wherein the key fob device is operable to be paired with the control unit; and

a processor communicatively coupled to the transceiver and memory and operable to execute instructions stored in the memory to, when the key fob device is paired with the control unit, cause the key fob device to;

send a signal, using the transceiver, to the control unit to initiate an operational key change operation, the signal representing a command to initiate the operational key change operation;

receive, using the transceiver, from the control unit an encrypted second operational key, wherein the encrypted second operational key is encrypted by the first operational key prior to being received at the transceiver;

use the first operational key stored in the memory to decrypted the encrypted second operational key to recover the second operational key and store the second operational key in the memory; and

use the second operational key to transmit a command to the control unit using the transceiver;

wherein, prior to the operational key change operation being initiated, the processor is operable to encrypt the first operational key using the first secret encryption key and to use the encrypted first operational key to send a command other than the command to initiate the operational key change operation to the control unit using the transceiver; and

wherein the first secret encryption key is common to the key fob device and the control unit and the processor is further operable to execute the instructions stored in the memory to cause the first secret encryption key to be generated by an ID authenticated key agreement protocol based on a control unit identification (ID) associated with the control unit.

2. The key fob device of claim 1, wherein after receiving the second operational key, the first operational key is no longer usable by the key fob device to transmit commands.

3. The key fob device of claim 2, wherein the instructions stored in the memory and executed by the processor causes the first operational key to be erased from the memory after the encrypted second operational key is received.

4. The key fob device of claim 1, wherein the control unit ID is received by the key fob device prior to executing the instructions for the ID authenticated key agreement protocol based on the control unit ID, and wherein the control unit ID is encrypted by a second secret encryption key when received by the key fob device.

5. The key fob device of claim 4, wherein the second secret encryption is common to the key fob device and a pairing device and is generated as a result of the processor executing instructions stored in the memory for an ID authenticated key agreement protocol based on a key fob ID associated with the key fob device.

6. The key fob device of claim 1, wherein the ID authenticated key agreement protocol based on the control unit ID is based on elliptical curve cryptography.

7. The key fob device of claim 6, wherein the elliptical curve cryptography includes a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.

8. The key fob device of claim 1, wherein sending the signal to initiate the operational key change operation is responsive the key fob device receiving user input corresponding to a preset sequence of inputs.

9. The key fob device of claim 1, wherein using the second operational key to transmit commands comprises providing the second operational key as part of a challenge-response protocol.

10. The key fob device of claim 7, wherein the challenge-response protocol is based on AES-128.