Method and apparatus for providing peer authentication for an internet key exchange

• US 7,269,730 B2
• Filed: 04/18/2002
• Issued: 09/11/2007
• Est. Priority Date: 04/18/2002
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Nokia Corporation
• Original Assignee: Nokia Corporation
• Inventors: Stirbu, Vlad Alexandru
• Primary Examiner(s): Barrón, Jr.; Gilberto
• Assistant Examiner(s): LASHLEY, LAUREL L
• Application Number:
  US10/127,342
• Publication Number:
  US 20030200433A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,972 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/169
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/081 applying self-generating credentials, e.g. instead of receiving credentials from an authority or from another peer, the credentials are generated at the entity itself cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords H04L9/0861
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0471 Key exchange
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys

Abstract

A protocol for use as a phase 1 authentication (and key agreement) IKE protocol, similar to IKE phase 1 authentication with public key encryption, but using the IMS AKA trust infrastructure instead of the PKI trust infrastructure. The invention thus allows an initiator (11) having a secret long-term key stored on a smart cart (11a), to authenticate a responder (12), the responder (12) having in some cases a trusted interface with a Home Subscriber Server (14) that has a copy (14a) of the initiator'"'"'s long-term key (and in other cases having itself access to the initiator'"'"'s long-term key). The protocol includes a Diffie-Hellman exchange, and by authenticating the initiator (11) and responder (12), the protocol authenticates the exchange.

Claims

1. A method, comprising:

an initiator sending a responder a message claiming an identity associated with a secret key;

providing an authentication field and a random number field from the responder to the initiator;

the initiator authenticating the responder based at least in part on the authentication field derived from the secret key without revealing the secret key; and

the responder authenticating the initiator based at least in part on a result field derived from the secret key without revealing the secret key;

wherein the secret key and the identity are provided out-of-band to both the initiator and at least one other entity, whereby the identity is associated with the secret key.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, the result field is determined by the initiator using the secret key, but the authentication field is provided to the responder by a third-party entity distinct from the responder and trusted by the responder.

3. The method of claim 1,

wherein the responder provides the authentication field and the random number field to the initiator, in response to a message flow from the initiator and also in response to the authentication field and the random number field provided by a third-party entity;

and

wherein the initiator authenticates the responder based on information conveyed by the authentication field and also based on the random number field.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

a third-party entity deriving the authentication field from the secret key.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

a third-party entity sending a message including an expected result field to the responder; and

the responder using the result field to test whether the initiator is authentic by comparing the result field with the expected result field.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

the initiator calculating the result field based on the secret key and the random number field if the initiator determines the responder to be authentic.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein in performing authentication, the authentication field and the result field are determined by the initiator using the secret key and also by the responder using the secret key.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein a shared secret is obtained based at least in part on the random number which is derived from, without revealing, the secret key.

9. An initiator apparatus, operative according to the method of claim 1 in respect to the initiator.

10. A responder apparatus, operative according to the method of claim 1 in respect to the responder.

11. A responder apparatus, operative according to the method of claim 2 in respect to the responder.

12. A digital communication system including an initiator apparatus, a responder apparatus, and a third-party entity apparatus, wherein the initiator apparatus, the responder apparatus and the third-party entity apparatus are operative according to the method of claim 2 in respect to the initiator, the responder, and the third-party entity respectively.

13. A digital communication system including an initiator apparatus and a responder apparatus, characterized in that the initiator apparatus and the responder apparatus are operative according to the method of claim 1 in respect to the initiator and the responder respectively.

14. A method as in claim 1, wherein the authentication field and the result field are also derived from a random number and a sequence number using a predetermined set of functions.

15. An apparatus comprising:

a card for providing a message claiming an identity associated with a secret key for transmission;

a receiver for receiving an authentication field and a random number field from a device in communication with the apparatus; and

a module for performing authentication of the device in communication with the apparatus based on the authentication field which is derived from the secret key without revealing the secret key;

wherein the secret key and identity are provided out-of-band to the apparatus and at least one other entity.

16. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the module is configured to determine a result field based at least on the secret.

17. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the device is configured for receiving the secret key from a third-party entity distinct from and trusted by the device.

18. The apparatus of claim 15,

wherein the module is responsive to the authentication field and the random number field for testing whether the device is authentic based on information conveyed by the authentication field and also based on the random number field.

19. The apparatus of claim 15, further comprising:

a receiver for receiving an expected result field from the third-party entity; and

wherein the module is configured to use a result field to test whether the device is authentic by comparing the result field with the expected result field.

20. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the module is configured to calculate a result field based on the secret key and the random number field if the apparatus determines the device to be authentic.

21. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein a shared secret is obtained based on information derived from, but not revealing, the secret key.

22. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the module is configured to use a predetermined set of functions to derive information from a random number and a sequence number.

23. An apparatus comprising:

means for providing a message claiming an identity associated with a secret key for transmission;

means for receiving an authentication field and a random number field from a device in communication with the apparatus, and

means for performing authentication of the device in communication with the apparatus based on the authentication field which is derived from the secret key without revealing the secret key;

wherein the secret key and identity are provided out-of-band to the apparatus and at least one other entity.

24. The apparatus of claim 23, further comprising means for determining a result field based at least in part on the secret key.