SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR SIGNALING AN ATTACK ON CONTACTLESS CARDS

• US 20200236133A1
• Filed: 10/18/2019
• Published: 07/23/2020
• Est. Priority Date: 10/02/2018
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Capital One Services LLC (Capital One Financial Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Capital One Services LLC (Capital One Financial Corporation)
• Inventors: DUANE, William, CHIGURUPATI, Srinivasa, OSBORN, Kevin
• Granted Patent: US 10,880,327 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0838 using one-time-passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0846 using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1416 Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002

Abstract

Example embodiments of systems and methods for data transmission system between transmitting and receiving devices are provided. In an embodiment, each of the transmitting and receiving devices can contain a master key. The transmitting device can generate a diversified key using the master key, protect a counter value and encrypt data prior to transmitting to the receiving device, which can generate the diversified key based on the master key and can decrypt the data and validate the protected counter value using the diversified key. In an embodiment, the transmitting device can signal an attack or potential attack through the counter value. The attack signaling can further include information relating to the attack or potential attack.

Claims

1-20. -20. (canceled)

21. A signaling system comprising:

a contactless card including a processor and memory; and

a server in data communication with the contactless card,

wherein the contactless card is configured to, upon detection of a potential attack, create a one-time password (OTP) value that is transmitted to the server, the OTP value indicative of the potential attack, and

wherein the server, upon receipt of the OTP value, is configured to execute one or more actions responsive to the potential attack.

22. The signaling system of claim 21, wherein:

the OTP value is created by one or more OTP generation algorithms; and

the OTP value is based on at least one selected from the group of a counter, time, and a challenge-response scheme.

23. The signaling system of claim 22, wherein:

the OTP value is counter-based; and

the contactless card is configured to set one or more keys of the contactless card to a zero value.

24. The signaling system of claim 23, wherein the contactless card is configured to create the OTP value by switching from a first OTP generation algorithm to a second OTP generation algorithm upon detection of the potential attack.

25. The signaling system of claim 22, wherein a plurality of counter-based OTP values are indicative of different potential attacks.

26. The signaling system of claim 22, wherein:

the OTP value is time-based; and

the OTP value comprises at least one selected from the group of a time value of zero, a time value prior to an activation of the contactless card, and a time value exceeding a maximum possible lifetime of the contactless card.

27. The signaling system of claim 22, wherein:

the OTP value is challenge-response scheme-based; and

the OTP value comprises a value that is configured to exceed a value for a response associated with at least one of the one or more OTP generation algorithms.

28. The signaling system of claim 21, wherein the server is configured to detect whether a plurality of contactless cards have been subject to the potential attack during a predetermined time.

29. The signaling system of claim 21, wherein the contactless card is configured to transmit the OTP value to the server via one or more intermediary devices.

30. A method for signaling a potential attack, comprising:

receiving, by a server, one or more notifications from a contactless card;

determining, by the server, that the one or more notifications are indicative of the detection of a potential attack to the contactless card; and

executing, by the server, one or more actions in response to the one or more notifications.

31. The method of claim 30, wherein the one or more notifications are based on a challenge-response scheme.

32. The method of claim 31, wherein the one or more notifications are based on at least one selected from the group of time, a counter, and at least one OTP generation algorithm.

33. The method of claim 32, further comprising adjusting, by the contactless card, one or more keys of the contactless card to a zero value when the one or more notifications are counter-based.

34. The method of claim 33, wherein:

the counter is adjusted to a value indicative of a specific attack; and

the specific attack is at least one selected from the group of a code-modification attack, a fuzzing attack, and a clock jitter attack.

35. The method of claim 33, wherein:

the one or more notifications are time-based; and

the one or more notifications include at least one selected from the group of a time value of zero, a time value prior to existence of the contactless card, and a time value exceeding the maximum possible lifetime of the contactless card.

36. The method of claim 33, wherein:

the one or more notifications are challenge-response scheme-based; and

the one or more notifications include a value that is configured to exceed a value for a response associated with at least one of the OTP generation algorithms.

37. The method of claim 33, further comprising receiving, by the server, the one or more notifications from the contactless card that is configured to create the one or more notifications by switching from a first OTP generation algorithm to a second OTP generation algorithm upon detection of the potential attack.

38. The method of claim 30, further comprising determining, by the contactless card, a cloning attempt associated with the transmitting device based on the one or more notifications being requested at a first rate that exceeds a second rate.

39. The method of claim 30, wherein the one or more actions includes at least one selected from the group of generating a plurality of event logs associated with the attack of the contactless card;

transmitting a notification to threat response personnel;

rendering the contactless card mute;

initiating a replacement request of the contactless card;

initiating a communication session with a device so as to indicate compromise of the contactless card; and

establishing data communication with an engine so as to adjust a risk level of the user based on the detection of the potential attack.

40. A non-transitory computer readable medium comprising computer-executable instructions that are executed by a processor and comprising the steps of:

creating, upon detection of a potential attack, a one-time password (OTP) value that is indicative of a potential attack;

transmitting the OTP value; and

performing, upon receipt of the OTP value, one or more protective actions.

41. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 40, wherein:

the OTP value is created by one or more OTP generation algorithms; and

the OTP value is based on at least one selected from the group of a counter, time, and a challenge-response scheme.

42. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 41, wherein:

the OTP value is counter-based; and

a plurality of counter-based OTP values are indicative of different potential attacks.

43. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 41, wherein:

the OTP value is time-based; and

the OTP value comprises at least one selected from the group of a time value of zero, a time value prior to an activation of a contactless card, and a time value exceeding a maximum possible lifetime of the contactless card.

44. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 41, wherein:

the OTP value is challenge-response scheme-based; and

the OTP value comprises a value that is configured to exceed a value for a response associated with at least one of the one or more OTP generation algorithms.

45. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 41, wherein:

the OTP value is created by switching from a first OTP generation algorithm to a second OTP generation algorithm upon detection of the potential attack.