Secure remote electronic voting system and cryptographic protocols and computer programs employed
First Claim
1. Secure electronic voting system which uses at least a Vote Casting Platform (102), a Polling Station (104)designed to receive and accumulate ballots in a digital ballot box during a preset voting period of time, a Tally Site (108) for the ballots and a Publication Site (106) of the results, said Polling Stations (104), Tally Site (108) and Publication Site (106) being able to achieve different levels of scattering or grouping, each of them been provided with computing means and preferably interconnected to each other in the event of scattering, through at least a communication network comprising cryptographic processes and protocols in order that throughout the execution of the method and when an electoral process is complete, a series of specific safety requirements of the electoral process are guaranteed, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
- a) providing an Electoral Board (110) operating said Tally Site (108) with at least a pair of asymmetric keys and allowing the access to the private key or private component of one of said pair of keys, only to a part (set by a minimum threshold) or the whole of members of said Electoral Board (110) preferably according to a cryptographic protocol of secret sharing;
b) starting at the Polling Station (104) a process of acceptance of the votes;
c) proceeding each voter to cast his vote through a set of programs named Voter Agent (116) and if required, with at least one Vote Casting Platform (102) having a sufficient computing capacity to execute said set of programs, comprising;
the voter selecting his voting option, generating a unique ballot identifier, obtaining a voting receipt which provides validity at least to said unique ballot identifier for said electoral process, without disclosing its content to said Polling Station (104), the construction, using the public component of said at least one pair of asymmetric keys of the Electoral Board (110), of a digital envelope protecting the voter privacy, said digital envelope containing at least the voting option, and after or before the said steps, carrying out a voter authentication proof;
d) ending at the said Polling Station (104) said process of ballots acceptance;
e) having access by means of the collaboration of a part (set by a minimum threshold) or the whole of the members of the Electoral Board (110), to the private component of said at least one pair of asymmetric keys of the Electoral Board (110) and use said private component to have access to the content of the digital envelopes; and
f) counting and tabulating the voting options of each voter, publishing the results at the Publication Site (106) and enabling a process allowing said voters a verification of said results without disclosing which their voting option is, using said unique ballot identifier.
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0 Petitions
Accused Products
Abstract
The method employs interrelated cryptographic processes (210) and protocols (202,204,206,208,212,214), specially designed to provide reliability to vote casting, ballots recount, and verification of vote or poll results. These cryptographic processes and protocols jointly constitute a cryptographic voting scheme capable of meeting the specific reliability requirements of an electronic voting where voters remotely cast their votes. More specifically, these reliability requirements include voter authentication and privacy; accurate results, the impossibility of coercion and sale of votes, verifying the final results and, if necessary, the secrecy of intermediate results before completing the vote or poll. The proposed cryptographic voting scheme allows minimizing the confidence level to be placed on any of the electronic voting individual party and participants. Moreover, the cryptographic voting scheme significantly improves the implementation practical aspects with regard to prior works in secure electronic voting methods and systems.
64 Citations
47 Claims
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1. Secure electronic voting system which uses at least a Vote Casting Platform (102), a Polling Station (104)designed to receive and accumulate ballots in a digital ballot box during a preset voting period of time, a Tally Site (108) for the ballots and a Publication Site (106) of the results, said Polling Stations (104), Tally Site (108) and Publication Site (106) being able to achieve different levels of scattering or grouping, each of them been provided with computing means and preferably interconnected to each other in the event of scattering, through at least a communication network comprising cryptographic processes and protocols in order that throughout the execution of the method and when an electoral process is complete, a series of specific safety requirements of the electoral process are guaranteed, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
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a) providing an Electoral Board (110) operating said Tally Site (108) with at least a pair of asymmetric keys and allowing the access to the private key or private component of one of said pair of keys, only to a part (set by a minimum threshold) or the whole of members of said Electoral Board (110) preferably according to a cryptographic protocol of secret sharing;
b) starting at the Polling Station (104) a process of acceptance of the votes;
c) proceeding each voter to cast his vote through a set of programs named Voter Agent (116) and if required, with at least one Vote Casting Platform (102) having a sufficient computing capacity to execute said set of programs, comprising;
the voter selecting his voting option, generating a unique ballot identifier, obtaining a voting receipt which provides validity at least to said unique ballot identifier for said electoral process, without disclosing its content to said Polling Station (104), the construction, using the public component of said at least one pair of asymmetric keys of the Electoral Board (110), of a digital envelope protecting the voter privacy, said digital envelope containing at least the voting option, and after or before the said steps, carrying out a voter authentication proof;
d) ending at the said Polling Station (104) said process of ballots acceptance;
e) having access by means of the collaboration of a part (set by a minimum threshold) or the whole of the members of the Electoral Board (110), to the private component of said at least one pair of asymmetric keys of the Electoral Board (110) and use said private component to have access to the content of the digital envelopes; and
f) counting and tabulating the voting options of each voter, publishing the results at the Publication Site (106) and enabling a process allowing said voters a verification of said results without disclosing which their voting option is, using said unique ballot identifier. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47)
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Specification