Method and apparatus for camouflaging of data, information and functional transformations

• US 8,429,720 B2
• Filed: 11/03/2008
• Issued: 04/23/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 12/23/1997
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: CA, Inc. (d/b/a CA Technologies) (Broadcom, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: CA, Inc. (d/b/a CA Technologies) (Broadcom, Inc.)
• Inventors: Rajasekaran, Sanguthevar, Hird, Geoffrey R., Kausik, Balas Natarajan
• Primary Examiner(s): Cervetti, David Garcia
• Application Number:
  US12/263,938
• Publication Number:
  US 20090138944A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,632 Days
• Field of Search: 726/4, 726/26, 713/183, 713/184, 380/44, 380/281, 380/284
• US Class Current: 726/4
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/62 Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/046 of operations, operands or results of the operations
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/20 Manipulating the length of blocks of bits, e.g. padding or block truncation
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures

Abstract

A computer-representable object (including, without limitation, a cryptographic key, or a graph or a Boolean description of a system) is secured using a generalized camouflaging technique. The secured object need not be stored in the system, not even in encrypted form. Instead, the technique employs a composition function that regenerates the secured object when one inputs a valid password (which may be any computer-representable information held by a user). By regenerating the secured object each time a valid password is entered, there is no need to store the secured object. If one inputs an invalid password, the technique may generate an incorrect object, such that the user is unable to distinguish this incorrect object from the secured object. If the user tries to use the incorrect object, the user can be exposed as unauthorized, without the user'"'"'s knowledge that he has been exposed.

Claims

1. A method for camouflaging a secret, the method comprising:

representing, in digital form, the secret to be protected against unauthorized access, wherein the secret is retrievable using a correct password;

representing said secret as a number of objects; and

storing, in a non-transitory computer-readable memory, a composition function, wherein;

the composition function is executable to generate a candidate secret using a candidate password and at least a subset of the number of objects;

the candidate secret matches the secret only if the candidate password matches the correct password;

the candidate secret does not match the secret if the candidate password does not match the correct password; and

the candidate secret when the candidate password matches the correct password and the candidate secret when the candidate password does not match the correct password have a common form.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein:

at least one of the number of objects is a first graph;

the correct password comprises a second graph; and

the composition function accepts the first graph and the second graph as operands.

3. The method of claim 2 wherein the secret represents linkage information among nodes of a network.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein:

at least one of the number of objects is a first matrix;

the correct password comprises a second matrix; and

the composition function accepts the first matrix and the second matrix as operands.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the secret represents at least one possible state of a system expressible as a Boolean logic function.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the correct password is a personal identification number (PIN).

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the secret is a private key.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the composition function is the XOR function.

9. A computer program product residing on a non-transitory processor-readable medium and comprising processor-readable instructions configured to:

represent, in digital form, a secret to be protected against unauthorized access, wherein the secret is retrievable using a correct password;

represent the secret as a number of objects;

store a composition function, wherein;

the composition function is executable to generate a candidate secret using a candidate password and at least a subset of the number of objects;

receive the candidate password from a user; and

generate, using the candidate password, the candidate secret, wherein;

the candidate secret matches the secret only if the candidate password matches the correct password;

the candidate secret does not match the secret if the candidate password does not match the correct password; and

the candidate secret when the candidate password matches the password and the candidate secret when the candidate password does not match the password have a common form.

10. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein:

at least one of the number of objects is a first graph;

the correct password comprises a second graph; and

the composition function accepts the first graph and the second graph as operands.

11. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein:

at least one of the number of objects is a first matrix;

the correct password comprises a second matrix; and

the composition function accepts the first matrix and the second matrix as operands.

12. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein:

the secret represents at least one possible state of a system expressible as a Boolean logic function.

13. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein the correct password is a personal identification number (PIN).

14. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein the secret is a private key.

15. An apparatus for camouflaging a secret, the apparatus comprising:

means for representing, in digital form, the secret to be protected against unauthorized access, wherein the secret is retrievable using a correct password;

means for representing said secret as a number of objects; and

means for storing a composition function, wherein;

the composition function is executable to generate a candidate secret using a candidate password and at least a subset of the number of objects;

the candidate secret matches the secret only if the candidate password matches the correct password;

the candidate secret does not match the secret if the candidate password does not match the correct password; and

the candidate secret when the candidate password matches the password and the candidate secret when the candidate password does not match the correct password have a common form.

16. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein:

at least one of the number of objects is a first graph;

the correct password comprises a second graph; and

the composition function accepts the first graph and the second graph as operands.

17. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein:

at least one of the number of objects is a first matrix;

the correct password comprises a second matrix; and

the composition function accepts the first matrix and the second matrix as operands.

18. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein:

the secret represents at least one possible state of a system expressible as a Boolean logic function.

19. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the correct password is a personal identification number (PIN).

20. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the secret is a private key.