RANDOM SAMPLE ELECTIONS

• US 20170200338A1
• Filed: 01/13/2017
• Published: 07/13/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 06/19/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Digital Community LLC
• Original Assignee: David Chaum
• Inventors: CHAUM, David
• Granted Patent: US 10,050,786 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 13/00 Voting apparatus
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/463 Electronic voting
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy

Abstract

A method allows a random sample of a large population of voters to cast votes and for both the unpredictability/un-manipulability of the sample selection and the integrity of the tally to be verified by any interested parties using public information. The problem of vote selling is addressed. Also, a variant allows voters to remain substantially anonymous.

Claims

1. A cryptographic method for conducting an election where at least some voters vote remotely and the integrity of the corresponding tally can substantially be verified by any interested party, comprising:

first commitment to first information to determine randomly-sampled voters from a first pre-agreed public random process result, the first public random process result to be realized later and the first committed information substantially encrypted using first cryptographic key information;

second commitment to second information, including for audit of ballot tally information, responsive to at least a second pre-agreed public random process, the second public random process results to be realized later and the second committed information substantially encrypted using second cryptographic key information;

providing ballot information, after the first public random process results are realized, to the randomly-selected voters, where the selection of voters depends on the first cryptographic key information and the first random process results;

accepting, and making public, at least portions of the ballot information corresponding to votes cast by the randomly-selected voters;

making public a tally corresponding to the ballot information of votes cast by the randomly-selected voters;

establishing, by opening at least portions of at least the second commitments, using the second cryptographic key information, that the tally corresponds at least substantially with high probability to ballot information corresponding to votes cast by the randomly-selected voters; and

where determining which voters are randomly-sampled is publicly verifiable as substantially secure from manipulation by those posting the first commitments, provided the realization of the public random process results is secure from substantial manipulation by those conducting the pre-agreed public random processes, and which voters comprise those randomly sampled is publicly verifiable as unpredictable until the pre-agreed first public random process is realized.

2. The cryptographic method of claim 1, further comprising:

submitting, by at least potential self-selected requesting volunteer voters, request information;

providing, to at least an allowed one of the requesting volunteer voters, a ballot not contributing votes to the tally of the election; and

the overall election process such that a ballot supplied to a requesting volunteer voter, and information made public that is related to such a volunteer voter ballot, is substantially indistinguishable as to whether it is related to a volunteer voter or related to a randomly-selected voter.

3. The cryptographic method of claim 1, further comprising:

4. The cryptographic method of claim 1, further comprising:

determining verifier persons, by committing to encrypted information that determines the choice of verifier persons based on third cryptographic key information and public random values determined later;

revealing the identity of a respective voter only to a corresponding verifier person; and

making the identity of the verifier person public.

5. In the cryptographic method of claim 1, where ballots are mailed to voters and voters can vote on an electronic bulletin board.

6. In the cryptographic method of claim 2, where the requesting volunteer voter can verify that the vote of the ballot received will not be included in the tally.

7. A cryptographic method for conducting an election in which the integrity of the election tally can be verified substantially by any interested party, comprising:

commitment to information, including for audit of ballot information and related tally information, responsive at least to a pre-agreed public random process, the public random process results to be realized later and the committed information substantially encrypted using cryptographic key information;

submitting ballot request information;

providing, responsive to at least an allowed one of the ballot request information submittals, a ballot;

making public a tally corresponding to the ballot information of votes with corresponding general ballots;

establishing, by opening at least portions of at least the commitments, using the cryptographic key information, that the tally corresponds at least substantially with high probability to the voted ballot information of general ballots; and

the overall election process such that a ballot supplied responsive to a request, and information made public related to such a ballot, is substantially indistinguishable as to whether it is related to a requested ballot or related to a general ballot.

8. In the cryptographic method of claim 7, including:

where the person requesting a ballot is able, before the requested ballot is submitted, to verify opened commitments in order to check that the vote of the requested ballot will not be included in the tally.

9. In the cryptographic method of claim 7, including:

where ballots are mailed to voters and voters can vote on an electronic bulletin board.

10. In the cryptographic method of claim 7, including:

where the voters of unrequested ballots are chosen randomly responsive to a second commitment and to second cryptographic key information.

11. A cryptographic method for conducting an election in which the integrity of the election tally can be verified substantially by any interested party, comprising:

creating ballot pairs including two individual ballots in each pair and a vote code for each choice of each individual ballot;

commitment to the ballot pair information;

printing the ballot pairs with indicia consistent with the ballot pair information;

opening the votes associated with vote codes that have been voted;

opening at least the vote codes of individual ballots for which a different vote code was voted; and

leaving committed the votes within the same an individual ballot as a voted code.

13. In the cryptographic method of claim 11, including:

opening rows of double ballots not voted.

12. A cryptographic method for conducting an election in which the integrity of the election tally can be verified substantially by any interested party, comprising:

creating ballot pairs including two individual ballots in each pair and a vote code for each choice of each individual ballot;

commitment to the ballot pair information;

printing the ballot pairs with indicia consistent with the ballot pair information;

opening the votes associated with vote codes other than those voted;

opening the vote codes voted; and

leaving committed the votes within the same individual ballot as a voted code.