EGM authentication mechanism using multiple key pairs at the bios with PKI

• US 9,141,952 B2
• Filed: 04/09/2014
• Issued: 09/22/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 01/15/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: IGT (International Game Technology)
• Original Assignee: IGT (International Game Technology)
• Inventors: Kim, John Hongjip, Ozmen, Melih, Cockerille, Warner R. IV, Gulbag, Ali R.
• Primary Examiner(s): CHEUNG, CALVIN K
• Application Number:
  US14/249,083
• Publication Number:
  US 20140250299A1
• Time in Patent Office: 531 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/10 Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material protection in video systems or pay television H04N7/16 ; Digital rights management [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/51 at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2211/008 Public Key, Asymmetric Key, Asymmetric Encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/382 insuring higher security of transaction
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/127 Trusted platform modules [TPM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/068 using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]

Abstract

Executable applications on a gaming machine are verified before they can be executed, for security purposes and to comply with jurisdictional requirements. Unlike in prior systems for authenticating the executable applications, embodiments allow for new executable applications to be provided and verified over time with different private and public key pairs, even after the operating code of the gaming machine is certified by the jurisdiction and deployed in the field.

Claims

1. A system for providing and verifying gaming software for use in a wager based gaming machine, the system comprising:

a certificate authority configured to

receive authorization of a gaming machine manufacturer to sign executable code of the gaming application on behalf of the gaming machine manufacturer,

the certificate authority configured to delegate authority to sign the executable code to a code signing authority, on behalf of the gaming machine manufacturer,

the code signing authority configured to

receive authorization from the certificate authority and

sign the executable code of the gaming application on behalf of the gaming machine manufacturer; and

an electronic gaming machine comprising a read only BIOS chip and a public key of a code signing certificate authority embedded within the BIOS chip, wherein the gaming machine is configured to execute BIOS instructions of the read only BIOS chip, the BIOS instructions configured to;

check the validity of the public key of the code signing certificate authority;

bypass terminate operation of the gaming machine after determining that the public key of the code signing authority is valid and trusted;

check game code with the public key of the code signing authority after determining that the public key is valid and trusted;

check the authenticity of an operating system of the gaming machine;

terminate operation of the gaming machine after determining that the authenticity of the operating system is not authentic; and

cause the gaming machine to execute the operating system after determining that the authenticity of the operating system is authentic.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the gaming machine further comprises a key of a gaming machine manufacturer supplied legacy application within the read only BIOS chip.

3. The system of claim 1, wherein in order to replace or update a key, a dedicated hardware security module is removed and replaced.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the certificate authority is further configured to maintain a certificate revocation list.

5. The system of claim 4, wherein the gaming machine is configured to receive the certificate revocation list at the gaming machine over a network connection and maintain the certificate revocation list within a drive of the gaming machine.

6. The system of claim 4, wherein the gaming machine is configured to check the revocation list and determining whether a permission to sign using said second key has been revoked.

7. The system of claim 1, wherein the gaming machine comprises the operating system within a drive of the gaming machine, and wherein the gaming machine comprises a key of the gaming machine manufacturer within the read only BIOS chip.

8. The system of claim 7, wherein the BIOS instructions are configured to verify a signature of the operating system with the gaming machine manufacturer key stored within the read only BIOS chip.

9. The system of claim 1, wherein the electronic gaming machine is configured to validate that the permission of the certificate authority is not revoked by:

sending an online certificate status request to the certificate authority over the network;

receiving an online certificate status response; and

verifying the online certificate status response.

10. A method of verifying gaming software for use in a gaming machine, the gaming machine including a read only BIOS chip and a public key of a code signing certificate authority embedded within the BIOS chip, the code signing certificate authority being authorized by a certificate authority to sign executable code on behalf of a gaming machine manufacturer, the method comprising:

checking, by a processor the gaming machine, the validity of the public key of the code signing authority;

bypassing, by the processor, terminate operation of the gaming machine after determining that the public key of the code signing authority is valid and trusted;

checking, by the processor, game code with the public key of the code signing authority after determining that the public key is valid and trusted;

checking, by the processor, the authenticity of an operating system of the gaming machine;

terminating, by the processor, operation of the gaming machine after determining that the authenticity of the operating system is not authentic; and

causing, by the processor, the gaming machine to execute the operating system after determining the authenticity of the operating system is authentic.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the certificate authority is configured to maintain a certificate revocation list.

12. The method of claim 11, further comprising:

receiving the certificate revocation list at the gaming machine over a network connection; and

maintaining the certificate revocation list within a drive of the gaming machine.

13. The method of claim 11, further comprising checking the revocation list to determine whether a permission to sign using said second key has been revoked.

14. The method of claim 10, wherein the gaming machine comprises the operating system within a drive of the gaming machine, and wherein the gaming machine comprises a key of the gaming machine manufacturer within the read only BIOS chip.

15. The method of claim 14, further comprising verifying, by the processor, a signature of the operating system with the gaming machine manufacturer key stored within the read only BIOS chip.

16. The method of claim 10, further comprising validating that the permission of the certificate authority is not revoked by:

sending an online certificate status request to the certificate authority over the network;

receiving an online certificate status response; and

verifying the online certificate status response.

17. A non-transitory computer-readable media having computer-executable instructions embodied therein that when executed by a processor of a gaming machine cause the gaming machine to perform operations to verify gaming software for use in the gaming machine, the gaming machine including a read only BIOS chip and a public key of a code signing certificate authority embedded within the BIOS chip, the code signing certificate authority being authorized by a certificate authority to sign executable code on behalf of a gaming machine manufacturer, the operations comprising:

check the validity of the public key of the code signing authority;

bypass terminate operation of the gaming machine after determining the public key of the code signing authority is valid and trusted;

check game code with the public key of the code signing authority after determining the public key is valid and trusted;

check the authenticity of an operating system of the gaming machine;

terminate operation of the gaming machine after determining the authenticity of the operating system is not authentic; and

cause the gaming machine to execute the operating system after determining the authenticity of the operating system is authentic.

18. The media of claim 17, wherein the certificate authority is configured to maintain a certificate revocation list.

19. The media of claim 18, wherein the operations further comprise:

receive the certificate revocation list at the gaming machine over a network connection; and

maintain the certificate revocation list within a drive of the gaming machine.

20. The media of claim 18, wherein the operations further comprise check the revocation list to determine whether a permission to sign using said second key has been revoked.

21. The media of claim 17, wherein the gaming machine comprises the operating system within a drive of the gaming machine, and wherein the gaming machine comprises a key of the gaming machine manufacturer within the read only BIOS chip.

22. The media of claim 21, wherein the operations further comprise verify a signature of the operating system with the gaming machine manufacturer key stored within the read only BIOS chip.

23. The media of claim 17, wherein the operations further comprise validate that the permission of the certificate authority is not revoked by:

sending an online certificate status request to the certificate authority over the network;

receiving an online certificate status response; and

verifying the online certificate status response.