Generating a root key for decryption of a transmission key allowing secure communications

• US 7,725,740 B2
• Filed: 05/19/2004
• Issued: 05/25/2010
• Est. Priority Date: 05/23/2003
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Nagravision SA (Kudelski SA)
• Original Assignee: Nagravision SA (Kudelski SA)
• Inventors: Kudelski, Henri, Gaumain, Serge
• Primary Examiner(s): Orgad, Edan
• Assistant Examiner(s): TURCHEN, JAMES R
• Application Number:
  US10/848,014
• Publication Number:
  US 20040236959A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,197 Days
• Field of Search: 713/194, 726/9, 380/44
• US Class Current: 713/194
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1016 Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption arrangements for secret communication, see H04L9/00

Abstract

A method is used to restore the security of a secure assembly such as a chip card, after the contents of its second memory zone have been read by a third party. The method is for generating a security key implemented by a secure module comprising a central unit, a first conditional access memory zone and at least one second memory zone containing all or part of the user program. The method includes reading of all or part of the second memory zone, and generation of at least one root key based on all or part of the second zone data and on at least one item of secret information stored in the first memory zone.

Claims

1. Method for generating a root key implemented by a secure module comprising a central unit, a first conditional access memory zone containing all or part of a bootstrap program and at least one second memory zone containing a first portion and a second portion containing all or part of a user program, the method comprising:

executing an initialisation program from the first conditional access memory zone;

reading and temporarily storing a secret information from the first conditional access memory zone into the first portion of second memory zone during the initialisation of the secure module;

reading all or part of the second portion of the second memory zone;

generating the root key based on an imprint of data of the second portion of the second memory zone and on the stored secret information, the imprint being generated based on the application of a unidirectional function to all or part of the data of the second portion of the second memory zone;

eliminating the secret information from the first portion of the second memory zone after the root key has been generated;

disabling access to the first conditional access memory zone, wherein at the time of execution by the central unit in the second memory zone, no access is granted to the first conditional access memory zone

wherein the root key is used to allow decryption of transmission key, the transmission key allowing secure communication between the secure module and a management center.

2. Method according to claim 1, wherein the secret information is a factory key.

3. Method according to claim 1, wherein the secret information is an algorithm describing the use of data to generate the root key.

4. Method according to claim 1, wherein the method further includes calculating at least one item of control information representative of all or part of the data of the second memory zone, this control information being used for the generation of the root key.

5. Method according to claim 4, wherein the control information is calculated based on a function (Hash) called unidirectional and without collision, executed on all or part of the data of the second memory zone.

6. Method according to claim 1, wherein the second memory zone further includes a description part including a location of one or more portions of the second memory zone, where the portions of the second memory zone are used in calculating control information.

7. Method according to claim 6, wherein this description part includes a plurality of location information for each part of a user memory zone corresponding to partial control information.

8. Method according to claim 2, wherein the factory key is of a symmetrical type.

9. Method according to claim 1, wherein the second memory zone includes a verification zone and a user zone, programs contained in the verification zone being in charge of the verification of the data in a user zone, the program system of the first zone transferring the necessary data from this first zone towards the verification zone.

10. Method according to claim 9, wherein the secret information is a factory key copied from the first conditional access memory zone towards the verification zone by a system program.

11. Method according to claim 10, wherein the factory key is eliminated when the root key is generated.

12. Method according to claim 1, wherein the root key is used as a transmission key to decrypt messages originating from a management centre.