VERIFYING PRIVACY OF WEB REAL-TIME COMMUNICATIONS (WEBRTC) MEDIA CHANNELS VIA CORRESPONDING WEBRTC DATA CHANNELS, AND RELATED METHODS, SYSTEMS, AND COMPUTER-READABLE MEDIA

• US 20150026473A1
• Filed: 07/17/2013
• Published: 01/22/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 07/17/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Avaya Incorporated
• Original Assignee: Avaya Incorporated
• Inventors: Johnston, Alan B., Yoakum, John H.
• Granted Patent: US 9,112,840 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/171
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/205 involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved negotiation of communication capabilities H04L69/24
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3215 using a plurality of channels network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18

Abstract

Verification of privacy of Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) media channels via corresponding WebRTC data channels, and related methods, systems, and computer-readable media are disclosed. In this regard, in one embodiment, a method for verifying privacy of a WebRTC media channel comprises establishing the WebRTC media channel between first and second WebRTC clients using a keying material. The method further comprises establishing a corresponding WebRTC data channel between the first and second WebRTC clients using the keying material, and negotiating, in the WebRTC data channel, a cryptographic key exchange. The method also comprises generating a first and a second Short Authentication String (SAS) based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel. The method further comprises displaying the first SAS and the second SAS, such that a mismatch between the first SAS and the second SAS indicates an existence of a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker.

Claims

1. A method for verifying privacy of a Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) media channel, comprising:

establishing, by a first WebRTC client executing on a first computing device and a second WebRTC client executing on a second computing device, a WebRTC media channel between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client using a keying material;

establishing, using the same keying material, a WebRTC data channel between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client corresponding to the WebRTC media channel;

negotiating, in the WebRTC data channel, a cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client;

generating a first Short Authentication String (SAS) and a second SAS based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel; and

displaying the first SAS via the first WebRTC client and the second SAS via the second WebRTC client, such that a mismatch between the first SAS and the second SAS indicates an existence of a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the WebRTC data channel is established prior to establishing the WebRTC media channel.

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising comparing a first fingerprint corresponding to a keying material for establishing the WebRTC media channel with a second fingerprint corresponding to a keying material for establishing the WebRTC data channel, such that a mismatch between the first fingerprint and the second fingerprint indicates the existence of the MitM attacker.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising, responsive to a match between the first SAS and the second SAS, re-keying the WebRTC media channel based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

caching cryptographic key material created by the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client during the cryptographic key exchange;

signing a third SAS and a fourth SAS generated in a subsequent cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client using the cached cryptographic key material; and

automatically comparing the third SAS and the fourth SAS based on the cached cryptographic key material, such that a mismatch between the third SAS and the fourth SAS indicates the existence of the MitM attacker.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein caching the cryptographic key material comprises:

storing a first derivation of the cryptographic key material in a first persistent data store by the first WebRTC client; and

storing a second derivation of the cryptographic key material in a second persistent data store by the second WebRTC client.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein negotiating the cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client comprises negotiating a key exchange based on a digital signature provided by an Identity Provider.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic key exchange comprises a key exchange based on a public key cryptographic algorithm.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the public key cryptographic algorithm comprises a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

10. A system for verifying privacy of a Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) media channel, comprising:

at least one communications interface;

a first computing device associated with the at least one communications interface and comprising a first WebRTC client, the first WebRTC client comprising a first WebRTC privacy verification agent; and

a second computing device associated with the at least one communications interface and comprising a second WebRTC client, the second WebRTC client comprising a second WebRTC privacy verification agent;

the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client configured to establish a WebRTC media channel between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client using a keying material; and

the first WebRTC privacy verification agent and the second WebRTC privacy verification agent configured to;

establish, using the same keying material, a WebRTC data channel between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client corresponding to the WebRTC media channel;

negotiate, in the WebRTC data channel, a cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client;

generate a first Short Authentication String (SAS) and a second SAS based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel; and

display the first SAS via the first WebRTC client and the second SAS via the second WebRTC client, such that a mismatch between the first SAS and the second SAS indicates an existence of a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker.

11. The system of claim 10, wherein the first WebRTC privacy verification agent and the second WebRTC privacy verification agent are configured to establish the WebRTC data channel prior to the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client establishing the WebRTC media channel.

12. The system of claim 10, wherein the first WebRTC privacy verification agent and the second WebRTC privacy verification agent are further configured to compare a first fingerprint corresponding to a keying material for establishing the WebRTC media channel with a second fingerprint corresponding to a keying material for establishing the WebRTC data channel, such that a mismatch between the first fingerprint and the second fingerprint indicates the existence of the MitM attacker.

13. The system of claim 10, wherein the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client are further configured to, responsive to a match between the first SAS and the second SAS, re-key the WebRTC media channel based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel.

14. The system of claim 10, wherein the first WebRTC privacy verification agent and the second WebRTC privacy verification agent are further configured to:

cache cryptographic key material created by the first WebRTC privacy verification agent and the second WebRTC privacy verification agent during the cryptographic key exchange;

sign a third SAS and a fourth SAS generated in a subsequent cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client using the cached cryptographic key material; and

automatically compare the third SAS and the fourth SAS based on the cached cryptographic key material, such that a mismatch between the third SAS and the fourth SAS indicates the existence of the MitM attacker.

15. The system of claim 14, wherein the first WebRTC privacy verification agent and the second WebRTC privacy verification agent are configured to cache the cryptographic key material by:

storing a first derivation of the cryptographic key material in a first persistent data store by the first WebRTC privacy verification agent; and

storing a second derivation of the cryptographic key material in a second persistent data store by the second WebRTC privacy verification agent.

16. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon computer-executable instructions to cause a processor to implement a method, comprising:

establishing a Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) media channel between a first WebRTC client and a second WebRTC client using a keying material;

establishing, using the same keying material, a WebRTC data channel between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client corresponding to the WebRTC media channel;

negotiating, in the WebRTC data channel, a cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client;

generating a first Short Authentication String (SAS) and a second SAS based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel; and

displaying the first SAS via the first WebRTC client and the second SAS via the second WebRTC client, such that a mismatch between the first SAS and the second SAS indicates an existence of a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 having stored thereon the computer-executable instructions to cause the processor to implement the method, wherein the WebRTC data channel is established prior to establishing the WebRTC media channel.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 having stored thereon the computer-executable instructions to cause the processor to implement the method, further comprising comparing a first fingerprint corresponding to a keying material for establishing the WebRTC media channel with a second fingerprint corresponding to a keying material for establishing the WebRTC data channel, such that a mismatch between the first fingerprint and the second fingerprint indicates the existence of the MitM attacker.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 having stored thereon the computer-executable instructions to cause the processor to implement the method, further comprising re-keying the WebRTC media channel based on the cryptographic key exchange in the WebRTC data channel, responsive to a match between the first SAS and the second SAS.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 having stored thereon the computer-executable instructions to cause the processor to implement the method, further comprising:

caching cryptographic key material created by the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client during the cryptographic key exchange;

signing a third SAS and a fourth SAS generated in a subsequent cryptographic key exchange between the first WebRTC client and the second WebRTC client using the cached cryptographic key material; and

automatically comparing the third SAS and the fourth SAS based on the cached cryptographic key material, such that a mismatch between the third SAS and the fourth SAS indicates the existence of the MitM attacker.