Apparatus and method for distributing private keys to an entity with minimal secret, unique information

• US 7,802,085 B2
• Filed: 02/18/2004
• Issued: 09/21/2010
• Est. Priority Date: 02/18/2004
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Original Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Inventors: Graunke, Gary L.
• Primary Examiner(s): Smithers; Matthew B
• Assistant Examiner(s): CALLAHAN, PAUL E
• Application Number:
  US10/782,572
• Publication Number:
  US 20050180572A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,407 Days
• Field of Search: 713/1, 713/2, 713/164, 713/194, 713/4, 726/34, 380/279, 725/34
• US Class Current: 713/2
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/60 Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0827 involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0877 using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3278 using physically unclonable functions [PUF]

Abstract

In some embodiments, a method and apparatus for distributing private keys to an entity with minimal secret, unique information are described. In one embodiment, the method includes the storage of a chip secret key within a manufactured chip. Once the chip secret key is stored or programmed within the chip, the chip is sent to a system original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in order to integrate the chip within a system or device. Subsequently, a private key is generated for the chip by a key distribution facility (KDF) according to a key request received from the system OEM. In one embodiment, the KDF is the chip manufacturer. Other embodiments are described and claims.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

programming a chip secret key into a manufactured chip;

sending the manufactured chip to a system original equipment manufacturer (OEM); and

generating at least one private key for the manufactured chip in response to a received key update request, issued by the manufactured chip, if the received key update request is authenticated, to enable authentication of the manufactured chip without disclosure of the private key or any unique device identification information of the manufactured chip,

wherein the key update request is issued by the manufactured chip in response to chip initialization.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein prior to programming the chip, the method comprises:

gathering unique identification (ID) information of the manufactured chip;

encrypting the identification information using a first key to form a chip ID for the manufactured chip; and

encrypting the chip ID using a second key to form the chip secret key.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the unique identification information includes a wafer serial number of a wafer from which the chip is formed and an X,Y coordinate location of the manufactured chip within the wafer.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein programming the chip secret key comprises:

storing the chip secret key within chip fuses of the manufactured chip; and

blowing selected fuses of the manufactured chip to prevent unauthorized access to the chip secret key.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein generating the private key further comprises:

receiving the key update request from the system OEM;

authenticating the received key update request;

generating cipher text including the at least one private key for the manufactured chip if the key update request is authentic; and

sending the cipher text to the system OEM.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein authenticating the received key update request comprises:

verifying a digital signature of the system OEM included within the key update request;

decrypting the key update request to form a decrypted chip ID if the digital signature of the OEM is verified;

verifying that the chip ID of the manufactured chip matches the decrypted chip ID; and

disregarding the received key update request if the decrypted chip ID is not verified.

7. The method of claim 5, wherein generating the cipher text comprises:

generating a key vector including the at least one private key.

8. An article of manufacture including a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon instructions which may be used to program a system to perform a method, comprising:

programming a chip secret key into a manufactured chip;

sending the manufactured chip to a system original equipment manufacturer (OEM); and

generating at least one private key for the manufactured chip in response to a received key update request, issued by the manufactured chip, if the received key update request is authenticated, to enable authentication of the manufactured chip without disclosure of the private key or any unique device identification information of the manufactured chip,

wherein the key update request is issued by the manufactured chip in response to chip initialization.

9. The article of manufacture of claim 8, wherein prior to programming the chip, the method comprises:

gathering unique identification (ID) information of the manufactured chip;

encrypting the identification information using a first key to form a chip ID for the manufactured chip; and

encrypting the chip ID using a second key to form the chip secret key.

10. The article of manufacture of claim 8, wherein generating the private further comprises:

receiving the key update request from the system OEM;

authenticating the received key update request;

generating cipher text including the at least one private key for the manufactured chip if the key update request is authentic; and

sending the cipher text to the system OEM.

11. The article of manufacture of claim 8, wherein authenticating the received key update request comprises:

verifying a digital signature of the system OEM included within the key update request;

decrypting the key update request to form a decrypted chip ID if the digital signature of the OEM is verified;

verifying that the chip ID of the manufactured chip matches the decrypted chip ID; and

disregarding the received key update request if the decrypted chip ID is not verified.

12. An integrated chip, comprising:

key request logic to generate a key update request using a preprogrammed chip secret key stored within the integrated chip to receive at least one private key from a key distribution facility (KDF) if the key update request is authenticated by the KDF; and

authentication logic to perform authentication with a content protection application to receive protected content using a received digital certificate to avoid disclosing the identity of the integrated chip during the authentication; and

a first cryptographic block to decrypt received initialization cipher text using the chip secret key to form a chip ID, the at least one private key and a digital certificate.

13. The chip of claim 12, further comprising:

a first cryptographic block to decrypt received random cipher text using the chip secret key to form a random ID, a random private key and a random digital certificate; and

a second cryptographic block to encrypt the random ID, the chip secret key and a pad value using a public key of the KDF to form the key update request.

14. The integrated chip of claim 12, wherein:

the initialization cipher text includes a key vector including a series of non-unique private keys.