Exploiting application characteristics for multiple-authenticator broadcast authentication schemes

• US 8,756,430 B2
• Filed: 04/14/2011
• Issued: 06/17/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 04/14/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC (General Motors Company)
• Original Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC (General Motors Company)
• Inventors: Kherani, Arzad A., Bhattacharya, Debojyoti, Muthaiah, Skanda N.
• Primary Examiner(s): Tabor, Amare F
• Application Number:
  US13/086,864
• Publication Number:
  US 20120265995A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,160 Days
• Field of Search: 713176-179, 713/168, 709/238, 709/246, 726 26- 30, 380/246
• US Class Current: 713/179
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/12 Applying verification of the received information cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/106 Packet or message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/027 using movement velocity, acceleration information
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/40 for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/005 Moving wireless networks

Abstract

A method for securing communications in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) system including an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle predicting a value for a vehicle parameter, generating a heavyweight signature corresponding to the predicted value, and obtaining an actual value for the vehicle parameter. The method also includes the computer comparing the predicted value to the actual value to determine if the predicted value bears a first relationship to the actual value. If the computer determines that the predicted value bears the relationship to the actual value, the on-board computer generates a lightweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value and broadcasts a data message having the predicted value with the corresponding heavyweight authenticating signature and the corresponding lightweight authenticating signature.

Claims

1. A method, for securing communications between automotive vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communications system, comprising:

predicting, by an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle, a future value for a vehicle parameter, yielding a predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value corresponding to a pre-identified future time;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value;

obtaining, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, subsequent to predicting the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value and generating the heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, an actual value for the vehicle parameter, yielding an actual-vehicle-parameter value;

comparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, in a first comparison, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter to the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter to determine whether the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter bears a first relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter; and

in response to the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determining in the first comparison that the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value bears the first relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a lightweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, the lightweight authenticating signature having a lower security level than the heavyweight authenticating signature; and

broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a data message having the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, the actual-vehicle-parameter value, the corresponding heavyweight authenticating signature, and the corresponding lightweight authenticating signature;

receiving, by an on-board computer of a receiving vehicle, the data message broadcasted by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle;

comparing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, in a second comparison, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value to the actual-vehicle-parameter value to determine whether the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value bears a second predetermined relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value; and

in response to the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle determining, in the second comparison, that the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value bears the second relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value;

processing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the heavyweight authenticating signature and the lightweight authenticating signature to verify the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value; and

utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, after verifying the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

determining, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, in a determining step, whether to predict the future-vehicle-parameter value of the vehicle parameter;

wherein the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle predicts the future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter in response to a positive result in the determining step.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein comparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter to the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter to determine whether the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value bears the first relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter, comprises determining whether the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value is within a threshold value of the actual-vehicle-parameter value.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein comparing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value to the actual-vehicle-parameter value to determine whether the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value bears the second predetermine relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value, comprises determining whether the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value is within a pre-determined threshold of the actual-vehicle-parameter value.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises performing, in response to the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determining, in the first comparison, that the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value does not bear the first relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value, operations comprising:

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the actual-vehicle-parameter value;

generating a lightweight authenticating signature to correspond to the actual-vehicle-parameter value; and

preparing and broadcasting a message including the actual-vehicle-parameter value and the heavyweight and lightweight authenticating signatures corresponding to the actual-vehicle-parameter value.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises performing, in response to the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle determining, in the second comparison, that the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value does not bear the second relationship to the actual-vehicle-parameter value, operations comprising:

processing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the heavyweight authenticating signature and/or the lightweight authenticating signature to verify the actual-vehicle-parameter value; and

utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, after verifying the actual-vehicle-parameter value, the actual-vehicle-parameter value.

