TACTICAL GPS DENIAL AND DENIAL DETECTION SYSTEM

• US 20070004331A1
• Filed: 06/16/2006
• Published: 01/04/2007
• Est. Priority Date: 06/16/2005
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Google LLC (Alphabet Inc.)
• Original Assignee: TeraHop Networks Incorporated
• Inventors: Smith, Delia, Twitchell, Robert
• Granted Patent: US 7,783,246 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 455/1
• CPC Class Codes: G01S 19/03 Cooperating elements; Interaction or communication between different cooperating elements or between cooperating elements and receivers
• CPC Class Codes: G01S 19/21 Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
• CPC Class Codes: G01S 19/34 Power consumption
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 2203/18 for wireless local area networks or WLAN
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 2203/34 involving multiple cooperating jammers
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/228 Elimination in the received signal of jamming or of data corrupted by jamming interference suppression in receivers H04B1/10
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/28 with jamming and anti-jamming mechanisms both included in a same device or system, e.g. wherein anti-jamming includes prevention of undesired self-jamming resulting from jamming
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/45 characterized by including monitoring of the target or target signal, e.g. in reactive jammers or follower jammers for example by means of an alternation of jamming phases and monitoring phases, called "look-through mode"
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/62 by exposing communication, processing or storing systems to electromagnetic wave radiation, e.g. causing disturbance, disruption or damage of electronic circuits, or causing external injection of faults in the information
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/90 related to allowing or preventing navigation or positioning, e.g. GPS
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 28/18 Negotiating wireless communication parameters
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/18 Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/16 Gateway arrangements

Abstract

A tactical GPS denial/denial detection system includes a plurality of GPS detection/denial devices, a gateway, and a computer management system. Each GPS detection/denial includes a GPS receiver for determining positional parameters based on the GPS satellite signals, a GPS denier, which may be selectively activated, for disrupting reliable operation of GPS receivers, and a remote sensor interface adapted to extract the GPS parameters from the GPS receiver and to effectuate the activation of the GPS denier. The remote sensor interfaces and the gateway are communication nodes in an ad hoc wireless network. The gateway receives the GPS parameters from the remote sensor interfaces and communicates instructions to the remote sensor interfaces to selectively activate the GPS deniers. The computer management system receives the extracted GPS parameters from the gateway and analyzes the GPS parameters to detect whether an active GPS denial device is present in the vicinity of the system.

Claims

1. A tactical GPS denial/denial detection system, comprising:

(a) a plurality of GPS detection/denial devices, each including;

(i) a GPS receiver for receiving radio signals from GPS satellites and determining parameters based on the signals received from the GPS satellites, the parameters including positional parameters,

(ii) a GPS denier for disrupting reliable operation of GPS receivers, wherein the GPS denier may be selectively activated, and

(iii) a remote sensor interface adapted to extract the GPS parameters from the GPS receiver and to effectuate the activation of the GPS denier,

(iv) wherein the plurality of remote sensor interfaces are communication nodes in an ad hoc wireless network;

(b) a gateway, serving as a communication node in the ad hoc wireless network, that receives the extracted GPS parameters from one or more of the plurality of remote sensor interfaces and that communicates instructions to one or more of the plurality of remote sensor interfaces to selectively activate the GPS denier respectively associated therewith; and

(c) a computer management system, disposed in communication with the gateway, that receives the extracted GPS parameters from the gateway and analyzes the GPS parameters to detect whether an active GPS denial device is present in the vicinity of the system, and further that controls the instructions communicated by the gateway, thereby selectively controlling which GPS deniers, of the plurality of GPS deniers, are activated.

2. A method of deploying a GPS denial/denial detection system, comprising:

(a) deploying a plurality of a plurality of GPS detection/denial devices in an area of interest, each including;

(i) a GPS receiver for receiving radio signals from GPS satellites and determining parameters based on the signals received from the GPS satellites, the parameters including positional parameters,

(ii) a GPS denier for disrupting reliable operation of GPS receivers, wherein the GPS denier may be selectively activated, and

(iii) a remote sensor interface adapted to extract the GPS parameters from the GPS receiver and to effectuate the activation of the GPS denier,

(iv) wherein the plurality of remote sensor interfaces are communication nodes in an ad hoc wireless network;

(b) assessing the area of interest for adversarial GPS denial devices using the plurality of GPS receivers and the ad hoc wireless network;

(c) based on the assessment, determining a tactical operation to be carried out against at least one adversarial GPS denial device; and

(d) selectively activating, using the ad hoc wireless network, one or more of the plurality of GPS deniers based on the determined tactical operation.

3. The method of claim 2, further comprising the step of, after carrying out the determined tactical operation, reassessing the area of interest for adversarial GPS denial devices using the plurality of GPS receivers and the ad hoc wireless network.

4. The method of claim 2, further comprising the step of establishing a corridor of operation in which GPS parameters may be determined accurately based on the locations of the activated GPS deniers, thereby facilitating tactical operations using the established corridor.