Railway train critical systems having control system redundancy and asymmetric communications capability

• US 8,714,494 B2
• Filed: 09/10/2012
• Issued: 05/06/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 09/10/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Siemens Mobility, Inc. (Siemens AG)
• Original Assignee: Siemens Industry Incorporated (Siemens AG)
• Inventors: Weber, Claus
• Primary Examiner(s): Tarcza, Thomas
• Assistant Examiner(s): GOLDMAN, RICHARD A
• Application Number:
  US13/608,313
• Publication Number:
  US 20140074327A1
• Time in Patent Office: 603 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 246/131
• CPC Class Codes: B61L 15/0027 Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
• CPC Class Codes: B61L 15/0063 Multiple on-board control systems, e.g. "2 out of 3"-systems
• CPC Class Codes: B61L 27/70 Details of trackside communication
• CPC Class Codes: B61L 29/00 Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic

Abstract

A railway vital or critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform with railway vital system failure-free standards. The vital system uses a pair of COTS personal computers and operating systems with asymmetric communications capability. Each computer and operating system may differ for additional redundancy. Both computers receive and verify vital systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first computer has sole capability to send vital system output messages including the output data and an output security code, but only the second computer has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of either computer'"'"'s hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a vital system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other vital systems.

Claims

1. A control system for a railway vital application system, comprising:

a first controller having an external bilateral communications interface capable of sending and receiving a vital systems message within a railway vital application system, the message including a security code and vital data;

a second controller having an external communications interface capable of receiving a vital systems message, but incapable of sending a vital systems message that is generated within the second controller, the second controller having a security code generator; and

an inter-controller communications pathway coupling the first and second controllers;

wherein the first and second controllers respectively receive an input vital systems message including input vital systems data and an input security code, verify the input message integrity and generate output vital systems data, the second controller generates an output security code and sends it to the first controller, and the first controller sends an output vital systems message including the output vital systems data and the second controller output security code for use within the railway vital application system.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the first and second controllers compare their respective input message integrity verifications prior to generating respective output vital systems data.

3. The system of claim 2, wherein the first and second controllers compare their respective output vital systems data.

4. The system of claim 3, wherein the first and second controllers compare their respective output vital systems data prior to generation of the output security code.

5. The system of claim 1, wherein the first controller verifies output vital systems data integrity before sending the output vital systems message.

6. The system of claim 1, wherein the first and second controllers comprise personal computers selected from the group consisting of respectively having at least one of different microprocessors, operating systems or software instruction sets.

7. The system of claim 1 wherein the functions of at least one of the controllers is virtually simulated.

8. A railway vital application system comprising the control system of claim 1.

9. A railway vital application system comprising the control system of claim 6.

10. A railway system comprising:

a plurality of control systems for controlling railway vital systems, the control systems communicatively coupled to each other for receipt and transmission of vital systems messages respectively having vital data and a security code, the respective control systems comprising;

a first controller having an external bilateral communications interface capable of sending and receiving a vital systems message that is generated within the railway system;

a second controller having an external communications interface capable of receiving a vital systems message, but incapable of sending a vital systems message that is generated within the second controller, the second controller having a security code generator; and

an inter-controller communications pathway coupling the first and second controllers;

wherein the first and second controllers respectively receive an input vital systems message including input vital systems data and an input security code, verify the input message integrity and generate output vital systems data, the second controller generates an output security code and sends it to the first controller, and the first controller sends an output vital systems message including the output vital systems data and the second controller output security code, for use within the railway system.

11. The railway system of claim 10, wherein the first and second controllers compare their respective input message integrity verifications prior to generating respective output vital systems data.

12. The railway system of claim 11, wherein the first and second controllers compare their respective output vital systems data.

13. The railway system of claim 12, wherein the first and second controllers compare their respective output vital systems data prior to generation of the output security code.

14. The railway system of claim 10, wherein the first controller verifies output vital systems data integrity before sending the output vital systems message.

15. The railway system of claim 10, wherein within each respective control system the first and second controllers comprise personal computers selected from the group consisting of respectively having at least one of different microprocessors, operating systems or software instruction sets.

16. The railway train of claim 15, wherein each respective control system the computers have different hardware and different operating systems.

17. A method for controlling a railway vital application control system, comprising:

receiving with respective first and second controllers a vital systems input message that is generated within a railway vital application system that includes a security code and vital data, and independently verifying the input message integrity;

independently generating output vital systems data in response to the input message with the respective first and second controllers;

generating an output security code only with the second controller and sending the generated output security code to the first controller; and

assembling and sending an output vital systems message including the output vital systems data and second controller output security code with the first controller.

18. The method of claim 17, further comprising comparing first and second controllers respective input message integrity verifications prior to generating respective output vital systems data.

19. The method of claim 18, further comprising comparing first and second controllers respective output vital systems data.

20. The method of claim 19, further comprising comparing first and second controllers respective output vital systems data prior to generating the output security code.