Portable pin card

• US 5,130,519 A
• Filed: 01/16/1990
• Issued: 07/14/1992
• Est. Priority Date: 01/16/1990
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Estelle Ross, George Bush
• Original Assignee: Estelle Ross, George Bush
• Inventors: Belfield, Robert, Bush, George, Ross, Estelle
• Primary Examiner(s): Levy, Stuart S.
• Assistant Examiner(s): Glembocki, Christopher R.
• Application Number:
  US07/465,476
• Time in Patent Office: 910 Days
• Field of Search: 235/379, 235/380, 235/441, 235/439, 235/492, 380/23, 380/24, 380/25, 380/46, 380/24, 380/50, 902/2, 902/5, 902/24, 902/26
• US Class Current: 235/380
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3415 Cards acting autonomously as pay-media
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/4012 Verifying personal identification numbers [PIN]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system

Abstract

A portable Personal Identification Card allows a cardholder to enter a PIN code into his card at a location remote from an authorization terminal. In an alternate embodiment, a PIN code may be enterd at the authorization terminal. The authorization terminal reads the cardholder'"'"'s account number from the PIN card. The account number is transmitted to a central computer which uses this number to index into memory to find a personal identification number and encryption parameters. The centerl computer transmits a pseudo-random number to the PIN Card. Both the PIN Card and the central computer perform an encryption of a function of the corresponding personal indentification number and pseudo-random number to derive a CGIPIN (Computer Generated Image of the PIN). If the CGIPIN transmitted from the PIN card matches the CGIPIN of the central computer, access is authorized.

Claims

1. A security apparatus comprising:

at least one chip card with a machine readable account number, chip encryption parameters and chip algorithm stored in protected RAM;

means for entering a cardholder'"'"'s PIN code into protected storage;

a central computer which stores, for each of said chip cards, a reference PIN code, reference encryption parameters and a reference algorithm, wherein said reference encryption parameters and said reference algorithm are identical to said chip encryption parameters and said chip algorithm, respectively, stored in said chip cards;

said central computer including pseudo-random number generating means which generates a pseudo-random number having a plurality of digits;

a terminal which receives said chip card, scans encoded account number and communicates said account number to said central computer;

wherein said central computer uses said communicated account number to access and retrieve said reference PIN code and said reference encryption parameters, retrieves a pseudo-random number from said pseudo-random number generating means, transmits said pseudo-random number to said PIN Card, uses said reference encryption parameters and said reference algorithm to encrypt a function of said PIN code and said pseudo-random number to derive a first CGIPIN;

wherein said chip card uses said chip encryption parameters and said chip algorithm to encrypt a function of said pseudo-random number and said cardholder'"'"'s PIN in said protected storage in order to derive a second CGIPIN;

comparing means for comparing said first CGIPIN to said second CGIPIN, including means for alerting a user whether or not said first CGIPIN and said second CGIPIN match, thereby authorizing an access and

wherein said chip and reference encryption parameters define a multidimensional matrix employed by said chip and reference algorithms wherein at least on digit of said pseudo-random number serves as an offset into the matrix.

2. A security apparatus comprising:

at least one chip card with a machine readable account number, chip encryption parameters and chip algorithm stored in protected RAM;

means for entering a cardholder'"'"'s PIN code into protected storage;

a central computer which stores, for each of said chip cards, a reference PIN code, reference encryption parameters and a reference algorithm, wherein said reference encryption parameters and said reference algorithm are identical to said chip encryption parameters and said chip algorithm, respectively, stored in said chip cards;

said central computer including pseudo-random number generating means which generates a pseudo-random number having a plurality of digits;

a terminal which receives said chip card, scans encoded account number and communicates said account number of said central computer;

wherein said central computer uses said communicated account number to access and retrieve said reference PIN code and said reference encryption parameters, retrieves a pseudo-random number from said pseudo-random number generating means, transmits said pseudo-random number to said PIN Card, uses said reference encryption parameters and said reference algorithm to encrypt a function of said PIN code and said pseudo-random number to derive a first CGIPIN;

wherein said chip card uses said chip encryption parameters and said chip algorithm to encrypt a function of said pseudo-random number and said cardholder'"'"'s PIN in said protected storage in order to derive a second CGIPIN;

comparing means for comparing said first CGIPIN to said second CGIPIN, including means for alerting a user whether or not said first CGIPIN and said second CGIPIN match, thereby authorizing an access and

wherein said chip and reference encryption parameters define a matrix employed by said chip and reference algorithms;

wherein the matrix comprises columns of 20 numbers 0-9 in arbitrary order which is repeated after the first ten digits;

wherein one and only one incident of each digit 0-9 is used per half column;

at least one digit of said pseudo-random number serves as an offset into the matrix, while remaining digits serve to name the columns used to calculate said CGIPIN.

3. A security apparatus comprising:

at least one chip card, without an encoded number therein, chip encryption parameters and chip algorithm stored in protected RAM;

means for entering a machine readable account number in said chip card;

means for entering a cardholder'"'"'s PIN code into protected storage;

a central computer which stores, for each of said chip cards, a reference PIN code, reference encryption parameters and a reference algorithm, wherein said reference encryption parameters and said reference algorithm are identical to said chip encryption parameters and said chip algorithm, respectively, stored in said chip cards;

said central computer including pseudo-random number generating means which generates a pseudo-random number having a plurality of digits;

a terminal which receives said chip card, scans said encoded account number and communicates said account number to said central computer;

wherein said central computer uses said communicated account number to access and retrieve said reference PIN code and said reference encryption parameters, retrieves a pseudo-random number from said pseudo-random number generating means, transmits said pseudo-random number to said PIN Card, uses said reference encryption parameters and said reference algorithm to encrypt a function of said PIN code and said pseudo-random number to derive a first CGIPIN;

wherein said chip card uses said chip encryption parameters and said chip algorithm to encrypt a function of said pseudo-random number and said cardholder'"'"'s PIN in said protected storage in order to derive a second CGIPIN;

comparing means for comparing said first CGIPIN to said second CGIPIN, including means for alerting a user whether or not said first CGIPIN and said second CGIPIN match, thereby authorizing an access and

wherein said chip and reference encryption parameters define a matrix employed by said chip and reference algorithms wherein at least one digit of said pseudo-random number serves as an offset into said matrix.