SYSTEM AND METHOD

• US 20110004513A1
• Filed: 07/16/2010
• Published: 01/06/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 02/05/2003
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Hoffberg Family Trust 2
• Original Assignee: Steven Mark Hoffberg
• Inventors: Hoffberg, Steven M.
• Granted Patent: US 8,600,830 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 705/14.1
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/0207 Discounts or incentives, e.g. coupons or rebates
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/0282 Rating or review of business operators or products
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/08 Auctions
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 17/32 for games, toys, sports, or amusements
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 17/323 wherein the player is informed, e.g. advertisements, odds, instructions
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 17/3237 about the players, e.g. profiling, responsible gaming, strategy/behavior of players, location of players

Abstract

A system and method providing for communication and resolution of utility functions between participants, wherein the utility function is evaluated based on local information at the recipient to determine a cost value thereof. A user interface having express representation of both information elements, and associated reliability of the information. An automated system for optimally conveying information based on relevance and reliability.

Claims

1. A method of allocating an auction payment, comprising:

determining that an expected gain as a result of winning an auction is insufficient incentive for at least one actual or potential auction participant to place or raise a respective bid or offer price;

defining an incentive for the at least one actual or potential auction participant to place or raise a respective bid or offer price prior to or during an auction;

conducting the auction; and

outputting a determination of the defined incentive by an automated computing device dependent on the placed or raised respective bid or offer price, for at least one auction participant for placing or raising a respective bid or offer price.

2. An auction method, comprising:

announcing an auction for pricing a transaction between at least one offeror and at least one bidder, in accordance with an incentive structure adapted to recruit at least one competitor to the at least one offeror or at least one winning bidder, under condition that a portion of the transaction price is allocated to competing bidders or competing offerors who are not parties to the transaction; and

conducting the auction, with an allocation of the proceeds determined by an automated computing device in accordance with the incentive structure.

3. An auction method, comprising:

defining a conditional payment as an incentive for the at least one actual or potential auction participant to compete in the auction, the conditional payment being dependent on intermediate states in the auction;

conducting the auction; and

automatically determining the conditional payment by an automated computing device based on the intermediate states, wherein at least one non-prevailing bidder or offeror receives the conditional payment.

4. An automated negotiation method for control of allocation of a set of resources between competing parties in an auction, comprising:

receiving, from each of a plurality of parties, a utility function representing a bid or offer value;

computing a set of successful bids from the plurality of bids and offers; and

receiving from at least one party placing a respective successful bid or offer, a payment; and

computing, using an automated computing device, a distributing of a first portion of the received payment to a respective counterparty and a second portion of the received payment to at least one competing party to a successful bidder or offeror.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the bidder utility function is evaluated based on private information of an offeror, and communicated as a normalized value.

8. The method according to claim 4, wherein a bidder party pays a Vickrey price, an offeror party receives a price in excess of a reserve price, and at least one competing bidder party receives a portion of the difference between the Vickrey price and the amount paid to the offeror party computed in dependence on a value of a utility function bid by the at least one competing bidder party.

9. The method according to claim 4, wherein the utility function of a bid or offer has a constant value.

10. The method according to claim 4, wherein the utility function of a bid or offer has a non-constant value.

11. The method according to claim 4, wherein the surplus is the difference between the bidder'"'"'s Vickrey price and the offeror'"'"'s reserve price.

12. The method according to claim 4, wherein the bidders who placed higher losing bids obtain more of the surplus than the bidders who placed lower bids.

6. A computer memory storing instructions for execution by one or more processors, comprising:

instructions to receive, from each of a plurality of bidders, a utility function representing a value to the bidder to obtain of a set of resources;

instructions to receive, from each of a plurality of offerors, a utility function representing a value to the offeror to relinquish a set of resources;

instructions to compute a set of successful bids from the plurality of bidders and plurality of offers, a successful bid comprising a matching of a maximimum aggregate value of the sets of resources to the bidders and a minimum aggregate value of the sets of resources to the offerors, wherein the maximum aggregate value of bids equals or exceeds the minimum aggregate value of offers; and

instructions to define, for each set of resources from a bidder placing a respective successful bid, a Vickrey price, and a payment for each set of resources to each respective offeror of a respective successful bid of its offer price, with at least a portion of any surplus being allocated to at least one bidder or offeror based on a value bid or offered.

7. The computer memory according to claim 6, wherein the bidder utility function is evaluated based on private information of an offeror, and communicated as a normalized value.

13. An apparatus implementing an automated negotiation, comprising:

an automated processor adapted to compute a set of successful bids from respective utility functions received from each of a plurality of bidders and plurality of offers, a successful bid comprising a matching of a maximum aggregate value of the sets of resources to the bidders and a minimum aggregate value of the sets of resources to the offerors, wherein the maximum aggregate value of bids equals or exceeds the minimum aggregate value of offers; and

an output from the automated processor defining, for each set of resources won by a bidder placing a respective successful bid, a Vickrey price, with an allocation of any surplus of the Vickrey price over the offer price of an offeror of a respective successful bid to at least a portion of the bidders based on a respective value bid.

14. The apparatus according to claim 13, wherein the bidder utility function is evaluated based on private information of an offeror, and communicated as a normalized value.

15. An auction method, comprising:

automatically conducting an auction in which at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors compete to participate in a transaction based on a price, and in which a portion of the transaction price is allocated to the at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors who do not initially participate in the transaction, in a manner adapted to promote participation in the transaction and competition, to determine a transaction price and the parties in the transaction; and

automatically defining a distributing of a portion of the transaction price to at least a portion of the at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors who are not parties in the transaction.

16. The method according to claim 15, wherein the auction is defined to have a payoff function which pays an offeror an amount in excess of its private value and a set of competing non-winning bidders an amount representing least a portion of a remainder of a wining bid after payment of the offeror, in a manner adapted to recruit bidders to compete with a winning bidder based on their receipt under the payoff function of an amount for presenting competing bids, such that the offeror is likjelky to receive a net amount in excess of a likely net amount if the portion of the remainder was not paid.

17. The method according to claim 15, wherein said transaction price is established such that the winning bidder or bidders pay a price less than their private value for the transaction, the winning offeror or offerors receive a price in excess of their private value for the transaction, and the economic surplus of the transaction is maximized.

18. The method according to claim 17, wherein a portion of the economic surplus of the transaction is allocated to the at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors who are not parties in the transaction in dependence on an amount of a bid by a respective one of the at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors.

19. The method according to claim 17, wherein a portion of the economic surplus of the transaction is allocated according to predefine rules to a subset of the at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors who are not parties in the transaction, the rules being adopted to promote recruitment of the at least one of competing bidders and competing offerors to participate in a manner to raise a respective bid or lower a respective offer of respective bidders or offerors that are parties to the transaction.

20. The method according to claim 19, wherein the auction is an ascending price auction, in which a portion of a transaction price is allocated to at least a second highest bidder.