7. A method, for securing communications between automotive vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communications system according to a prediction-and-multiple-authenticator protocol, comprising:

generating, by an on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a first value for a vehicle parameter, yielding a generated actual vehicle-parameter value;

preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a first authenticating signature, having a first security level, to correspond with the generated actual vehicle-parameter value;

predicting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a second, future value for the vehicle parameter having lower accuracy than an accuracy of the first value for the vehicle parameter, yielding a predicted future-vehicle-parameter value;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a second authenticating signature to correspond with the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter, the second authenticating signature having a lower security level than the security level of the first authenticating signature;

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a data message including the generated actual vehicle-parameter value, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, and the corresponding authenticating signatures;

receiving, by an on-board computer of a receiving vehicle, the data message;

determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, which level of data accuracy is preferred;

processing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the authenticating signature corresponding to the level of data accuracy preferred; and

utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the data having the preferred accuracy;

wherein;

predicting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value includes predicting the future-vehicle-parameter value to be a relatively high-accuracy prediction of the vehicle parameter;

preparing by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the first authenticating signature includes preparing the first authenticating signature to have a relatively-high level of security;

the method further comprises;

predicting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, with relatively moderate accuracy a third, moderate-accuracy predicted value for the vehicle parameter; and

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a relatively moderate-security authenticating signature to correspond with the moderate-accuracy predicted value for the vehicle parameter; and

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the data message comprises preparing the message to include the actual-vehicle-parameter value, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, the third, moderate-accuracy value, and the corresponding authenticating signatures.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising:

determining, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, levels at which to prepare values for the vehicle parameter;

wherein the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generates the actual vehicle-parameter value and prepares the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value in response to determining (i) to prepare the actual vehicle-parameter value having an accuracy that the actual vehicle-parameter value is prepared to have and (ii) to prepare the future-vehicle-parameter value having an accuracy that the future-vehicle-parameter value is prepared to have.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the authenticating signature to correspond with the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter includes preparing the authenticating signature to have a very-high level of security.

10. The method of claim 7, further comprising:

determining, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, whether to predict any future value of the vehicle parameter;

wherein a group of steps, performed in response to a positive result from the determining, comprise;

(1) generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter;

(2) preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the relatively high-security authenticating signature;

(3) preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter;

(4) generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the security authenticating signature;

(5) preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the data message;

(6) receiving, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the data message;

(7) determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, which level of data accuracy it prefers;

(8) processing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the authenticating signature corresponding to the preferred level of data accuracy; and

(9) utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the data having the preferred accuracy.

11. A method, for securing communications between automobiles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communications system according to a delayed-authentication protocol, comprising:

determining, by an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle, in a determination, whether to predict a future value for a vehicle parameter;

performing, in response to the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determining, in the determination, to predict the future value, operations comprising;

predicting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the future value for the vehicle parameter, yielding a predicted future-vehicle parameter value;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, using an authenticating key, an authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted future-vehicle parameter value;

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an initial predicted-value message including the predicted future-vehicle parameter value and the corresponding authenticating signature; and

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a subsequent predicted-value message including the authenticating key, for use by receiving vehicles to;

authenticate the authenticating signature received in the initial predicted-value message for using the predicted future-vehicle parameter value received in the initial predicted-value message; and

performing, in response to the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determining in the determining not to predict the future-vehicle parameter value, operations comprising;

preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an actual-vehicle parameter value for the vehicle parameter;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an authenticating signature to correspond to the actual-vehicle parameter value; and

broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an actual-value message including the actual-vehicle parameter value and the corresponding authenticating signature.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein the determination comprises evaluation of needs of an application of at least one of the receiving vehicles.

13. A method, for securing communications between automobiles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communications system according to a delayed-authentication protocol, comprising:

predicting, by an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle, a future-vehicle parameter value for a vehicle parameter;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a first authenticating signature, using an authenticating key, to correspond to the predicted future-vehicle parameter value;

preparing and generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an initial message including the predicted future-vehicle parameter value and first authenticating signature;

preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an actual-vehicle parameter value of the vehicle parameter;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a second authenticating signature to correspond to the actual-vehicle parameter value;

