Election system enabling coercion-free remote voting

• US 20060000905A1
• Filed: 07/05/2005
• Published: 01/05/2006
• Est. Priority Date: 07/05/2004
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Seliger, Frank, Acker, br Van
• Granted Patent: US 7,490,768 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 235/386
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 13/00 Voting apparatus

Abstract

Election system enabling coercion-free remote voting wherein a remote voter transmits his/her selected vote to the election authority through a data transmission network such as the Internet network by using a host computer having a card reader, the vote being transmitted after the voter has introduced an identifying smart card into the card reader. At least one secret code is recorded into the smart card at the location of the election authority at the moment when the latter delivers the smart card, the secret code having to be input by the voter into the host computer when the voter wants to vote during an election in order for the vote to be transmitted to the election authority and validated by the election authority.

Claims

1. An election system for enabling coercion free remote voting, comprising:

a host computer having a card reader adapted for transmitting a selected vote over a data transmission network to an election authority;

a smart card in which a voter records at least one secret code at the location of said election authority at the time when said authority delivers said card; and

wherein said host computer is adapted to require that said secret code has to be input by said voter into said host computer when said voter wants to vote during an election.

2. A system according to claim 1, wherein said host computer generates several dummies different from the secret code when the voter records said secret code into said smart card, said dummies being also recorded into said smart card and being displayed to said voter, this one inputting in said computer one of said dummies if he is forced by a coercer to choose a vote different from his own choice so that the vote being transmitted to said election authority is modified using shuffling or addition modulo a certain number and therefore is not the vote as witnessed by or shown to said coercer.

3. A system according to claim 2, wherein the vote is sent to said election authority after being encrypted by an encryption key which has been defined for the election.

4. A system according to claim 3, wherein said encryption key results from the sequential encryption by a group of trustees, each trustee encrypting the key received from the preceding trustee with his own key.

5. A system according to claim 4, wherein the vote received by said election authority is decrypted by using the sequential encryption keys of the trustees in the reverse order that they have been applied.

6. A system according to claim 5, wherein the encryption by each one of said trustees is an addition modulo 10.

7. A system according to claim 6, wherein a number is associated with said secret code and with each one of said dummies, said number being recorded into said smart card and being displayed to said voter.

8. A system according to claim 7, wherein, if said voter has chosen a dummy and not said secret code because he has been forced by a coercer to choose a vote different from his own choice, the difference between the number associated with said dummy and the number associated with said secret code is deducted from the vote after encryption by said encryption key so that the vote received by said election authority is not the vote as shown to the coercer.

9. A system according to claim 8, wherein said number associated with said secret code or with one of said dummies being input into said computer added to said encryption key, used to send the vote to said election authority when said secret code or said dummy is input.

10. A system according to claim 9, wherein, if said voter inputs said secret code into said computer, the number associated with said secret code is deducted from the modified encryption key obtained after addition of the secret code number, the vote received by said election authority being a true vote and being validated.

11. A system according to claim 9, wherein, if said voter inputs a dummy instead of said secret code into said computer because he has been forced by a coercer to choose a vote different from his own choice, the number associated with said dummy is deducted from the modified encryption key obtained after addition of the secret code number, the vote received by said election authority having not been encrypted with the true encryption key and being then a modified and possibly invalid vote.

12. A system according to claim 7, wherein the number of possible choices such as the number of candidates is equal to or less than 10, each candidate being associated with a number comprised between 0 and 9, and the number of said dummies is equal to 9.

13. A system according to claim 12, wherein said number associated with said secret code or with one of said dummies being input into said computer is added module 10 to said encryption key used to send the vote to said election authority when said secret code or said dummy is input.

14. A system according to claim 13, wherein, if said voter inputs said secret code into said computer, the number associated with said secret code is deducted from the modified encryption key obtained after addition of the secret code number, the vote received by said election authority being a true vote and being validated.

15. A system according to claim 12, wherein said voter inputs a dummy instead of said secret code into said computer because he has been forced by a coercer to choose a candidate different from his own choice, such dummy being chosen such that the result of the subtraction modulo 10 of the number associated with such dummy from said secret code additioned to the number associated with the candidate imposed by the coercer results in the number associated with the candidate chosen by said voter.

16. A system according to claim 13, wherein, if said voter inputs a dummy instead of said code into said computer because he has been forced by a coercer to choose a candidate different from his own choice, such dummy is chosen such that the substraction modulo 10 of the number associated with said dummy from the modified encryption key obtained after addition of the secret code and the addition modulo 10 of the result of this substraction to the number associated with the candidate imposed by the coercer is equal to the number associated with the candidate chosen by said voter.

17. A system according to claim 12, wherein the involved election is a referendum such that there is only one dummy, whereby the voter has to choose YES instead of NO or reciprocally, so that it is sufficient for the system to revert the vote in such a case, in order to obtain a true vote.