Methods and systems for securely uploading files onto aircraft

• US 9,602,509 B2
• Filed: 09/02/2014
• Issued: 03/21/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 02/18/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Honeywell International Inc.
• Original Assignee: Honeywell International Inc.
• Inventors: Johnson, Daniel P., Nutaro, Joseph
• Primary Examiner(s): Gee, Jason K.
• Assistant Examiner(s): Ullah, Sharif E
• Application Number:
  US14/475,258
• Publication Number:
  US 20150033015A1
• Time in Patent Office: 931 Days
• Field of Search: 726/26, 726/2, 726/21, 726/36, 713/150, 713/163, 713/181, 380/255, 380/264, 380/276
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/64 Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/445 Program loading or initiating bootstrapping G06F9/4401; security arrangements for program loading or initiating G06F21/57
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0876 based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC

Abstract

Embodiments described herein provide for a system for verifying integrity of files uplinked to a remote vehicle. The system is configured to receive a first message authentication code (MAC) for the uplinked file, a first acknowledgement MAC for the MAC, and a first cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for the first MAC and the acknowledgement MAC. The system is also configured to compute a second MAC from the uplinked file, a second acknowledgement MAC from the second MAC and a second CRC from the second MAC and second acknowledgement MAC. Integrity of the uplinked file is verified by comparing the first CRC with the second CRC. If integrity of the uplinked file is confirmed, the uplinked file is accepted. If integrity of the uplinked file is not confirmed, the uplinked file is rejected.

Claims

1. A system for verifying integrity of files uplinked to a remote vehicle, the system comprising:

a communication system onboard the remote vehicle, the communication system configured to receive an uplinked file;

at least one processor onboard the remote vehicle coupled to the communication system; and

at least one storage device coupled to the at least one processor, the at least one storage device including processor executable instructions which, when executed by the at least one processor, implement data checking functionality to;

receive a first message authentication code for the uplinked file, a first acknowledgement message authentication code for the message authentication code, and a first cyclic redundancy check for the first message authentication code and the acknowledgement message authentication code;

compute a second message authentication code from the uplinked file by deriving a value from a first keyed hash function on the uplinked file and a first secret key, a second acknowledgement message authentication code from the second message authentication code by deriving a value from one of the first keyed hash function or another keyed hash function on the message authentication code and one of the first secret key or another secret key, and a second cyclic redundancy check from the second message authentication code and second acknowledgement message authentication code;

verify integrity of the uplinked file by comparing the first cyclic redundancy check with the second cyclic redundancy check;

if integrity of the uplinked file is confirmed, accept the uplinked file; and

if integrity of the uplinked file is not confirmed, reject the uplinked file.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the remote vehicle is an aircraft avionics system onboard an aircraft.

3. The system of claim 1, wherein verifying integrity of the uplinked file using the security file includes validating the uplinked file by comparing the second acknowledgement message authentication code against the first acknowledgement message authentication code.

4. A system for verifying integrity of files uplinked to a remote vehicle, the system comprising:

a communication system onboard the remote vehicle, the communication system configured to receive an uplinked file;

at least one processor onboard the remote vehicle coupled to the communication system; and

at least one storage device coupled to the at least one processor, the at least one storage device including processor executable instructions which, when executed by the at least one processor, implement data checking functionality to;

receive a first message authentication code for the uplinked file, a first acknowledgement message authentication code for the message authentication code, and a first cyclic redundancy check for the first message authentication code and the acknowledgement message authentication code;

compute a second message authentication code from the uplinked file by deriving a value from a first keyed hash function on the uplinked file and a first secret key, a second acknowledgement message authentication code from the second message authentication code by deriving a value from one of the first keyed hash function or another keyed hash function on the message authentication code and one of the first secret key or another secret key, and a second cyclic redundancy check from the second message authentication code and second acknowledgement message authentication code;

verify integrity of the uplinked file by comparing the second acknowledgement message authentication code against the first acknowledgement message authentication code;

if integrity of the uplinked file is confirmed, accept the uplinked file; and

if integrity of the uplinked file is not confirmed, reject the uplinked file.

5. The system of claim 4, wherein the remote vehicle is an aircraft avionics system onboard an aircraft.

6. The system of claim 4, wherein verifying integrity of the uplinked file using the security file includes validating the uplinked file by comparing the first cyclic redundancy check with the second cyclic redundancy check.

7. A system for transmitting files to a remote vehicle, the system comprising:

a communication system at a ground unit;

at least one processor coupled to the communication system; and

at least one storage device coupled to the at least one processor, the at least one storage device including processor executable instructions which, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to;

obtain a file for transmittal from the ground unit to a remote vehicle;

calculate a message authentication code from the file by deriving a value from a first keyed hash function on the uplinked file and a first secret key, an acknowledgement message authentication code for the message authentication code by deriving a value from one of the first keyed hash function or another keyed hash function on the message authentication code and one of the first secret key or another secret key, and a cyclic redundancy check for the message authentication code and the acknowledgement message authentication code;

uplink the file for transmittal to the remote vehicle; and

uplink the message authentication code, acknowledgement message authentication code for the message authentication code, and the cyclic redundancy check for the message authentication code and the acknowledgement message authentication code with the file for transmittal to the remote vehicle.

8. The system of claim 7, wherein the remote vehicle is an aircraft avionics system onboard an aircraft.

9. The system of claim 7, wherein the instructions cause the at least one processor to transmit uplink transmissions through one or more alternate communications channels.