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a subsequent message including the actual-vehicle parameter value, the second authenticating signature, and the authenticating key used to generate the first authenticating signature, so that receiving vehicles can determine which of the first authenticating signature and the second authenticating signature to process for accessing the predicted future-vehicle parameter value or the actual-vehicle parameter value, respectively;

receiving, by an on-board computer of a receiving vehicle, the broadcasted initial message;

receiving, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the broadcasted subsequent message; and

determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, whether to process the first authenticating signature for authenticating the predicted future-vehicle parameter value or to process the second authenticating signature for authenticating the actual-vehicle parameter value;

wherein determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, whether to process the first authenticating signature, using the authenticating key, for authenticating the predicted future-vehicle parameter value, or to process the second authenticating signature for authenticating the actual-vehicle parameter value, includes considering needs of an application of the receiving vehicle.

14. The method of claim 13, further comprising:

authenticating, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, in response to the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle determining to process the first authenticating signature for authenticating the predicted future-vehicle parameter value, using the authenticating key received in the initial message, the first authenticating signature; and

utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, in response to the authenticating the first authenticating signature, the predicted future-vehicle parameter value.

15. The method of claim 13, further comprising authenticating, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, in response to the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle determining to process the second authenticating signature for authenticating the predicted future-vehicle parameter value, the second authenticating signature and, upon the authentication, uses the actual-vehicle parameter value.

16. A method, for securing communications between automotive vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communications system according to a prediction-and-multiple-authenticator protocol, comprising:

generating, by an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle, a first value for a vehicle parameter, yielding a generated actual vehicle-parameter value;

preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a first authenticating signature, having a first security level, to correspond with the generated actual vehicle-parameter value;

predicting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a second, future value for the vehicle parameter having lower accuracy than an accuracy of the first value for the vehicle parameter, yielding a predicted future-vehicle-parameter value;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a second authenticating signature to correspond with the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter, the second authenticating signature having a lower security level than the security level of the first authenticating signature;

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a data message including the generated actual vehicle-parameter value, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value, and the corresponding authenticating signatures;

receiving, by an on-board computer of a receiving vehicle, the data message;

determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, which level of data accuracy is preferred;

processing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the authenticating signature corresponding to the level of data accuracy preferred;

utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the data having the preferred accuracy; and

determining, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, whether to predict any future value of the vehicle parameter;

wherein a group of steps, performed in response to a positive result from the determining, comprise;

(1) generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the actual-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter;

(2) preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the first authenticating signature;

(3) preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the predicted future-vehicle-parameter value for the vehicle parameter;

(4) generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the second authenticating signature;

(5) preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, the data message;

(6) receiving, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the data message;

(7) determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, which level of data accuracy it prefers;

(8) processing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the authenticating signature corresponding to the preferred level of data accuracy; and

(9) utilizing, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the data having the preferred accuracy.

17. A method, for securing communications between automobiles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communications system according to a delayed-authentication protocol, comprising:

predicting, by an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle, a future-vehicle parameter value for a vehicle parameter;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a first authenticating signature, using an authenticating key, to correspond to the predicted future-vehicle parameter value;

preparing and generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an initial message including the predicted future-vehicle parameter value and first authenticating signature;

preparing, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, an actual-vehicle parameter value of the vehicle parameter;

generating, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a second authenticating signature to correspond to the actual-vehicle parameter value; and

preparing and broadcasting, by the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, a subsequent message including the actual-vehicle parameter value, the second authenticating signature, and the authenticating key used to generate the first authenticating signature, so that receiving vehicles can determine which of the first authenticating signature and the second authenticating signature to process for accessing the predicted future-vehicle parameter value or the actual-vehicle parameter value, respectively;

receiving, by an on-board computer of a receiving vehicle, the broadcasted initial message;

receiving, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, the broadcasted subsequent message;

determining, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, whether to process the first authenticating signature for authenticating the predicted future-vehicle parameter value or to process the second authenticating signature for authenticating the actual-vehicle parameter value; and

authenticating, by the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle, in response to the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle determining to process the second authenticating signature for authenticating the predicted future-vehicle parameter value, the second authenticating signature and, upon the authentication, uses the actual-vehicle parameter value.