Establishment of a secure communication link based on a domain name service (DNS) request

• US 7,490,151 B2
• Filed: 09/30/2002
• Issued: 02/10/2009
• Est. Priority Date: 10/30/1998
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: VirnetX Inc. (Virnetx Holding Corporation)
• Original Assignee: VirnetX Inc. (Virnetx Holding Corporation)
• Inventors: Munger, Edward Colby, Larson, Victor, Short, Robert Dunham III, Williamson, Michael
• Primary Examiner(s): Lim; Krisna
• Application Number:
  US10/259,494
• Publication Number:
  US 20030037142A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,325 Days
• Field of Search: 709217-225, 709/229, 713/201
• US Class Current: 709/225
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2101/604 Address structures or formats
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 45/00 Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks routing or path finding in wireless networks H04W40/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 45/24 Multipath
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 45/243 using M+N parallel active paths
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 45/28 using route fault recovery
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/35 involving non-standard use of addresses for implementing network functionalities, e.g. coding subscription information within the address or functional addressing, i.e. assigning an address to a function
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/4511 using domain name system [DNS]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/5007 Internet protocol [IP] addresses
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/5076 Update or notification mechanisms, e.g. DynDNS
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/5092 by self-assignment, e.g. picking addresses at random and testing if they are already in use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0407 wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for anonymous credentials or for identity based cryptographic systems H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0414 during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1458 Denial of Service
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1491 using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 65/403 Arrangements for multi-party communication, e.g. for conferences data switching systems for conference H04L12/18; arrangements for connecting several subscribers to a common circuit, i.e. affording conference facilities H04M3/56; television conferencing systems H04N7/15

Abstract

A plurality of computer nodes communicate using seemingly random Internet Protocol source and destination addresses. Data packets matching criteria defined by a moving window of valid addresses are accepted for further processing, while those that do not meet the criteria are quickly rejected. Improvements to the basic design include (1) a load balancer that distributes packets across different transmission paths according to transmission path quality; (2) a DNS proxy server that transparently creates a virtual private network in response to a domain name inquiry; (3) a large-to-small link bandwidth management feature that prevents denial-of-service attacks at system chokepoints; (4) a traffic limiter that regulates incoming packets by limiting the rate at which a transmitter can be synchronized with a receiver; and (5) a signaling synchronizer that allows a large number of nodes to communicate with a central node by partitioning the communication function between two separate entities.

Claims

1. A data processing device, comprising memory storing a domain name server (DNS) proxy module that intercepts DNS requests sent by a client and, for each intercepted DNS request, performs the steps of:

(i) determining whether the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server;

(ii) when the intercepted DNS request does not correspond to a secure server, forwarding the DNS request to a DNS function that returns an IP address of a nonsecure computer, and

(iii) when the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server, automatically initiating an encrypted channel between the client and the secure server.

2. The data processing device of claim 1, wherein step (iii) comprises the steps of:

(a) determining whether the client is authorized to access the secure server; and

(b) when the client is authorized to access the secure server, sending a request to the secure server to establish an encrypted channel between the secure server and the client.

3. The data processing device of claim 2, wherein step (iii) further comprises the step of:

(c) when the client is not authorized to access the secure server, returning a host unknown error message to the client.

4. The data processing device of claim 3, wherein the client comprises a web browser into which a user enters a URL resulting in the DNS request.

5. The data processing device of claim 1, wherein automatically initiating the encrypted channel between the client and the secure sewer comprises establishing an IF address hopping scheme between the client and the secure server.

6. The data processing device of claim 1, wherein automatically initiating the encrypted channel between the client and the secure server avoids sending a true IP address of the secure server to the client.

7. A computer readable medium storing a domain name server (DNS) proxy module comprised of computer readable instructions that, when executed, cause a data processing device to perform the steps of:

(i) intercepting a DNS request sent by a client;

(ii) determining whether the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server;

(iii) when the intercepted DNS request does not correspond to a secure server, forwarding the DNS request to a DNS function that returns an IP address of a nonsecure computer; and

(iv) when the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server, automatically initiating an encrypted channel between the client and the secure server.

8. The computer readable medium of claim 7, wherein step (iv) comprises the steps of

(a) determining whether the client is authorized to access the secure server, and

(b) when the client is authorized to access the secure server, sending a request to the secure sewer to establish an encrypted channel between the secure sewer and the client.

9. The computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein step (iv) further comprises the step of:

(c) when the client is not authorized to access the secure server, returning a host unknown error message to the client.

10. The computer readable medium of claim 9, wherein the client comprises a web browser into which a user enters a URL resulting in the DNS request.

11. The computer readable medium of claim 7, wherein automatically initiating the encrypted channel between the client and the secure sewer comprises establishing an IP address hopping scheme between the client and the secure server.

12. The computer readable medium of claim 7, wherein automatically initiating the encrypted channel between the client and the secure server avoids sending a true IP address of the secure server to the client.

13. A computer readable medium storing a domain name server (DNS) module comprised of computer readable instructions that, when executed, cause a data processing device to perform the steps of:

(i) determining whether a DNS request sent by a client corresponds to a secure server;

(ii) when the DNS request does not correspond to a secure server, forwarding the DNS request to a DNS function that returns an IP address of a nonsecure computer; and

(iii) when the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server, automatically creating a secure channel between the client and the secure server.

14. The computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein step (iii) comprises the steps of

(a) determining whether the client is authorized to access the secure server;

and

(b) when the client is authorized to access the secure server, sending a request to the secure server to establish a secure channel between the secure server and the client.

15. The computer readable medium of claim 14, wherein step (iii) further comprises the step of:

(c) when the client is not authorized to access the secure server, returning a host unknown error message to the client.

16. The computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the client comprises a web browser into which a user enters a URL resulting in the DNS request.