Signed envelope encryption

• US 10,412,098 B2
• Filed: 12/11/2015
• Issued: 09/10/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 12/11/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Inventors: Campagna, Matthew John
• Primary Examiner(s): Shehni, Ghazal B
• Application Number:
  US14/967,142
• Publication Number:
  US 20170171219A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,369 Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/045 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3236 using cryptographic hash functions
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures

Abstract

Clients within a computing environment may establish a secure communication session. Sometimes, a client may trust another client to read, but not modify, a message. Clients may utilize a cryptography service to generate a message protected against improper modification. Clients may utilize a cryptography service to verify whether a protected message has been improperly modified.

Claims

1. A system, comprising memory to store instructions that, as a result of execution by the one or more processors, cause the system to:

obtain, from a cryptography service and via a web API request, a first set of information comprising;

an encrypted cryptographic key usable to obtain a cryptographic key; and

an authentication tag, validity of the authentication tag cryptographically derivable from at least the cryptographic key and a public key;

generate a second set of information by at least;

encrypting data using the cryptographic key, thereby generating a second ciphertext; and

using a private key corresponding to the public key to generate a digital signature based at least in part on the data, wherein validity of the digital signature is verifiable using the public key; and

provide the first set of information and the second set of information to another computer system.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein:

the second ciphertext is further generated using at least additional authenticated data;

the first set of information further comprises additional authenticated data; and

obtaining the cryptographic key and a key identifier based on the additional authenticated data.

3. The system of claim 1, wherein:

the system further comprises the other system, the other system comprising a second memory to store instructions that, as a result of execution by a second one or more processors, causes the other system to;

receive the first set of information and the second set of information;

obtain the cryptographic key and a key identifier based at least in part on the first ciphertext, the public key, and the authentication tag;

verify that the key identifier matches an expected key identifier and that the digital signature is valid; and

obtain the data by decrypting the second ciphertext using the cryptographic key.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the private key is an elliptic curve private key, and the public key is an elliptic curve public key.

5. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

obtaining, from a cryptography service, a first set of information comprising;

an encrypted cryptographic key usable to obtain a cryptographic key; and

an authentication tag, validity of the authentication tag cryptographically derivable from at least the cryptographic key and a public key;

generating a second set of information by at least;

encrypting data using the cryptographic key to generate a second ciphertext of the data; and

generating a digital signature of at least the data using a private key corresponding to the public key; and

providing the first set of information and the second set of information to another computer system.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 5, wherein:

the first set of information further comprises additional authenticated data; and

obtaining the first set of information comprises;

requesting, to the cryptography service, an authenticated encryption by providing at least the cryptographic key, the public key, the additional authenticated data, and an indication to encrypt the cryptographic key using the public key; and

receiving the encrypted cryptographic key and the authentication tag in response to the request.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, further comprising providing the additional authenticated data to the other computer system.

8. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, wherein requesting the authenticated encryption further includes providing a nonce.

9. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, wherein the authenticated encryption is AES-CCM or AES-GCM encryption.

10. The computer-implemented method of claim 5, wherein the private key is an elliptic curve private key, and the public key is an elliptic curve public key.

11. The computer-implemented method of claim 5, providing the first set of information and the second set of information comprises transmitting, in one or more TCP packets, the first set of information and the second set of information.

12. The computer-implemented method of claim 5, further comprising using a second web API request to obtain the cryptographic data key.

13. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions that, as a result of being executed by one or more processors of a computer system, cause the computer system to at least:

receive a first set of information comprising;

an encrypted cryptographic key usable to obtain a cryptographic key; and

an authentication tag, validity of the authenticity tag cryptographically derivable from at least the cryptographic key and a public key;

receive a second set of information comprising;

a ciphertext; and

a digital signature, authenticity of the digital signature verifiable using at least in part on the public key;

provide, to a cryptography service and via a web API request, the encrypted cryptographic key, the public key, and the authentication tag;

receive, as a response, at least the cryptographic key and a key identifier;

verify that the key identifier matches an expected key identifier associated with an expected client and that the digital signature is valid; and

decrypt the ciphertext using the cryptographic key to obtain a plaintext, wherein the cryptography service lacks sufficient cryptographic material to generate the digital signature from the plaintext.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the public key is an elliptic curve public key.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the second set of information further comprises the public key.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions to provide, to the cryptography service and via the web API request, the encrypted cryptographic key, the public key, and the authentication tag comprise instructions that, as a result of being executed by the one or more processors of the computer system, cause the computer system to request an authenticated decryption of the encrypted cryptographic key.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that, as a result of being executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to:

receive, as the response, at least the cryptographic data key, the public key, and the key identifier.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the cryptographic key is a symmetric cryptographic key.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein:

the message is obtained after the digital signature is verified;

the digital signature is verified after receiving at least the cryptographic key and the key identifier; and

the digital signature is verified after verifying the key identifier matches the expected key identifier associated with an expected client.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the first set of information or the second set of information is received as part of one or more TCP packets.