Method for communicating between a reader and a wireless identification marker, associated reader and marker

• US 7,942,324 B2
• Filed: 03/30/2006
• Issued: 05/17/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 04/15/2005
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: IDEMIA Identity and Security France SAS (Advent International Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Morpho (Advent International Corporation)
• Inventors: Chabanne, Hervé
• Primary Examiner(s): ST CYR, DANIEL
• Application Number:
  US11/911,334
• Publication Number:
  US 20080185434A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,874 Days
• Field of Search: 235/439, 235/492, 235/462.46, 235/472.02
• US Class Current: 235/439
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0858 Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding

Abstract

A method includes transmitting a first digital channel (X₀) from a reader to a marker, receiving a second digital channel (Y₀) corresponding to the first digital channel and to errors introduced by a noisy channel, introducing artificial errors into at least one of the first or second digital channels, carrying out an advantage distillation phase in such a way that a new first digital channel (X₁) is determined for the reader. A new second digital channel (Y₁) is determined for the marker such that the advantage is taken with respect to a possible passive attacker. In an information reconciliation phase, an error-correcting protocol is applied to the new first (X₂) and new second (Y₂) digital channel, and in carrying out a secrecy amplification phase, a hash function (G) is applied to the new first (X₂*) and the new second (Y₂*) digital channel.

Claims

1. A method for communicating between a wireless identification reader and a wireless identification marker via a noisy channel, comprising:

/a/ transmitting a first numeric string from the reader to the marker;

/b/ receiving, on the wireless identification marker, a second numeric string corresponding to the first numeric string, excepting errors introduced by the noisy channel;

/c/ modifying at least one of the first and second numeric strings by introducing artificial errors into at least one of the first and second numeric strings;

/d/ performing an advantage distillation phase in which a third numeric string is determined on the reader on the basis of the first numeric string resulting from step /c/, and a fourth numeric string is determined on the wireless identification marker on the basis of the second numeric string resulting from step /c/, in such a way as to take an advantage with respect to a possible passive attacker;

/e/ performing an information reconciliation phase, wherein an error-correction protocol is applied to the third and the fourth numeric strings so as to obtain, at the end of step /e/, respective fifth and sixth numeric strings which are identical with a predetermined probability level; and

/f/ performing a secrecy amplification phase, wherein a hash function is applied to the fifth and the sixth numeric strings, so as to obtain a numeric string which can be used to secure the exchanges on the noisy channel.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1, in which the advantage distillation phase comprises the following steps:

dividing up the first and second numeric strings resulting from step /c/ into groups of N successive numerical values, where N is an integer;

carrying out an exclusive OR on each of said groups;

exchanging the results of the exclusive OR between the reader and the marker;

determining the third numeric string is determined on the reader on the basis of the first numerical value of each group of the first numeric string resulting from step /c/ for which the result of the exclusive OR is identical to the result of the exclusive OR carried out on the corresponding group of the second numeric string resulting from step /c/; and

determining the fourth numeric string on the marker on the basis of the first numerical value of each group of the second numeric string resulting from step /c/ for which the result of the exclusive OR is identical to the result of the exclusive OR carried out on the corresponding group of the first numeric string resulting from step /c/.

3. The method as claimed in claim 1 in which introducing artificial errors in step /c/ comprises randomly modifying numerical values of at least one of the first and second numeric strings.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1, in which step /d/ is repeated a number of times depending on the estimated noise of the noisy channel.

5. The method as claimed in claim 1, in which the error-correction protocol is chosen in such a way as to allow a minimum of information to be leaked to a possible passive attacker.

6. A wireless identification reader suitable for communicating with a wireless identification marker via a noisy channel, comprising:

means for transmitting a first numeric string to the marker;

means for modifying the first numeric string by introducing artificial errors into the first numeric string;

means for determining a second numeric string on the basis of the modified first numeric string, in such a way as to take an advantage with respect to a possible passive attacker;

means for applying an error-correction protocol to the second numeric string, so as to obtain a third numeric string; and

means for applying a hash function to the third numeric string, so as to obtain a numeric string which can be used to secure the exchanges on the noisy channel.

7. A wireless identification marker suitable for communicating with a wireless identification reader via a noisy channel, comprising:

means for receiving a second numeric string corresponding to a first numeric string transmitted by the reader, excepting errors introduced by the noisy channel;

means for modifying the second numeric string by introducing artificial errors into the second numeric string;

means for determining a third numeric string on the basis of the modified second numeric string, in such a way as to take an advantage with respect to a possible passive attacker;

means for applying an error-correction protocol to the third numeric string, so as to obtain a fourth numeric string; and

means for applying a hash function to the fourth numeric string, so as to obtain a numeric string which can be used to secure the exchanges on the noisy channel.