Electronic transaction systems and methods therefor

• US 7,635,084 B2
• Filed: 12/04/2006
• Issued: 12/22/2009
• Est. Priority Date: 12/04/1996
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: ServStor Technologies, LLC (IP Investments Group LLC)
• Original Assignee: Esignx Corporation
• Inventors: Grizzard, James A., Wang, Ynjiun P., Ding, Joshua C.
• Primary Examiner(s): Labaze; Edwyn
• Application Number:
  US11/566,661
• Publication Number:
  US 20070089168A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,114 Days
• Field of Search: 235/379, 235/380, 235/382, 235/375, 705/50, 705 57- 59, 705/64, 705/75, 705/67, 713165-168
• US Class Current: 235/379
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/00 Payment architectures, schemes or protocols apparatus for performing or posting payment transactions G07F7/08, G07F19/00; electronic cash registers G07G1/12
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/02 involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/18 involving self-service terminals [SST], vending machines, kiosks or multimedia terminals
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/322 Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/327 Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3415 Cards acting autonomously as pay-media
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/363 with the personal data of a user
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3823 combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40 Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 19/20 Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/0866 by active credit-cards adapted therefor G07F7/1008 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/0886 the card reader being portable for interacting with a POS or ECR in realizing a payment transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1016 Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption arrangements for secret communication, see H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1025 Identification of user by a PIN code
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/102 : applying security measure for e-commerce data processing systems or methods, specially adapted for e-commerce G06Q30/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 : wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 : wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 : using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 : involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 : using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 : involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures

Abstract

The method includes the steps of receiving at the PEAD first digital data representing the transaction request. The PEAD provides information to the user regarding an ability to approve the transaction request. When the transaction request is approved by the user, the PEAD receives second digital data representing the electronic service authorization token. A remote agent server may provide a bridge between the electronic transaction system and the PEAD. In another embodiment, the private key is stored on the portable device, encrypted. The decryption key is stored outside of the device, at a trusted 3^rd party location. When the user attempts to make a signature the software sends a request for the decryption key, along with the user'"'"'s password or pass phrase keyed in at the keyboard of the PDA, smart phone, or cell phone, to a server belonging to the trusted 3^rd party.

Claims

1. In a portable electronic authorization device (PEAD) with inaccessible storage of a user'"'"'s private key, a method for approving a transaction request originating from an electronic transaction system which stores or has access to a user'"'"'s public key, comprising:

receiving at said portable electronic authorization device first digital data, said first digital data representing said transaction request and including the user'"'"'s public key;

performing approval and encryption of the transaction approval solely within the PEAD utilizing a private key stored within the PEAD accessed using the user'"'"'s public key without transmission of the private key to the remote electronic transaction system or entry of the private key by the user to the PEAD; and

if said transaction request is approved by a user of said portable electronic authorization device, and transmitting a second digital data to said electronic transaction system, said second digital data being encrypted by said user private key but without transmission of the private key to the transaction approval system at any time during or after the transaction approval.

2. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein decrypting the user private key includes sending a request from the PEAD to the server including a password from the user of the PEAD but not including transmission of the user'"'"'s private key to the server.

3. A method as claimed in claim 2 wherein the request includes transmitting a user password or pass phrase.

4. A method as claimed in claim 3 wherein the password or pass phrase is keyed in at the PEAD.

5. A method as claimed in claim 4 wherein if the password or pass phrase provided to the server is incorrect, the PEAD is informed and the event is recorded.

6. A method as claimed in claim 5 wherein once a certain number of failures due to an uncorrected password or pass phrase have occurred, the users account associated with the private key is deactivated.

7. A method as claimed in claim 6 wherein upon deactivation of the account, the server will refuse to provide the decryption key.

8. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein the user private key is stored in the PEAD encrypted with a symmetric key scheme.

9. A method as claimed in claim 8 wherein the symmetric key scheme is 3DES.

10. A method as claimed in claim 9 wherein the 3DES key is stored in the remote server associated with an authorization test password or pass phrase for the user.

11. A method as claimed in claim 10 wherein whenever the user needs to authorize a transaction, the user inputs the password or pass phrase at a keyboard at the PEAD.

12. A method as claimed in claim 11 where upon the password or pass phrase being keyed into the PEAD, it is transmitted to the remote server, the remote server returning the symmetric key to the PEAD for decrypting the private key.

13. A method as claimed in claim 12 wherein after finishing the signing process, both the 3DES key and the plain private key, the password or pass phrase entered by the user are deleted from the PEAD.

14. A method as claimed in claim 13 wherein the remote server will monitor and detect any unauthorized attempted access of the symmetric key stored at the server, and notifies the PEAD user through e-mail alert, phone call or message alert.

15. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein the decryption key stored at the PEAD is transmitted to the PEAD from a remote server separately from the transaction approval request and is stored in inaccessible storage at the PEAD.

16. In an electronic authorization system with inaccessible storage of a user'"'"'s private key, at a portable electronic authorization device (PEAD) a method for approving a transaction request originating from an electronic transaction system which accesses a public key of the user, comprising:

receiving at said electronic authorization system first digital data, said first digital data representing said transaction request the transaction request including the user'"'"'s public key;

performing approval and encryption of the transaction approval solely within the PEAD utilizing a private key stored within the PEAD without transmission of the private key to the remote electronic transaction system or entry of the private key by the user to the PEAD; and

if said transaction request is approved by a user of said electronic authorization system, decrypting the user private key using the user'"'"'s public key transmitted to the PEAD from the electronic transaction system, transmitting a second digital data to said electronic transaction system, said second digital data being encrypted by said user private key but without transmission of the private key to the transaction approval system at any time during or after the transaction approval.

17. A method as claimed in claim 16 wherein decrypting the user private key includes sending a request from the electronic authorization system to the server including a password from the user of the electronic authorization system.

18. A method as claimed in claim 17 wherein the request includes transmitting a user password or pass phrase.

19. A method as claimed in claim 18 wherein the password or pass phrase is keyed in at the electronic authorization system.

20. A method as claimed in claim 19 wherein if the password or pass phrase provided to the server is incorrect, the electronic authorization system is informed and the event is recorded.

21. A method as claimed in claim 20 wherein once a certain number of failures due to an uncorrected password or pass phrase have occurred, the users account associated with the private key is deactivated.

22. A method as claimed in claim 21 wherein upon deactivation of the account, the server will refuse to provide the decryption key.

23. A method as claimed in claim 16 wherein the user private key is stored in the electronic authorization system encrypted with a symmetric key scheme.

24. A method as claimed in claim 23 wherein the symmetric key scheme is 3DES.

25. A method as claimed in claim 24 wherein the 3DES key is stored in the remote server associated with an authorization test password or pass phrase for the user.

26. A method as claimed in claim 25 wherein whenever the user needs to authorize a transaction, the user inputs the password or pass phrase at a keyboard at the electronic authorization system.

27. A method as claimed in claim 26 where upon the password or pass phrase being keyed into the electronic authorization system, it is transmitted to the remote server, the remote server returning the symmetric key to the electronic authorization system for decrypting the private key.

28. A method as claimed in claim 27 wherein after finishing the signing process, both the 3DES key and the plain private key, the password or pass phrase entered by the user are deleted from the electronic authorization system.

29. A method as claimed in claim 28 wherein the remote server will monitor and detect any unauthorized attempted access of the symmetric key stored at the server, and notifies the electronic authorization system user through e-mail alert, phone call or message alert.

30. A method as claimed in claim 16 wherein the decryption key stored at the PEAD is transmitted to the PEAD from a remote server separately from the transaction approval request and is stored in inaccessible storage at the PEAD.