COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A COMMUNICATION DEVICE AND A NETWORK DEVICE

• US 20180332021A1
• Filed: 07/24/2018
• Published: 11/15/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 02/27/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
• Original Assignee: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
• Inventors: NASLUND, Mats, SAHLIN, Bengt, NORRMAN, Karl, ARKKO, Jari
• Granted Patent: US 10,659,447 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/082 applying multi-factor authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0816 Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/10 Integrity

Abstract

A communication device of a communication network receives, via a network, a challenge, generates a first Diffie Hellman, DH, parameter, a first verification code for the first DH parameter, forwards the challenge or a derivative thereof to an identity module, receives at least one result parameter as response from the identity module, determines, based on the result parameter, whether the first DH parameter is authentic, and if the first DH parameter is authentic, generates and sends a second DH parameter to the network device for session key generation based on the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.

Claims

1. A communication device for communicating with a network device of a communication network, the communication device comprising:

at least one processor circuit; and

at least one memory connected to the at least one processor circuit and storing program instructions that are executed by the at least one processor to perform operations comprising;

receiving, via a network, a challenge, a first Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameter, and a first verification code for the first DH parameter from the network device;

forwarding said challenge to an identity module;

receiving at least one result parameter as a response from the identity module, the at least one result parameter having been generated by the identity module and being one of a ciphering key (CK), an integrity key (IK) and a response parameter (RES);

determining, based on said result parameter, whether said first DH parameter is authentic;

responsive to determining that the first DH parameter is authentic, generating a second DH parameter and sending, through the network, the second DH parameter to the network device.

2. The communication device of claim 1, being further operative to generate a session key for communication between the communication device and the network device, said session key being based on values used for generating the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.

3. The communication device of claim 2, wherein the session key is based on the first DH parameter and an exponent of the second DH parameter.

4. The communication device according to claim 3, wherein said session key being further based on values used for generating the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.

5. The communication device according to claim 1, wherein the communication device comprises a mobile equipment comprising the at least one processor circuit and the at least one memory, the mobile equipment configured to receive the challenge from the network, perform said forwarding, receive the at least one result parameter, determine whether the first DH parameter is authentic and generate and send the second DH parameter.

6. The communication device according to claim 1, wherein the communication device comprises the identity module, wherein said identity module is configured to perform key and cryptographic processing operations.

7. The communication device according to claim 1, wherein the first verification code comprises a message authentication code based on at least the first DH parameter.

8. The communication device according to claim 7, wherein said message authentication code is based on HMAC/SHA-256.

9. The communication device according to claim 1, wherein to forward said challenge to an identity module, the at least one processor circuit is configured to send a derivative of the challenge to the identity module.

10. The communication device according to claim 9, wherein the derivative is a hash of the challenge.

11. The communication device according to claim 1, further configured to:

receive the challenge, the first DH parameter, and the first verification code in an authentication request message from the network device, wherein the authentication request message further comprises a challenge verification code;

receive a response parameter as a response to said challenge; and

wherein while generating and sending the second DH parameter, the at least one processor circuit of the communication device generates the second DH parameter together with a second verification code and sends, via the network, the second DH parameter and the second verification code in an authentication response message that comprises the response parameter.

12. The communication device according to claim 11, wherein the authentication request message comprises the first verification code in a corresponding separate information element of the authentication request message and the at least one processor circuit of the communication device determines the authenticity of the first DH parameter based on the first verification code.

13. The communication device according to claim 11, wherein the first verification code is provided as at least part of the challenge verification code and the at least one processor circuit of the communication device determines the authenticity of the first DH parameter based on the identity module providing said at least one result parameter.

14. The communication device according to claim 13, wherein the challenge is based on the first DH parameter.

15. The communication device according to claim 11, the at least one processor circuit being further configured to generate the second verification code based on at least one of the at least one result parameters and when being configured to send the authentication response message is operative to send the second verification code in an information element assigned to the response parameter.

16. The communication device according to claim 11, wherein the second verification code is generated as a message authentication code based on at least the second DH parameter.

17. A method for a communication device in communication with a network device of a communication network, the method being performed by the communication device and comprising:

receiving, via a network, a challenge, a first Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameter and a first verification code for the first DH parameter from the network device;

forwarding said challenge to an identity module;

receiving at least one result parameter as a response from the identity module, the at least one result parameter having been generated by the identity module and being one of a ciphering key (CK), an integrity key (IK) and a response parameter (RES);

determining, based on said result parameter whether said first DH parameter is authentic;

responsive to determining that the first DH parameter is authentic, generating a second DH parameter and sending, through the network, the second DH parameter to the network device.

18. The method according to claim 17, comprising generating a session key for communication between the communication device and the network device, said session key being based on values used for generating the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.

19. The method according to claim 18, wherein the session key is based on the first DH parameter and an exponent of the second DH parameter.

20. The method according to claim 18, wherein said session key being at least further based on values used for generating the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.

21. The method according to claim 17, wherein the challenge, the first DH parameter and the first verification code are received in an authentication request message, the authentication request message also comprising a challenge verification code,

the at least one result parameter comprises a response parameter received as a response to said challenge, and

the generating and sending of the second DH parameter comprises generating the second DH parameter together with a second verification code and sending the second DH parameter and the second verification code in an authentication response message also comprising the response parameter.

22. The method according to claim 21, wherein the authentication request message comprises the first verification code in a corresponding separate information element of the authentication request message and the determination of the authenticity of the first DH parameter is made using the first verification code.

23. The method according to claim 21, wherein the first verification code is provided as at least a part of the challenge verification code and the determination of the authenticity of the first DH parameter comprises determining the authenticity based on the identity module providing said at least one result parameter.

24. The method according to claim 21, further comprising basing the second verification code on the response parameter and the sending of the authentication response comprises sending the second verification code in an information element of the authentication response message assigned to the response parameter.

25. The method according to claim 17, wherein forwarding said challenge to an identity module comprises forwarding a derivative of the challenge to the identity module.

26. The method device according to claim 25, wherein the derivative is a hash of the challenge.

27. A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing program code for a communication device in communication with a network device of a communication network, the program code, which when run in the communication device, causes the communication device to:

receive, via a network, a challenge, a first Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameter and a first verification code for the first DH parameter from the network device;

forward said challenge to an identity module;

receive at least one result parameter as a response from the identity module, the at least one result parameter having been generated by the identity module and being one of a ciphering key (CK), an integrity key (IK) and a response parameter (RES);

determine, based on said result parameter whether said first DH parameter is authentic;

responsive to determining the first DH parameter is authentic, generate a second DH parameter and send, through the network, the second DH parameter to the network device for session key generation based on the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.