Electronic message system with federation of trusted senders

• US 8,359,360 B2
• Filed: 12/08/2009
• Issued: 01/22/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 03/15/2005
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Meta Platforms, Inc. (f/k/a Facebook, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Meta Platforms, Inc. (f/k/a Facebook, Inc.)
• Inventors: Logue, Jay D., Sullivan, Timothy T., Landsman, Richard
• Primary Examiner(s): Etienne, Ario
• Assistant Examiner(s): Kim, Hee Soo
• Application Number:
  US12/633,290
• Publication Number:
  US 20100138658A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,141 Days
• Field of Search: 709/206
• US Class Current: 709/206
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 51/212 using filtering or selective blocking
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/12 Applying verification of the received information cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32

Abstract

Systems and methods for allowing challenge messages to be sent directly to a recipient'"'"'s inbox where normally the challenge message would be sent to a pending folder or deleted. Challenge messages sent between federated messaging services contain a federated token which can be identified, authenticated and validated to determine whether the challenge message should be sent to a recipient'"'"'s inbox. The federated token can include an authentication portion and a validation portion. Authentication methods for the authentication portion can include, for example, checksums, salts, hashes and digital signatures. Once a federated token is authenticated by decrypting the authentication portion according to one or more of these authentication methods, the federated token is validated by determining the defined use-base and determining whether the receipt of the federated token satisfies the defined use.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method, the method comprising:

a first authorized server, which includes one or more processors, generating an electronic challenge message, wherein the electronic challenge message;

identifies a sender and a recipient and contains data to be delivered to the recipient; and

includes a federated token identifying that the electronic challenge message was sent from a federated server, the federated token also being configured to be authenticated and validated by a second authorized server that has previously formed a federated relationship with the first authorized server, such that the second authorized server delivers the electronic challenge message to the recipient'"'"'s inbox without the second authorized server generating a second electronic challenge message based at least in part on the electronic challenge message having been sent from a federated server.

2. The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the federated token comprises one or more of:

a checksum;

a hash value;

a digital signature portion;

a digital signature portion applied by an external certificate authorizing server;

an authentication code;

or

a validation code.

3. The method as recited in claim 2, wherein the checksum is derived using a private salt.

4. The method as recited in claim 2, wherein the validation code defines a use basis for evaluating the federated token.

5. The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the first authorized server is associated with one or more partner keys that are configured to allow the second authorized server to decrypt the federated token.

6. One or more non-transitory computer storage media that store an authorization module and a tokenization module, wherein:

the authorization module comprises computer-executable instructions that are executable by one or more processors to;

receive a first challenge message from a second server, wherein the first challenge message;

identifies a first user associated with a first server as a recipient of the first challenge message and a second user associated with the second server as a sender of the first challenge message and contains data to be delivered to the first user; and

includes a first federated token identifying the second server; and

determine at least one of whether the first federated token is authentic and whether the first federated token is valid; and

the tokenization module comprises computer-executable instructions that are executable by the one or more processors to generate a second challenge message identifying a third user associated with the second server as a recipient of the second challenge message and a fourth user associated with the first server as a sender of the second challenge message, the second challenge message comprising;

a second federated token that identifies the second challenge message as being sent by a server that previously formed a federated relationship with the second server and that is configured to be one or both of authenticated or validated by the second server and used to deliver the second challenge message to an inbox of the third user without the second server generating a third challenge message in response to receiving the second challenge message based at least in part on the second challenge message having been sent from a federated server.

7. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 6, wherein the authorization module further comprises computer-executable instructions that are executable by the one or more processors to deliver the first challenge message to an inbox of the first user after determining that the first federated token is at least one of authentic and valid.

8. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 6, wherein the authorization module further comprises computer-executable instructions that are executable by the one or more processors to deliver the first challenge message to a pending folder of the first user after determining that the first federated token is not authentic or valid.

9. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 6, wherein the computer-executable instructions that are executable to determine whether the first federated token is authentic comprise computer-executable instructions that are executable to perform at least one of:

decrypting the federated token using a partner key associated with a private key used by the second server to encrypt the federated token;

regenerating a checksum in the federated token to determine whether the regenerated checksum is the same as an original checksum originally included in the federated token;

regenerating a hash value in the federated token to determine whether the regenerated hash value is the same as an original hash value originally included in the federated token;

or

verifying a digital signature contained in the federated token.

10. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 6, wherein the tokenization module further comprises computer-executable instructions that are executable by the one or more processors to exchange one or more partner keys with the second server, the one or more partner keys configured to permit the second server to authenticate the second challenge message.

11. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 10, wherein the computer-executable instructions that are executable to exchange the one or more partner keys with the second server include computer-executable instructions that are executable to perform at least one of:

passing the second challenge message through a certificate authorizing server;

sending the one or more partner keys to the second server with the second challenge message;

or

sending a message subsequent to the second challenge message to the second server, the subsequent message containing the one or more partner keys.

12. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 6, wherein the computer-executable instructions are executable to generate the second challenge message in response to receiving an original message generated by the third user associated with the second server, the original message indicating the fourth user associated with the first server to receive the original message.

13. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 6, wherein the computer-executable instructions that are executable to determine whether the first federated token is valid comprise computer-executable instructions that are executable to analyze the first federated token to determine a defined use base and to determine whether the receipt of the first federated token satisfies the defined use base.

14. The non-transitory computer storage media of claim 13, wherein the defined use base of the first federated token is at least one of single-based, multiple-based, or time-based usage.

15. An authorized server computer system, the authorized server comprising:

a processor that is configured to execute computer-executable instructions;

computer-executable instructions that are executable by the authorized server to transmit an original message generated by a first user associated with the authorized server to a second server, the original message indicating a second user associated with the second server to receive the original message;

an authorization module comprising computer-executable instructions that are executable by the authorized server to;

receive a first challenge message from the second server, wherein the first challenge message was generated in response to the first user being unknown to the second user, wherein the first challenge message;

identifies the first user as a recipient of the first challenge message and the second user as a sender of the first challenge message and contains data to be delivered to the first user; and

includes a first federated token identifying the second server;

determine at least one of whether the first federated token is authentic and whether the first federated token is valid; and

deliver the first challenge message to an inbox of the first sender when the first challenge message is at least one of authentic and valid; and

a tokenization module comprising computer-executable instructions that are executable by the authorized server to generate a second challenge message identifying a third user associated with the second server as a recipient of the second challenge message and a fourth user associated with the first server as a sender of the second challenge message, the second challenge message comprising;

a second federated token that identifies the second challenge message as being sent by a server that previously formed a federated relationship with the second server and that is configured to be one or both of authenticated or validated by the second server and used to deliver the second challenge message to an inbox of the third user without the second server generating a third challenge message in response to receiving the second challenge message based at least in part on the second challenge message having been sent from a federated server.

16. The authorized server of claim 15, wherein the second federated token includes a checksum generated by the tokenization module.

17. The authorized server of claim 16, wherein the checksum is generated by the tokenization module using a private salt.

18. The authorized server of claim 15, wherein the second federated token includes a hash value generated by the tokenization module.

19. The authorized server of claim 18, wherein the hash value is encrypted by the tokenization module using a private encryption key associated with the authorized server.

20. The authorized server of claim 15, wherein the tokenization module further comprises computer-executable instructions that are executable by the authorized server to perform at least one of:

passing the second challenge message through a certificate authorizing server;

sending one or more partner keys associated with a private key of the authorized server to the second server with the second challenge message;

or

sending a message subsequent to the second challenge message to the second server, the subsequent message containing the one or more partner keys.